



UNITED STATES ARMY

# COMBAT FORCES

*Journal*

JULY 1954 50¢

The combat experienced  
soldier must take the  
lead in developing  
Army organization and  
tactics for a time of  
atomic plenty

## One Hundred and Seventy-Nine Years of U.S. Infantry

### *To the Members of the Infantry of the United States Army*

THE 179th anniversary of the establishment of the Infantry is an occasion to honor the American Infantryman.

IN land war the Infantryman plays a valiant, essential role. Upon his courage, skill, and resolute spirit rests the final outcome of the effort to close with and defeat the enemy. In World War II and in Korea, no less than in the many previous wars our Nation has fought, the Infantryman has borne the major burden on the battlefield and has reaped the decisive results. The advent of modern weapons has increased the Infantry soldier's capabilities and placed greater demands upon his physical stamina and his spiritual dedication. In any test of the future, he will continue to be an indispensable instrument of victory.

I SPEAK for all your comrades in the Army in expressing to each member of the Infantry our deep pride in your achievements and abilities and our abiding confidence in your devotion to your Service and your Nation.

M. B. RIDGWAY  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

15 June 1775 • 15 June 1954



Overhauling the motor of a giant Marine Corps helicopter used to hasten troop movements.

## ON THE JOB... not "on the way"

When military operations call for the services of skilled technicians like this helicopter mechanic, the need is often immediate. That's why they're flown from one important assignment to another, via the Scheduled Airlines, that get them "on the job" *five times faster* than slow surface travel! It's sound economy, too. The Scheduled Airlines save the military millions of vital man-hours — which, in turn, saves millions in pay and per diem dollars. So, next time you're moving one man or many, call a Scheduled Airlines representative — compare the costs — the speed — *the dependability of Scheduled flight* with any other means of travel!

### NEW LOWER INSURANCE RATES AVAILABLE ONLY ON SCHEDULED CERTIFICATED AIRLINES

Due to the consistent safety record of these Airlines, insurance rates have been reduced as follows:

\$50,000 now costs only \$2.00  
\$37,500 now costs only \$1.50  
\$25,000 now costs only \$1.00  
\$12,500 now costs only \$.50

Policies cover Stateside and much Foreign travel — personal or official.

### 10% DISCOUNT

for official travel on TR's . . . covers Full Service.

Saving the Military Millions of Vital Man Hours with Dependable, On-Time, *Scheduled Service* . . .



## THE *Scheduled Certificated Airlines* OF THE U.S.A.

ALASKA AIRLINES  
ALLEGHENY AIRLINES  
AMERICAN AIRLINES  
BONANZA AIR LINES  
BRANIFF AIRWAYS  
CAPITAL AIRLINES  
CENTRAL AIRLINES  
COLONIAL AIRLINES  
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES

DELTA-C & S AIR LINES  
EASTERN AIR LINES  
FRONTIER AIRLINES  
LAKE CENTRAL AIRLINES  
MACKAY AIRLINES  
MOHAWK AIRLINES  
NATIONAL AIRLINES  
NEW YORK AIRWAYS

NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES  
NORTHEAST AIRLINES  
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES  
OZARK AIR LINES  
PACIFIC NORTHERN AIRLINES  
PIEDMONT AIRLINES  
PIONEER AIR LINES  
RESORT AIRLINES

SOUTHERN AIRWAYS  
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS  
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS  
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES  
UNITED AIR LINES  
WEST COAST AIRLINES  
WESTERN AIR LINES  
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

# UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT FORCES *Journal*

Vol. 4, No. 12

July 1954

United States Army Combat Forces Journal is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1954, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in *Combat Forces Journal* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors.

ONE of the prime qualities of a good editorial staff is the power to visualize a future issue of the magazine in terms of raw, unedited copy, deadline and issue dates, and a limiting budget.

Those who read the JOURNAL critically will understand that your publication strives to present its material in an attractive form. A look at the masthead will reveal the absence of an Art Editor; this is one more detail handled by the editor himself.

All of this preamble is by way of telling you that Gil Walker, one of our more frequent illustrators, recently received a Medal for Distinctive Merit at the Washington Art Directors' Show—and the medal was awarded for the illustrations accompanying "And They Marched, Every One," by Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Randle, which appeared in our issue of September, 1953.

Finding competent military illustrators is a difficult chore; so many good artists know so little about the military that Sam Browne belts are likely to appear in illustrations that purport to illuminate happenings in late World War II. Gil Walker is a former soldier who also worked as a civilian artist for the Office of Public Information, Department of the Army. He has the happy combination of artistic talent and military know-how. More of his work appears in this issue with Colonel Rigg's piece on how to defeat Red armor.

A couple of other artists who do good work for us are George Warfel, who served in the Army Air Forces during World War II, and Stuart Freeman, now a free-lancer but formerly an artist in the Department of State. Neither has won a prize in the last few months that we know of, but both of them turn out prize-winning work for us right along.

Gil Walker won the medal—but the staff visualized General Randle's fine piece as one that was especially suited to Mr. Walker's talents. That's part of the teamwork that brings you a fresh, readable, informative JOURNAL each month.

THE PUBLISHER.

PUBLISHER  
Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

EDITOR  
John B. Spore

BUSINESS MANAGER  
Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

CONSULTING EDITORS  
Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, USA-Ret (OrdC)

Maj. Orville C. Shirey, Inf-USAR

Assistants  
N. J. Anthony, Esther E. Bennett, Mary F. Grant, Martha J. O'Brien

Membership and Circulation  
D. A. Mulloy, Manager

Doris Montgomery, Assistant

## COVER

Design by Stuart Freeman

## THE CURRENT SCENE

To the U. S. Infantry on its 179th Anniversary

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway **Cover 2**

Time of Atomic Plenty ..... Lt. Col. H. A. DeWeerd **11**

Life of a Jaycock ..... **15**

The Cold Objective Look ..... Col. Shillelagh **41**

A Line Officer Looks at Ordnance ..... Col. S. Legree **44**

## MEN AND METHODS

D Plus Ten Years ..... Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley **23**

Lament for a Skulker ..... Col. Frederick Bernays Wiener **33**

Career Management and Your Future. No. 11: Military Missions and  
MAAG ..... **48**

## TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Design for the Defeat of Red Armor ..... Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg **16**

Patrols in Korea ..... Lt. David Abshire **20**

## AT HOME AND ABROAD

Around the Bases: Berlin ..... Maj. Marco Polo **30**

## DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Mail ..... **4** The Month's Reading ..... **28**

Front and Center ..... **9** The Word from the Schools **46**

The Month's Books ..... **49**

One year \$5.00; two years \$9.00 when paid in advance; three years \$12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army \$3.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions \$6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, Combat Forces Journal, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

## ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVES

San Francisco Office  
Duncan A. Scott Company  
Mills Building  
San Francisco, Calif.  
Garfield 1-7950

New York Office  
55 West 55th Street  
New York 19, New York  
Judson 6-4099

Los Angeles Office  
2978 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, Calif.  
Dunkerque 8-4151

Advertising rates furnished upon request to any of the advertising offices.





## The Cessna "Bird Dog" is a Pack Horse, Too!



Supplying small Army units by air is a tough, dangerous job frequently assigned to Army aviators flying Cessna L-19's. These rugged airplanes can carry and drop up to 500 lbs. of food, clothing, ammunition, weapons and medical supplies. In serving the needs of 7 basic Army branches, they also supply many *intangibles* . . . "eyes" for the Infantry and Artillery, better communications for the Signal Corps, traffic control for the M.P.'s, fast transportation for field commanders and V. I. P.'s. In combat, in camp, L-19's have proved their ability to take it. Cessna has been delivering them to U. S. armed forces *on schedule* for 4 years.

### Easiest to Service

Even in zero temperatures, under punishing field conditions, all-metal Cessna L-19's are easy to service, require less maintenance than any other airplane used by the Army!



### Help 'on the Wing'

Supply packs, snapped to the wings of waiting L-19's are on their way to distant troops *in seconds*! Other uses of these versatile army airplanes: wire laying, flare dropping, aerial photography, insect spraying, courier work. L-19's are also used by U. S. Marines, the Army National Guard and are available to state governments for emergency use.

CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, WICHITA, KANSAS

## ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950

U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

### PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

### OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to esprit de corps and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

### INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

### OFFICERS

#### PRESIDENT

LT. GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER, USA (Inf)

#### VICE PRESIDENT

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT N. YOUNG, USA (Inf)

#### SECRETARY

COL. ARTHUR SYMONS, Arty-USAR

#### ASSISTANT SECRETARY

COL. ROBERT F. COCKLIN, Arty-NGUS

#### TREASURER

MARGUERITE MATTISON

#### ASSISTANT TREASURER

N. J. ANTHONY

### EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

For the term ending June 1954

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM H. ABENDROTH, NGUS (Armor)

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE C. STEWART, USA (Inf)

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT C. LIEBER, USA (CE)

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES, USAR (Armor)

COL. CHARLES W. MCCARTHY, Inf-USA

COL. CHARLES A. H. THOMSON, Inf-USAR

VACANCY

For the term ending June 1955

MAJ. GEN. EGBERT F. BULLENE, USA-Ret (CmlC)

MAJ. GEN. JAMES C. FRY, USA (Inf)

COL. DENNIS MOORE, Inf-USA

COL. JOHN LEMP, Arty-USAR

COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON, JR., Arty-USA

LT. COL. FRANCIS X. BRADLEY, Arty-USA

VACANCY

For the term ending June 1956

LT. GEN. WILLISTON B. PALMER, USA (Arty)

MAJ. GEN. ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU, USA (Armor)

MAJ. GEN. HARRY MCK. ROPER, USA (Arty)

BRIG. GEN. VICTOR A. CONRAD, USA (SigC)

COL. CAROL V. CADWELL, MPC-USAR

CAPT. JOHN H. BOLTON, JR., CE-NGUS

VACANCY

## The Month's Mail

### Thanks

To the Editors:

Your March issue is certainly full of thought. In particular, the Baldwin-Norman-Millis series is very provocative.

One thing about being in Korea—we gobble up all such magazines that we can get.

COL. JOHN D. BYRNE.

24th Division Artillery

APO 24, San Francisco, Calif.

### Inaccurate Rifles

To the Editors:

I was pleased to read Captain Straight Shooter's article on inaccurate rifles and worn muzzles [May issue]. But I was certainly greatly surprised to read the reply from the Ordnance Corps. I thought everyone realized that a worn muzzle would lead to inaccurate shooting.

A rifle will shoot fairly well even though the barrel is badly worn, providing that the last several inches at the muzzle end are still in good condition. It is common practice in all gun shops to cut several inches from the end of a barrel that has a worn muzzle, and recrown it.

The gas pressure in the barrel of a .30-06, at the time that the bullet leaves, is about 7000 pounds per square inch. When the muzzle of the rifle is square and true and crowned properly, this great burst of gas will escape uniformly around the base of the bullet just as the bullet clears the muzzle, and thus the bullet will fly straight upon its course. Now if a person forms the habit of holding in the same general manner each time he cleans it the muzzle will be worn unevenly as well as oversize. Then, when fired, and just as the bullet is about to leave the muzzle, this great pressure of gas pushes past the bullet on the worn side of the muzzle, exerting an uneven pressure upon the base of the bullet as it leaves and causing the bullet to fly off at a slight angle.

If a rifle has a good barrel, properly bedded and tightly breeched, and everything is uniform from shot to shot, then that rifle will shoot accurately. In fact, if these items are uniform from shot to shot, you may even cut the muzzle of the rifle off at an angle and the group of bullets will continue to stay small.

However, with factory ammunition everything is not uniform from shot to shot. The weight of both the bullet and the powder charge may vary several grains, the intensity of the primer flash will not be the same each shot, and each cartridge case will not fit the chamber the same or have the same interior capacity. Thus the pressure, pushing the bullet up the barrel, will also vary, and as it bursts out from the worn, no longer concentric muzzle, will tip the bullet a different amount each time, causing inaccuracy.

I, of course, agree with the Ordnance Corps when they say that such rifle deficiencies as metal fouling in the bore, improper bedding of the stock, bent barrels, pitted bores, etc., will cause inaccuracy but someone is sure missing the boat when they make a statement such as, "these investigations failed to establish a correlation between eccentric muzzle wear and inaccuracy."

LEIGHTON L. BAKER.

The A. W. Peterson Gun Shop  
Mount Dora, Fla.

To the Editors:

Inaccurate rifles surely do make inaccurate shooters. I am not sure what the Ordnance answer means by "accuracy" in its explanation, but many smart people have made a lot of tests which prove that worn muzzles certainly don't help accuracy.

However, other factors enter into the case. When an M1 has a worn muzzle, it may also need a few other attentions, such as melting down for scrap iron. The 37th Division was issued a fine line of clunkers when it was federalized. Many defects were of the order that recruits could detect them with the naked eye.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Busted gas cylinder locks, self-adjusting sights, wobbly piston surfaces, worn cylinders, and what have you. They averaged out as accurate as a *Pravda* travelogue about the U.S.A.

I cannot go along with Straight Shooter's idea about the thong. If a cleaning chain of the German type is used, OK, but why use that worthless piece of cheap string which so often busts in the center of the bore? A rod is necessary to ram out obstructions. Attachment of a rod section to each rifle, as almost every other nation does, would take care of that. The issue thong is inexpensive but has no other virtues.

One item that the best rifle can't fix is that we are blessed with large amounts of war production mild steel jacketed ammo. The early lots of this were made without change from the specs of the gilding metal jacketed rounds, and as a result, "issued from the bore unchanged," as an *American Rifleman* contributor who helped make them once wrote. I recently fired a couple of groups with some 1941 Western issue M2 ball, and with 1943 St. Louis M2 with steel jacket. The wide shots came from the 1943 stuff, the 1941 ammo went into the V ring at 100 yards. I am a reasonably good shot. At 300 yards I would have been able to keep the 1943 stuff on the target frame only. Until we get rid of this old stuff each John could draw a National Match rifle and he still couldn't group inside a gymnasium.

JOHN P. CONLON.

52 Columbia Street  
Newark, Ohio

#### ORO Replies

To the Editors:

The letter by Lt. Col. Douglas Lindsey [May issue] referred to our work ["The Human Price of Combat"—March issue] as "the poorest example . . . of front line research in Korea . . . I know of."

His position as Chief of Operations, Medical Section, Eighth Army, should have permitted him to become acquainted with all of the facts concerning the work of the stress research team in Korea. He was most helpful in solving the myriad problems that faced the team when it first arrived. Nevertheless, it is clear from his letter that he is not in possession of the pertinent facts concerning the actual work of the team.

The statement in his letter that we were "many miles behind the front" in a "concrete-floor, running water laboratory" implies that we were therefore unable to do our job—to record responses to stress. It should be pointed out that the concrete-floor laboratory was erected at the 8063 MASH at Colonel Lindsey's suggestion. The reasons were: (1) the availability of material assistance, (2) the housing of our WAVE officers, and, (3) Colonel Lindsey's desire to have a concrete-floor tropical shell available for the Medical Section's neurosurgical team upon our departure. We had originally asked for two squad tents erected

at a site to which we could transport samples of blood and urine rapidly enough to prevent spoilage. Actually, some of the analyses (in samples not subject to deterioration) were performed in Tokyo, in California, and in Massachusetts. The significance or validity of our analyses of these samples is in no way dependent upon the danger to which the analysts might incidentally be exposed.

Colonel Lindsey's implication is emphasized further by the statement "a few of the members of the team ventured up to stable positions and did a little work on patrols. . . . When fighting broke out and real stress was present, the team was in Japan . . ." The scientists on the team did not go to Korea to assist in the combat there, but rather to determine what happens to men physiologically and psychologically as a result of having been in combat. The original plan for our work in Korea was to study patrols. There were two reasons for this: (1) That was about the only activity taking place when our plans were made, and (2) since patrols varied in severity of action, it would provide a convenient scale of degree of stress. As it turned out, however, we were able to take measures on groups of men from two companies involved in Operation Showdown. This was the action in which the 7th Division took and held the Triangle Ridge

area with the help of the ROKs on their right flank. We measured 24 men from Able Company of one of the regiments in the division. This company led the initial attack. It took 70 per cent casualties in the 18 hours it was engaged; only 5 of our original 24 men were not casualties. We increased the number of subjects to 20 by adding 15 men from the 60 remaining in the company. The company commander (one of our subjects) was recently awarded the Medal of Honor for his performance in this battle. Data such as we obtained from this company could not have been "obtained by studying a college ball team." The physiological changes measured have never been incurred from laboratory-induced stresses (including experiments on college ball teams). An authority in the field has declared: "These findings suggest an acute adrenal exhaustion in these subjects, which has never been demonstrated before in man."

The other stress group studied was a sample from George Company, of another regiment of the division which moved into positions on Pike's Peak after it had been taken in the first two days of fighting. It was on the hill five days, withstood three counterattacks, and almost continuous artillery fire. It suffered 10 per cent casualties in the five-day period. The third group studied was comprised of men from 3d



## AUTO INSURANCE

Now, for the first time, **GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS** offer immediate savings to 33 1/3% on complete coverage auto insurance from prevailing board rates in your state or territory. New low rates effective immediately. Join the thousands of policy holders enjoying protection against loss from bodily injury and property damage, liability, medical payments, accidental death, comprehensive personal liability, comprehensive fire and theft coverage, towing, and collision damage to your car. Why pay more when these new increased savings are passed on to you immediately? More than 600 claim representatives are ready to serve you in case of accident. Available to officers on active, reserve, or retired status, and first 3-graders who are at least 25 and married.

## HOUSEHOLD & PERSONAL PROPERTY

### NEW ALL-RISK COVERAGE

Make sure your valuable personal property is covered by insurance regardless of where you may be in the world. This new policy gives you maximum protection at savings up to 33 1/3% and is written with you and your possessions in mind. Protects clothing, furniture, jewelry, household goods and other valuable personal effects. Act now! Mail coupon today!



## GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

NOT AFFILIATED WITH U.S. GOV'T.

GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS 4  
CROCKETT AND PRESA STS. SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

NAME .....  
ADDRESS .....  
AGE ..... RANK ..... MARRIED ..... SINGLE .....  
CAR DESCRIPTION ..... ANNUAL MILEAGE .....  
BUSINESS USE ..... AGES OF DRIVERS .....  
☐ AUTO IN U. S. ☐ AUTO OVERSEAS ☐ PERSONAL PROPERTY



## CHANGING STATION?

Don't forget to notify us of your change in address. Simply send your name, old address and new one to:

Circulation Manager  
Combat Forces Journal  
1529 18th St., N.W.  
Washington 6, D. C.



## ★ the Fatigue Cap that never shows Fatigue!

And No Wonder! It keeps you looking sharp on the toughest duty! Stands any abuse. Collapse it, step on it, sit on it—it springs right back into shape—no extra stiffeners required.


- **WON'T WRINKLE**
- **WON'T SAG.**
- Wind resistant, water repellent.
- Can be dry cleaned.
- **Ask for it at your P. X.** If not available, order by mail. Sent prepaid anywhere in the world.

**ONLY \$2.00** postpaid

Specify  
#8590 with inside ear flap  
#8593 without flap

**Be Sure—Specify your size**

Write for Quantity Prices



\*Patent applied for.

Division occupying positions on the MLR, near White Horse. It provided our control data. In addition, we obtained measures on a few psychiatric casualties. Contrary to Colonel Lindsey's letter, the team returned to Japan after the Triangle Hill action had subsided, and not before.

Colonel Lindsey states that the work of the team was "superficial, uncoordinated, and unproductive." In answer, I would like to quote from three evaluations of our preliminary report (ORO-T-41 [FEC]), prepared by the Office of the Surgeon General, FEC:

(1) "A study of the physiological and psychological aspects of combat stress in the infantryman is considered a most appropriate and worthwhile project. The concept of this problem appears to have been well developed. The plan of attack was obviously well organized. The method used in carrying out this plan appears to be in line with the most up-to-date medical thinking."

(2) "The conclusions and recommendations are concurred in. It is considered this study is a very worthwhile application of scientific principles and techniques to the combat situation."

(3) "This particular research team is to be congratulated on getting out a report very expeditiously. This office was impressed by the high caliber of the members of the team and their thoroughly businesslike approach." It does not appear that there is universal feeling that the stress team was a "superficial, uncoordinated, and unproductive outfit."

Colonel Lindsey seems to have confused an overly popularized science article with the serious efforts of a competent research team and its reports. Certainly they cannot intelligently be classified as "claptrap 'science' stuff."

It is regrettable that Colonel Lindsey saw fit to criticize the efforts of the team so harshly . . .

STANLEY W. DAVIS.

Operations Analyst  
Operations Research Office  
The Johns Hopkins University  
Chevy Chase, Md.

## Sell Education, Too

To the Editors:

Congratulations to Major Harry W. Morse on his letter, "Sell 'em Hard" [May issue].

I am the Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Joliet Township High School, Joliet, Ill., an organization anyone would be well proud of.

The ROTC program here, in addition to teaching the cadets the instruction required by the Army Training Program, has such organizations as: Officers' Club, NCO Club, Rifle Team, Crack Drill Team, and so forth. Also, we sponsor every drive for the needy put on by the institution. We get a terrific amount of publicity in all newspapers which keeps us always in the public eye, and the school faculty is behind the ROTC program 100 per cent.

Our idea as to how to sell the Armed Services to these young men is similar to Major Morse's, but one very important thing must not be forgotten, especially in high school: *education*. The cadets should be indoctrinated with the importance of education constantly, as well as selling the Army. All students should be encouraged to continue their education, by either going to college or after entering the service, taking certain courses through the education program offered by services.

CAPT. WALTER W. MCCREARY.  
PMST, Joliet Township High School.  
Joliet, Ill.

## Applicant

AN AIR FORCE REGULAR CAPTAIN (TEMPORARY MAJOR IN JUNE), AGE 35, HEALTH EXCELLENT, GROUND OFFICER (GLASSES) WHO CAN QUOTE S. L. A. MARSHALL, TRUSCOTT, AND GAVIN, WHO LIKES TO COMMAND, BUT NOT BEING A PILOT IS FOREVER RELEGATED TO COMMAND NON-TACTICAL UNITS IN THE USAF HAS TOYED WITH RESIGNING HIS COMMISSION TO BECOME A RACE TRACK TOUT TO GET OUTDOOR WORK, BUT THINKS THE GROUND FIGHTER WILL ALWAYS BE NEEDED, PERHAPS SOON AGAIN, WANTS TO KNOW IF HE COULD TRANSFER TO U. S. ARMY AS CAPTAIN (TO GAIN COMPANY EXPERIENCE) IN COMBAT INFANTRY OR ARMORED UNIT.

IS AN INTER-SERVICE TRANSFER POSSIBLE, OR MUST I RESIGN MY REGULAR AF COMMISSION TO GET AN ARMY RESERVE COMMISSION?


CAPTAIN, USAF.

APO 942, Seattle, Wash.

- NO PRESENT METHOD TO TRANSFER FROM USAF TO USA EXISTS. IF YOU RESIGN FROM USAF PROBABLY BE ABLE TO GET USAR COMMISSION BUT NO POSSIBILITY OF

**California's  
MONTEREY PENINSULA  
COUNTRY CLUB offers**

**CHOICE HOME  
SITES**




**EASY TERMS.** As an officer, you qualify for special purchase privileges. Also, you can start payments while still on active duty, at reduced rates.

**A FULL LIFE.** Your site will be adjacent to the spacious Club, with its congenial facilities, golf course, bathing pool, and tennis courts. Many Club members are retired officers.

This beautiful, outdoor community is close to Fort Ord, Monterey Presidio, and the Naval Postgraduate School. There is no finer place to live. Investigate today.

**FREE BOOKLET**

Handsome illustrated booklet gives full particulars. For your copy, write:  
**DEL MONTE PROPERTIES COMPANY**  
Box M-2, Pebble Beach, California







### The Army Does "Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard"

At Fort Eustis, Boy and Girl Scouts from Philadelphia and Fort Eustis embark on the BARC for a James River voyage (see letter below). And at Fort Belvoir, the Engineers, in

the person of Sergeant First Class Martin A. Sorrel, "sell" a couple of young Alexandrians by showing them how to operate the controls of an Army bulldozer.

BEING CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY AT PRESENT AS ARMY OVER-STRENGTH IN CAPTAINS. YOU WILL BE NEEDED ONE OF THESE DAYS SO RECOMMEND YOU KEEP YOUR BLUE SUIT ON. RACE TRACK TOUTS ARE LESS WELL DRESSED.

THE EDITORS.

#### BARC Riders

To the Editors:

"Catch 'em Young—and Sell 'em Hard" in the March issue posed the query "Who, besides soldiers, have ridden in the BARC?"

We here at Fort Eustis have an answer to the specific question, although in all honesty, I must admit that your article stimulated a specific reply.

On 16 April thirty-four Boy Scouts from Philadelphia Troop 241, accompanied by an equal number of Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts from Fort Eustis, Troops 45 and 49 respectively, were taken on a James River voyage aboard the BARC (see cut). The trip, a part of our continuing program to orient our citizens on the work of the Army with particular emphasis on the Transportation Corps, lasted over one hour. The visit of the Scouts was our own idea but, based on your dig, however, we made a special effort to give the Scouts a ride in the BARC.

In addition to "catching 'em young," we feel confident we sold these youngsters hard. During the time they were our guests they slept three nights in one of our new barracks and ate "chow" in a field mess.

The troop toured Colonial Williamsburg and spent a half-day at Langley Air Force Base. On their last full day here, they were shown the operating intricacies of steam and diesel locomotives and the repair shops of the Fort Eustis rail system. Army helicopters and planes were demonstrated and

explained to the group. The scouts were shown through ocean-going vessels and harbor craft belonging to the Army, and a deep-sea diving exhibition by Fort Eustis soldiers was witnessed by them.

When Philadelphia's Boy Scout Troop 241 left Fort Eustis in their chartered bus, they were tired, happy, knew a great deal more about the Army and expressed enthusiasm for an action-packed two days.

And they had ridden on the BARC.

BRIG. GEN. F. S. BESSON, JR.  
Commanding General  
Transportation Training Command  
Fort Eustis, Va.

● We're lucky! Not only can we reproduce the photo General Besson sent us, but another one, from Fort Belvoir, showing that it also can "catch 'em young—and sell 'em hard." The Editors are now convinced, not only that the editorial note in the March issue was less well informed than it might have been, but that our readers are quick to catch us in such lapses!

#### Bunker Bombs

To the Editors:

This is in reference to comment by Sgt. Robert M. Lauth in the May issue.

The M1 ammo tin container was used in the construction of the bunker bomb as well as caliber .50 and .30 ammo boxes. The 1st Marine Division used the No. 10 can for the same purpose by punching a hole in the middle of the lid that had been removed, inserting the white phosphorus grenade, and then soldering this assembly onto the can body. Napalm was introduced by a separate hole. The round can was extremely adaptable to rolling into enemy bunkers or for rolling down the slopes from friendly positions onto attacking enemy

troops. However, when it came to producing a large number of bunker bombs, it was found that the caliber .30 preferably, or caliber .50 ammo box were available in larger numbers and were more easily adapted to the purpose.

Reference Sgt. Lauth's second point: He is correct again. However, this was corrected, that is, the WP grenade was moved and fastened to the top lid so that the infantryman could carry and keep his hand on the safety lever of the grenade. This method proved to be preferred and did add a measure of control and safety to the user.

Another use of the bunker bomb was to place it in front of friendly positions with trip wires attached. The enemy in approaching would trip off the charge which caused casualties or created a back-lighting effect which at night allowed more effective use of infantry direct fire weapons. The bunker bomb was also valuable behind the enemy lines if placed for trip wire effect on roads.

LT. COL. WALTER L. MILLER, JR.  
730 Conowingo Rd.  
Bel Air, Md.

#### 37th Division History

To the Editors:

Next-of-kin of 37th Division veterans of World War II may obtain a history of the famous division in which their loved ones served if they send their name, address, relationship, and also the name and outfit of the man to our address. The history will be sent with the compliments of the 37th Division Veterans Association.


FRANK WALKER.

37th Division Veterans Association  
5620 Brinsted Ave.  
Dayton 9, Ohio

# ***SUPERIORITY...***



**THUNDERFLASH**



**THUNDERSTREAK**



**THUNDERJET**




**THUNDERBOLT**

For more than a decade Republic has designed and built a succession of Thunder-craft fighters and fighter bombers for the U.S.A.F. which have proven without peer. >> The mighty THUNDERBOLT of World War II established a proud record in combat as the sturdiest, deadliest "work horse" of its time . . . the

THUNDERJET which earned its fame as a fighter bomber during the Korean War is maintaining its own fine position of leadership with our Air Force and our allies in NATO.

>> The new THUNDERSTREAK, now in service, and the THUNDERFLASH, its photo-reconnaissance counterpart, with an entirely new range of speeds and effectiveness emphasize that each product of Republic's know-how maintains superiority of performance in its field.

**REPUBLIC AVIATION**



FARMINGDALE, LONG ISLAND N. Y.

*Builders of the Incomparable* **THUNDER-CRAFT**

# Front And Center

The high cost of helicopter maintenance has the Army worried. How costly maintenance is was stressed recently by Colonel William B. Bunker, Assistant Chief of Transportation for Army Aviation. He said that the original cost of an Army helicopter has to be duplicated in three and one-half years to buy spare parts for it. This, he observed, is a pretty high price to pay for a replacement for an Army truck that can be driven for twenty years without spending the equivalent of its original cost for parts. Today's "helicopters are being equipped, manned, and, we hope, designed to operate 100 hours a month," he said. Yet "A truck which this thing is supposed to replace, can . . . run 100 hours a week." Observing that engineers are speaking of building bigger and more high performance aircraft, Colonel Bunker warned them that "dependability, availability and economy must be undertaken today, in this era, or there will be no point at all in designing larger and more high performing, better aircraft, that nobody can afford to operate."

*It is quite evident that cynical Washingtonians and the ubiquitous tourists still love a parade. Thirty-five hundred persons showed up at Fort Myer, across the Potomac from Washington, on the first Sunday—23 May—of the renewal of the pre-war tradition of a parade during retreat. On the second Sunday an estimated 7,000 jammed the post to watch the 3d Infantry and to hear the Army Band.*

Some pre- and post-Korea Rangers (who are also paratroopers) don't like the new requirement that all new Regular Army second lieutenants of Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Corps of Engineers and Signal Corps now must complete either the Ranger or the Airborne course. Their objection is that Rangers and paratroopers have always been volunteers and this fact was largely responsible for the high esprit of Rangers and troopers. The proudest of them say that they think the mandatory requirement may not only destroy the high spirits of the breed, but may also result in a gradual lowering of the quality of the training.

*If we may utter a platitude, the purpose of a re-enlistment allowance is to encourage a soldier to re-enlist. That*

*obviously is the purpose of the present effort to raise the re-up allowances. If he does a little figuring the soldier who remembers the pre-World War II Army may wonder about the degree of encouragement. The proposed bonus isn't as large percentage-wise as his increase in base pay (about 90 percent), or the high*

*cost of living, since the 1930s. In those days noncoms in the first three grades drew a re-enlistment allowance of \$50 for each year served and other enlisted grades drew \$25. Assuming a soldier in those days was a corporal or sergeant at the end of his first three-year hitch (the normal period then) he would draw a bonus of \$75 upon re-enlistment. If during the next three years he got into the first three grades and stayed in them for the rest of his career he would be paid a bonus of \$150 each time he re-enlisted after a three-year hitch. There would be eight of these periods in a thirty-year career for a total of \$1,200 which added to the \$75 would give him a total of \$1,275. If the re-up bonus today was 90 per cent greater than it was in the 1930s, a soldier with a similar record would stand to receive about \$2,400 during a thirty-year career. But the new proposal would limit him to about \$1,800.*

## REUNIONS

The information listed here was furnished by officers of the various associations. For further information we suggest you write directly to the organization in which you are interested.

**30th Infantry Division.** DeSoto Hotel, Savannah, Ga. 1-3 July. For details write: Box 1919, Savannah, Ga.

**25th Infantry Division,** Fifth Annual Reunion. Hotel Sherman, Chicago, Ill. 2-4 July. For details write: Lt. Col. G. W. Master, Secretary, PO Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

**94th Infantry Division.** Hotel Sheraton Gibson, Cincinnati, Ohio. 8-11 July. For details write: Francis P. Burke, First National Bank Building, Covington, Ky.

**9th Infantry Division.** Hotel New Yorker, New York, N. Y. 29-31 July. For details write: Stanley Cohen, National Secretary, Box 428, Jersey City, N. J.

**484th Engineer Construction Battalion.** VFW Home, York Pa. 30-31 July. For details write: Harry Becker, R.F.D. 8, York, Pa.

**4th Infantry Division.** Hotel Alexandria, Los Angeles, Calif. 5-8 August. For details write: Lewis W. Smith, Reunion Chairman, 4517 Marmion Way, Los Angeles 65, Calif.

**1st Infantry Division.** Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C. 20-22 August. For details write: Society of the First Division, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

**7th Armored Division.** Statler Hotel, Detroit, Mich. 27-29 August. For details write: Reunion Comm., 7th Armd. Div. Assoc., c/o Hotel Statler, Detroit, Mich.

**37th Infantry Division.** Morrison Hotel, Chicago, Ill. 4-6 September. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 1101 Wyandotte Building, 21 West Broad St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

The Army expects to have a pretty full schedule of field exercises in fiscal '55. Present plans, subject to change, call for these ten exercises:

Green Hill, Camp Carson, Colo., Sept.-Oct., 8th Inf. Div.

Hail Storm, Camp Carson, Colo., Jan.-Mar., 10th Inf. Div.

Snow Bird, Alaska, Jan.-Feb., RCT from 11th A/B Div.

Surf Board, West Coast, Feb.-Mar., RCT from 44th Inf. Div.

Blue Bolt I, Fort Hood, Tex., March, III Corps and others.

Fire Ball, Fort Bragg, N. C., April, XVIII A/B Corps and others.

High Tide, Little Creek, Va., May, 47th Inf. Div.

Blue Bolt II, Fort Hood, Tex., May, armored units.

Apple Jack, Yakima, Wash., May, 44th Inf. Div.

Jungle Jim, Panama, May-June, Units from 11th A/B Div. and others.

*The striking difference between the household shipping allowances of military and Foreign Service officers shows the inequity in the present limitations. For example, a general officer of the Army with large official responsibilities is limited to 9,000 pounds of household goods when he makes an official change of station, while a young \$4,000-a-year Foreign Service officer has an allowance of 10,000 pounds.*



# Where can you get **DIVIDENDS** exceeding \*40%?



• United Services Automobile Association was organized in 1922 to provide low-cost automobile and household-personal effects insurance for Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Armed Forces.

• USAA is the oldest automobile insurance company exclusively serving officers in the U. S. Armed Forces.

• USAA is under the direction and management of active and retired officers of the Armed Services. Thus, USAA understands the insurance problems of officers; is better able to serve them.

• USAA operates in the United States, its possessions, territories; Canada, Cuba, Canal Zone, Japan; certain U. S. military bases in the Pacific, in the Philippines and in Western Continental Europe.

• Claims are settled promptly even in the most out-of-the-way places.

• No matter whether you're stateside, overseas or on orders, USAA is as close as your nearest mailbox, telephone or telegraph office. Your USAA insurance becomes effective as of postmarked time of application, unless a later date is specified.



Our new home now under construction  
Ready late 1955

Because United Services Automobile Association is a non-profit organization, wherein officers of the Armed Services pool insurance funds for their mutual protection, unusual savings are made possible.

Substantial savings have always been returned to officer-members of the USAA during all of the Association's 32 years.

During 1953, 180,000 officers insured by USAA shared in dividends of \$4,300,000—an increase of more than \$1,000,000 above 1952.

Did you get in on these tremendous savings?

When you insure today, be sure it's with USAA.

Enjoy the best of automobile and household-personal effects insurance at the lowest possible cost by preparing now to participate in future dividend distributions by the USAA.

For additional information on how USAA can serve you . . . and save you money, fill in coupon and mail it today.

\* Last year (1953) USAA policyholders received 20% initial discount from the manual premium and a 30% dividend at end of policy year—resulting in a 44% saving. In Texas, where initial discount is prohibited, a 44% dividend on manual rates was returned at end of policy year.



## United Services

### AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION

Dept. G1. 1400 E. Grayson Street • San Antonio 8, Texas

☐ Send information on Insurance covering household effects. ☐ Send information on automobile insurance based on following data:

Car Year	Make	Model	Body Type	Pass. Cap.	Serial Number	Motor No.	No. Cyls.
Factory Price	Cost	Purchase Date	New/Used	Current Car License Year	State	Name in which car legally registered	

Is the automobile customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation?

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work?

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way?

How many operators under age 25? \_\_\_\_\_

Age of each: \_\_\_\_\_

Are any of the operators under 25 owners or principal operators of the automobile?

\_\_\_\_\_

Name & Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Military Address \_\_\_\_\_

If car not at above address, give location of car \_\_\_\_\_


If any of the operators under 25 are owners, or principal operators, of the automobile,

(a) are all such operators married? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) do all such operators have legal custody of a child resident in the household? \_\_\_\_\_



Out of its vast reservoir of battle experience the Army must develop combat organization and doctrines for a



## Time of Atomic Plenty

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. A. DE WEERD**

It is almost nine years since the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki announced an impending revolution in war methods. It was clear from the start that this was no ordinary development. The atomic bomb, as Captain Cyril Falls observed, was a virtually "complete" weapon when it arrived. Four years later, Major General James M. Gavin wrote: "if an H-bomb is developed and A-bombs become available for tactical employment, we should realize *now* that this will radically revolutionize land warfare." Gordon Dean of the Atomic Energy Commission pointed out in 1951 that "our fundamental concepts of what atomic warfare is and what it might mean to us must undergo revolutionary change." Speaking before the Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953, President Eisenhower said that "the United States stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all the bombs and all the shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theater of war through all the years of World War II." He added that "in size and variety the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable."

For better or for worse the Air Force developed a weapons

system and doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons in strategic air war in the years after 1945. This was no mystery; its pros and cons were debated with conspicuous frankness in the B-36 and the MacArthur hearings. We have had no such detailed revelation of the reaction of the Army to the "revolution" which seemed to have been pending in its organization, equipment, and doctrine since 1945.

I do not mean to imply that the Defense Department has been slow to concern itself with the problems of atomic weapons and ground warfare. We have abundant grounds for assurance that it has been about its business with promptness and energy. The results of its work are not always visible, for it is not in the national interest that all aspects of our weapons systems and strategies be discussed in unclassified publications. But there is an area in the field of doctrine and organization in which no amount of free discussion can benefit the enemy. It is in this field that we cannot rely entirely on the operations analyst and scientist, valuable as their contributions may be. There is a tremendous reservoir of practical experience in the officer corps of the Army. These men have a great deal to contribute, for sound doctrine and organization can be achieved only

---

LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. A. DEWEERD, USAR (*inactive*) is a member of the staff of the Rand Corporation. A former associate editor of *Infantry Journal*, Colonel DeWeerd has been an occasional contributor to this magazine for 25 years. He is the author of *Great Soldiers of World War I*, *Great Soldiers of World War II*, and other books including the co-authorship of *World War II: A Concise History*. Before going to the Rand Corporation he was Professor of History at the University of Missouri. He was educated in Michigan and also studied at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J.

## **We will have tactical atomic weapons, but will we have the forces and the doctrine?**

through the give and take of open discussion between men with different experiences and skills. It is the purpose of this article to stimulate this kind of discussion.

**I**N an article in the February issue of **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**, remarkable for its clarity and insight, Lloyd Norman called attention to the dangers and weaknesses of a national policy which emphasizes air atomic power at the expense of ground and sea forces. Some readers may feel that he should have gone farther in stressing the implications which the "massive retaliation" policy may have in the day when the Soviet Union has relatively equal air atomic capability. But it is not enough merely to set forth the perils of present trends without systematically considering alternative strategies and policies and without offering some idea of the weapons systems which are to implement them. One must do more than warn against concluding that "ground fighting is now outmoded" or that "machines can never really replace men on the battlefield." Sooner or later one must deal with the 64-dollar question: *What preparations have been and are being made to prepare the ground forces for employment in the day of atomic plenty?*

Mr. Norman's article gives his opinion of the timetable involved. He writes that in 1950, five years after Hiroshima, "Army planners realized that atomic weapons and guided missiles would change the nature of future warfare." Then, later in his article, he suggests that it may be 1958 or 1960 "before the atomic-age infantry will appear." In other words a fifteen-year delay may have to be envisaged between the advent of atomic weapons and the appearance of atomic-age infantry. If this is to be the case, when may we expect to have a doctrine for the effective employment of these forces and atomic weapons in ground operations?

In the March issue of **COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**, Walter Millis questions the wisdom of basing national policies and strategy primarily on atomic weapons. He warns that they cannot be considered as fully "conventional" ground weapons until we can reduce the artillery, armor and infantry components which heretofore provided the main sources of fire, shock and staying power. He questions the wisdom of hurrying atomic weapons into tactical use by suggesting that in a

period of Soviet inferiority in *numbers* of atomic weapons, their use by our side in the ground defense of Western Europe or some other vital area, may force the Soviet Union to reply by expending their smaller stockpile on American cities. Thus he fears that an attempt to confine atomic weapons to the battlefield may merely insure bringing them onto our cities. By stressing the belief that in an atomic war that saw the use of both air and ground forces, we might need more, not fewer soldiers, Mr. Millis sees a confirmation of the value to the Soviet state of its advantage in manpower numbers.

Mr. Millis's thought-provoking article forces these questions: Unless it is able to employ an atomic ground capability against a Soviet invasion by conventional or atomic ground forces, especially at a time when the Soviet Union holds over the heads of Europe and America the blackmail threat of atomic attacks on our cities, how is the West to defend itself?

If the American capability for waging strategic air war with atomic weapons has exerted a powerful deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, may we not assume that a ground atomic capability would add to this deterrence?

Atomic weapons, like the airplane and the weather, are here to stay. If we do not develop a ground atomic capability, we run the risk that in time the Soviet Union may do so. If we judge by their ideology, objectives, and past methods, this application of atomic energy to war purposes would be "doing what comes naturally." In the face of this development, of what use would mere numbers of soldiers and conventional weapons be?

**A**FTER the advent of atomic weapons, one should have anticipated that our military press would be full of articles exploring the implications of this development. This has hardly been the case. Perhaps the Korean war, with its exclusive use of conventional weapons, has diverted attention away from the tactical employment of atomic weapons, and so added several years to the time lag involved in the transfer to advanced weapons. If that is the case, it may turn out to be the greatest gain the Communists will draw from the Korean war. Be that as it may, the fact remains that comparatively few articles have been written by military men on the tactical employment of atomic weapons. Why is this? Why have Army officers in particular been slow to make their views and opinions

known?

As Professor I. B. Holley, Jr. has written:

Even the most cursory survey of military history substantiates the premise that superior weapons give their users an advantage favoring victory. A somewhat closer study of military history shows that new and more effective weapons have generally been adopted slowly in spite of their obvious advantages. Since the character of modern weapons is such that their production as well as their use can dislocate whole economies, it is probably not too much to suggest that the survival of entire cultures may hinge upon an ability to perfect superior weapons and exploit them fully.

In order for a weapon to attain its maximum effectiveness military leaders must recognize its capabilities and potentialities, forces must be adapted to employ it, and a doctrine must be developed regarding its use. It would appear that although we have or will have atomic weapons for tactical employment, we lack forces adapted to their use and a doctrine covering their use. Here is where the active participation of all soldiers is needed.

There are many understandable reasons why soldiers have been reluctant to "go out on a limb" with forecasts of how atomic weapons will be used in tactical operations. Since no one *knows* what war will actually be like under these conditions, the soldier runs a certain amount of risk that his views may look bad in retrospect. In earlier days one could offer official secrecy about atomic weapons as an excuse for inaction, but that is hardly possible now. Enough literature is available and unclassified to get at the essentials. To judge by the statements of President Eisenhower and Gordon Dean, the day of atomic plenty is dawning if not already here. Therefore no officer can at present pretend that he does not have enough "facts" on hand to begin a study of the effects of atomic weapons on ground force operations.

**T**HE few books and articles written by ground force officers on this subject in the period from 1945-1954 show that the authors have assumed that very few atomic weapons would be available for tactical operations after the requirements of strategic air operations were met. This may have encouraged soldiers to look upon atomic weapons as just another limited addition to an already large arsenal

## Rhetoric will not alter the great technological revolution in advanced weapons

at their disposal—and not as a weapon which might itself revolutionize ground warfare. It may account for what on the surface appears to be an effort to fit atomic weapons into existing ground force organization and doctrine with a minimum dislocation. This is the traditional way of armed forces with new weapons and accounts at least in part for the astonishing time lag which has accompanied the exploitation of new weapons in the past.

In the period of transition from high explosives to atomic weapons, there is a great danger these new weapons will be farmed out to existing organizations with the public assuming that this constitutes preparing for atomic war. One suspects the emergence of a strange hermaphrodite creature, half HE and half atomic, having all the limitations of the former with only half the potentiality of the latter.

Rather than trying to save as much as possible of existing institutions and organizations, it may be helpful for ground force officers to hammer out some kind of hard and detailed answers to questions of the following kind:

(1) How can targets be found and attacked with atomic weapons by ground force organizations with the minimum delay?

(2) What is the most advantageous size for a self-contained combat unit which can utilize atomic weapons in a ground campaign?

(3) What kind of specialized training will be required and what kind of command structure can control the operation of many of these units when widely dispersed or in rapid movement?

THE limitations of a less drastic approach to the problem are illustrated in *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*, written by Colonels G. C. Reinhardt and W. R. Kintner. While these officers deserve highest praise for their pioneer effort in this field, their book suffers under the handicap of assuming that the next war will be fought by regiments, battalions, and divisions of World War II type, and that the Army may use a few atomic weapons now and then as weapons of opportunity along with conventional types. The Colonels pay some attention to the need for dispersion, concealment and mobility, but when the chips are down, they speak primarily in terms of World War II experience. In their efforts to reassure Army readers that the problems of atomic war can be

mastered, the authors may have unintentionally conveyed a misleading impression of the survival possibilities under atomic attack of ground force organizations employing World War II numbers, tactics, weapons and logistics. They have also, perhaps unwittingly, helped to strengthen the existing impression that atomic weapons are and will continue to be low powered, very expensive, limited in numbers, and difficult to obtain.

The framework in which Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner foresee the application of atomic weapons to ground force operations is one in which they will be used to perform tasks which cannot be handled effectively by conventional weapons. The supply will be too limited and these weapons will be too "valuable for expenditure on area targets or blanket interdiction." Need is seen for specially-trained forces to service and deliver the weapons but our main reliance must be placed on "many divisions backed by adequate tactical air power." Then, in a rather astonishing follow-up, it is insisted that these "divisions must possess the mobility of command, and the organization and training to survive hostile atomic attacks." How is this to be achieved? Certainly not by giving our "divisions" discipline and mobility at least equal to that of the elite divisions of World War II.

Even if it were possible for an old-fashioned division to survive in the day of atomic scarcity—which is open to doubt—their use on the battlefield in the day of atomic plenty would seem to invite disaster. One can only hope that Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner will try their hands at writing a new book based on the assumption that atomic weapons will be plentiful enough in the future to fight through an entire ground campaign without relying in any important way on HE for fire and shock power. Such an effort might lead to the conclusion that an entirely new type ground combat organization is required. It might also force them to work out a basic doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons in land warfare, not as weapons of opportunity, but as the main source of shock power, not as something to exploit the power of the infantry but as something whose power the infantry might exploit. It is worth pointing out that the British Defense Ministry's *White Paper*, issued early this year, speaks of employing conventional forces to exploit atomic and advanced weapons rather than the other way around.

When anyone gets to this point in a discussion of the implications of atomic weapons for the United States, Korea and Indochina are mentioned and there is an anvil chorus of objections all ending with the refrain: we can't afford to dismantle our conventional military organizations at this stage and rely on an untried weapons system. One could list these objections—and what I think are fairly convincing counter arguments, if space were available—but all this rhetoric will not alter the fact that a great technological revolution is pushing us in the direction of advanced weapons, whether we like it or not. We must consider the advantages as well as the risks involved. As for relying on "untried weapons," it is helpful to recall Bernard Brodie's observation that "all weapons are untried" as far as atomic warfare is concerned.

THERE are reasons to believe that the introduction of atomic weapons into ground force operations will offer advantages to the United States and to our Allies. We have shown in the past a remarkable aptitude for solving the engineering and logistical problems of modern war. We should be able to produce machines which would give small, well-trained atomic ground forces a mobility and radius of action undreamed of in World War II. Such ground forces could exert a fire or shock power dwarfing that of army groups in earlier days without being burdened by vast weights of high explosives. The mobility and radius of action which could be achieved by investing this saving in weight in new machines for transporting men and supplies cross-country should be enough to revolutionize war plans. If we free ourselves from dependence on roads, movement and surprise will be restored to the battlefield. Being specialists in confusion, we should not be the ones to worry if the old familiar war of lines disappears in the interaction of widely dispersed small units. We do not have to insist on wooden and rigid controls. We can trust our people!

SINCE no one knows what form and character ground combat operations will take in the day of atomic plenty, it is highly desirable that something be done to reduce the delay involved in finding out. In the absence of knowledge and lacking the resources of the operations analyst, one must begin by resorting to speculation. This speculative ef-



## Problems of tac air support cannot be solved until ground doctrines are known

fort might well be divided into two phases. In the first phase, an attempt should be made to establish the organizational requirements of a ground combat unit capable of employing atomic weapons and having in addition as many of the following capabilities as possible: (1) rapid movement across terrain; (2) air transportability, (3) maximum dispersion and radius of action; (4) operation in a flankless, frontless war; (5) expending its own atomic weapons with minimum delay on air and ground targets in its area; and (6) close cooperation with tactical air.

If all these capabilities cannot be built into a single new organization, and it is unlikely that they can, then the best compromise possible should be accepted. Once a combat unit designed exclusively for atomic operations has been devised, one can move to the second phase during which efforts should be made to play flankless and frontless campaigns in map exercises and war games in the environment of atomic plenty. If nothing else presents itself one could begin with Rommel's campaigns of November 1941 and June 1942 in the Western Desert. These exercises would show, I think, the need for a command structure which can keep track of a battle of confusion and which will allow decisions to expend atomic munitions to be made at the lowest echelon possible. They may also show

that a start on the tactical air support problem cannot be made until after the nature of the ground force atomic units and the doctrines governing their employment have been worked out.

Army officers should not be discouraged by the magnitude of the overall problem, frightening though it may seem. Fortunately there are limited segments of the overall problem which may be handled separately. Fortunately also they are in the general areas in which the United States has shown special skill in the past. If someone could, for example, devise a target acquisition and fire control system which would give our atomic combat units the capacity to bring their shock power to bear on a target area a few minutes faster than the enemy can, that alone might decide the outcome of a future campaign—or war. Similarly the perfection of a communications system which would be twenty percent more dependable, faster than that of the enemy, and impervious to counter measures, might have the same value. There is also the field of camouflage and concealment, together with provisions for misleading the enemy as to the location of our own units.

**L**ITTLE is to be gained by dealing with the atomic weapons problem as if it were the principal cause for inter-service rivalries. Nor is there much to be happy

about in dwelling on the limitations of an air atomic strategy, unless the organization, equipment, and doctrine exist for the effective employment of atomic weapons in tactical operations on the ground. Above all it is not helpful to imply that one strategy or arm of the service somehow is convinced that men are not important in war. Sir Winston Churchill, after a lifetime of study and participation in military matters, summed up the problem when, receiving the Chesney Gold Medal from the Royal United Service Institution in July 1950, he said:

You cannot help men who have had experience and handled matters, after ten or fifteen years of peace having rooted in their minds the strong impressions which they derived from the actual conduct of operations in the field. That is of the greatest value because, in the main, war consists of the same tunes played through the ages . . . But it is of the utmost consequence that, besides cherishing the fruits of experience, everyone's mind should be open to the ceaseless and almost baffling rapidity of the changes which science is introducing into the whole field of war, into every aspect of it . . .

Above all we have this intruder—the air, which has shoved its way in and continues to push forward in all directions . . . until a lot of people begin to think that there is only one pebble on the beach. That would be going too far because I am quite sure of this, that when all modern science has been exploited and employed, and when all the worst that can be done has been done in some terrible encounter, which pray God may never occur, but if it should be so, still the life of nations will depend on the spirit, the courage of their race and of their men and women . . . [This] will be the final decider of the life of nations, whether in a civilized or a barbaric world.

## Progress Is Not Inevitable

*We must adjust our military affairs to the progress of science. We must not make the error of employing the weapons of today, or of the future, under the tactics of a previous war. Obviously, the introduction of atomic and nuclear weapons is going to bring changes to land forces. Each step will take us closer and closer to the point of no return; that will call for a major political decision.*

*Change is inevitable. Progress is not inevitable. Progress depends on sound decisions, and then on action.*

*We must make a serious study of the shape of future war on land. It is little use to superimpose new weapons on World War II organizations, and then try to work out the tactical changes involved; this sort of approach to the problem is unprofitable.*

*Any suggestion that the introduction of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is not going to affect the organization of armies and the tactics of land warfare is nonsense. We must examine our armies, and their equipment, to see what changes are needed in an atomic age. . . .*

FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY

24 May 1945

**S**INCE nothing clarifies ideas more effectively than an attempt to set them forth in writing, it is to be hoped that a larger number of Army officers and men will express their ideas in print about the problems of ground atomic operations. That is the way that weapons, organization and doctrine have evolved in the past. As Mr. Norman correctly indicated: "the Army can offer no glittering promises in the dirty business of war," but it can speed the day when alternative atomic strategies and policies may be possible. It can do this best by analyzing the organization and doctrine of ground forces in the day of atomic plenty.



# Life of a Jaycock

Every man a VIP; every man an Honorary Doughboy

**T**HANKS to the good fortune of being able to renew an old friendship with Mr. Fred Seaton, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for legislation and public affairs, the editor of this magazine was recently rewarded (no other word seems to fit) with an invitation to be a member of the eighteenth Joint Civilian Orientation Conference and spent six busy days visiting four military and naval installations in the United States, preceded by a day of high-level briefing in the Pentagon.

For the hard-working soldier who seldom gets to look in on the activities at the highest levels of the military establishment, it should, perhaps, be explained that the impressively named Joint Civilian Orientation Conference (JCOC for short and rendered "Jaycock" in the vernacular) is equally impressive so far as its host and guests are concerned. The Secretary of Defense issues the invitations to American industrial, business and professional leaders. Eighteen orientation conferences have been held since 1948 when the late James Forrestal, then Secretary of Defense, adapted a Navy program to inter-service use. Altogether about a thousand Americans have been "jaycocked" and presumably each displays in his rumpus room or office certificates attesting that he is an "Honorary Doughboy" in the Army, a "Jet Jockey" in the Air Force, an "Honorary Twirlie" in a Marine helicopter squadron, and a "Carrier Observer" in the Navy. As you can see, the benefits of membership are also impressive.

Briefly, the purpose of the JCOC is to orient civilian leaders on the problems and progress of the military establishment. It is primarily a public relations function and a good one. I have assurance of that from the President of the Public Relations Society of America who has called it "one of the most efficient public relations instruments I have ever had the opportunity to observe in action." As it happened, the gentleman who made this statement—Mr. Frederic Bowes, Jr. of Pitney-Bowes, Inc.—was a member of the eighteenth JCOC and I observed that he was one of the most active, inquisitive and perceptive of the sixty of us. I should say that his judgment was not lightly given.

**T**O get this report down to a working level, let me say here and now that the Army did itself proud. Fort Benning was the last stop and the Army had a job cut out for it as we were all quite full of orientation after five strenuous days: one at the Pentagon; most of one at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico (the rest of the day was spent in flying to Florida); one at the Naval Air Training Station, Pensacola; and two at the Air Force Proving Ground, Eglin AFB.

The Marines, the Navy and the Air Force were all fine hosts and each gave us something we shall long remember. But to me (and I think to most of us) Fort Benning was the most memorable visit.

**T**HE demonstrations at Fort Benning were remarkably well conducted and impressively staged. The briefing of the operations of The Infantry School and its work load were lucid and helpful to our understanding of the mission of Fort Benning. The airborne demonstrations, the explanation of infantry weapons and company organization, and two fire-power demonstrations—infantry-tank team in attack and a fire-power demonstration of a reinforced rifle company in defense at night—were superbly organized, narrated and staged. The night show, using all tracer ammunition, was a dramatic and explosive climax to the whole conference. But to me the most useful show of all was the demonstration of types of supporting fires staged by artillery elements assigned to The Infantry School. This well presented demonstration, plus the quite extensive display of armor, engineer, signal, chemical and other equipment, made the Benning show an all-Army demonstration. It was not confined to infantry.

But the most effective part of the Fort Benning performance was infantry and rightly so. Wherever we were at Benning we were not far away from a reminder that in the final analysis wars are won by men who are physically and mentally trained, disciplined and ready to lead Americans into ground combat under the Benning precept of "Follow Me." Whether it was at the official dinner where there was a deeply touching (but too long) tribute to the infantryman, at the OCS where many of the businessmen among us were greatly impressed by the very thorough personnel selection and testing procedures used in the OCS, or on the various ranges—the infantryman got his due.

One final touch may have been the clincher. This was a subtle one that gradually entered our consciousness. It was the continued, unescorted presence among us of General Meloy and his assistant commandant, General Fritzsche. They elected to tag along with us and hitch-hiked (if I may use an obviously inaccurate term) rides in our several busses, seemingly without design, but with one I am now confident.

The little things wherein the Army was revealed were, I think, all to the Army's credit. Hanson Baldwin will be delighted to hear that General Meloy not only had the band at Lawson Field to greet us, but drums and bugles playing martial music woke us each morning.

Such service differences as I or others may have noted were all minor and the one impression that I am sure was common to every member of the eighteenth Jaycock—I am sure of this because I heard it repeated over and over again—was of the high quality of men in the services. In the Pentagon and from Quantico to Benning we had unending association with alert, intelligent, decisive men. I can't remember seeing a potbelly from the time we left the Pentagon until we landed back at the MATS terminal in Washington eight days later.



The Reds outnumber us in men and armor, but if we mix ingenuity with mobility we can take their measure. Here are some of the ingredients of a

## DESIGN FOR THE DEFEAT OF RED ARMOR

**Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg**

ILLUSTRATED BY GIL WALKER

**I**f Red Armor should be unleashed, we can block, divert and finally defeat it by using new tactics and techniques at river barriers, by using helicopters to sow minefields, and by engaging in vertical envelopment to destroy armor and artillery behind his leading forces. More armor on our side would make the task easier. Tank for tank we are outnumbered, so the defeat of Communist armor can only partially be achieved by pitting armor against armor. It will be necessary for us to combine a variety of unique methods—each in itself not overly decisive—that in combination can destroy the Red armor.

New techniques and concepts are needed to properly exploit natural tank barriers. Rivers are conventionally defended from one bank or another but always the defense is parallel to the river. We should reorient river defense so as to include *on water* attacks, from upstream or downstream by the use of naval PT type boats and amphibian tanks. The latter's capabilities for maneuver and mobility are great compared to the landlocked Red tanks.

Naval PT boats can navigate the principal rivers of Europe, and being fast they are hard to hit. The PT boats should carry torpedoes and recoilless 105mm guns as well as caliber .50 machine guns. Torpedoes can be used to destroy bridges. Where the Reds establish a bridgehead and complete a span across it, these PT boats could be sent up or down stream for rapid torpedo attacks and quick getaway. These attacks can be

launched suddenly. Torpedoes can also be effective against underwater bridges.

Floating mines could be used more effectively in on-river attacks. These explosive packets should be developed to where they can become electronically guided, water missiles. Employed in great mass, and *air dropped* upstream at night they could be devastating to Red crossing attempts. Every effort must be made at river crossings and especially at bridges after Red armor has crossed. If the fuel and ammunition supply of armor is effectively cut off and kept cut off, we can expect tankers and SP gunners in our PW cages in a few days. It is cheaper to defeat a battalion of tanks by cutting off its supplies than it is by gunfire. Underwater demolition teams can also be used. We should develop methods of letting some armor across a river and then sealing up its supply source and isolating it; thus gradually chewing up the enemy's armor.

**L**AND mines can be laid on a large scale by helicopters, both in front of the enemy and in rear areas where reinforcements and reserves are centered. The heavy work of unloading and stringing the mines out over thousands of yards of terrain can be done more rapidly by helicopters which would fly low and drop mines through a slide or chute arrangement, leaving engineers or infantry on the ground to adjust them into the final pattern holes. The H-19 Sikorsky could be easily adapted to this purpose. Mines can be flown from supply points directly to the minefields in one operation. Each H-19 helicopter could carry 65 to 70 M6 mines or about 300 of the M7A1 antitank mines. With a round-trip mileage of 135 miles from supply point to minefield it is estimated that

two and one-half to three hours would be required for loading, flight forward, unloading, and return. Thus one helicopter could be expected to provide about 200 M6 mines, or 900 M7A1 mines per day at this distance. (M15 mines can also be sown. The weight of the M15 is greater than the M6). Fifty helicopters could deliver and sow a total of 10,000 M6 or 45,000 M7A1 mines in one day. If we used M6 mines we could plant a belt 1000 yards wide and almost seven mines deep. If we used M7A1 mines we could plant a 1000-yard belt 30 mines deep.

On-the-ground manpower requirements to dig the mines in and fuze them would have to be proportioned to the delivery rate for speed of final installation.

In the event of serious enemy armored thrust the creation of minefields must be considered on an extremely large scale. Helicopter delivery and sowing has great potential where speed is essential. Helicopters of greater capacity can spread mines in greater density.

Mines by the magnificent mile should be contemplated and should far exceed any past use. Our combat investment here is in easily manufactured material and not in human lives. When we need to use mines in large quantities we should hire thousands of laborers. The effect should not be halfhearted. The mine plans should envisage not only stopping Red armor but diverting it to points where our ground and air forces can destroy it.

**O**UR man power will never let us engage hostile armor on a frontal basis entirely. Our depth of resistance should be built forward into the enemy's zones

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, *Armor*, is an occasional contributor to this magazine and the author of the excellent *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, published a couple of years ago. He is now on duty in Germany.



as well as backward into our own. Furthermore, we should increase the mobility of our means over those of enemy armor. Deep attacks that are fast and sure are necessary, not only so as to present the enemy with the least profitable targets, but to preserve our own forces for a succession of deep-in strikes.

The main pressure and effort would have to be wrought by conventional forces in our main body. However, to supplement this effort it would be simple for us to design and employ mobile forces for deep-in use.

The helicopter is already contemplated for this, but the scale of employing helicopter-landed combat teams needs greater emphasis. Likewise the purpose and mission of deep-in forces must be as singular and objective as possible. Deep-in combat teams should be armed to destroy the enemy's *main might*: tanks and self-propelled guns.

For this purpose we should create Vertical Destruction Companies. Call them what you may, their mission would be the destruction of hostile armor at *night* when tanks are most vulnerable. Forty-eight-man companies with the principal armament of about twelve 3.5-inch rocket launchers and ammunition towed handily in golf-bag-like trailers could be helicopter landed (the Sikorsky XHR<sub>2</sub>S carries three jeeps or 26 men) at night to work against armored assembly and bivouac areas. Evacuate these units in early morning unless circumstances are extremely favorable to their daylight employment. These units would

not hold ground or establish defense areas. Their forte would lie in their ability to strike *night after night* in *all directions*. The multiplied and coordinated use of these Vertical Destruction Companies in enemy rear areas would account for many tanks and self-propelled guns and also divert the enemy's effort and attention. Several tanks destroyed at night mean several less tanks in combat the next day. Multiply this by many nights of destruction and you have attrition that becomes significant. The Vertical Destruction Companies can actually become targets of no opportunity (for the enemy) and the source of steady loss. The units should obviously be composed of volunteers. Actuarial rates for raider forces, tank hunters and parachutists are high. The rate can be greatly lowered for this new organizational breed of men, because they can (and should) count on daily evacuation, adequate rest during the day, and vigorous, daring reemployment again at night. Like the Air Force, they will come back to roost in some comfort. They will not always succeed but there is always another night! They should rarely see much of daylight. They will be attacking Red troops tired from daylight combat, and, if nothing more, they can tire these tankers by successive nights of unrest. Infrared sighting devices are necessary for these blackout operating companies whose main stock in trade will be mobility.

By holding Red armor up at river barriers we force it to telescope upon itself to some degree. It is against such con-

centrations that the Vertical Destruction Companies should operate. We could use 200 of these units in Europe.

**L**ACKING sufficient tanks to meet the Red masses it will be necessary for our artillery to deliberately engage hostile armor by direct fire in a proportion much greater than we have heretofore thought of or practiced. Artillery casualties will of necessity be higher than in previous conflicts, but in terms of the tank destruction that can be wrought we will have fewer casualties in the long run. Self-propelled artillery will have to forget its SP designation and act in a *direct assault role*—and be designated “assault artillery.” This is necessary because of our shortage of tanks and the Red technique of using their self-propelled guns in direct support of tanks.

Too little attention has been paid to the Red use of self-propelled artillery in direct support of tanks. By this technique the Reds bring tremendous firepower into play in their tank attacks. We have been too prone to count Red tanks and ignore the smashing impact of SU-85s, SU-100s and the JSU-122s and JSU-152s. At this date the SU-100 and the JSU-152 are the primary Red weapons of this category.

We did see a few obsolete SU-76s in Korea, but *nowhere* in combat have we seen the real Red tank and SU combination in action. The power of Red armor lies in the slugging support the SUs (in over-watching roles) give tanks. Red technique here is well developed for the SUs engage in direct fire, overrun,





ram and crush just like the tanks they follow. Their *shock* must be met with *shock* from our SP artillery.

**S**UPERB gunnery, most rapid and accurate, is the first requisite for our armored units. Our new range finders and our fire control instruments give us some advantage here. Mobility-wise we cannot claim any distinct advantage over the Communists. Here is where we need the most attention, especially in training.

Our armor commanders must concentrate on increasing the speed and mobility of units, experimenting with column organization, vehicle dispersion, SOPs, elimination of non-combat vehicles and other equipment so as to come up with maneuvering elements that can strike swiftly and destructively and then move to strike elsewhere the *same day*.

Red manuals are conspicuous for their omission of the "calculated risk doctrine" in the use of armor. This should be remembered as should also the fact that Soviet reactions in command actions on lower levels usually are not as swift as our own. Our forte for success lies in swift action, disconcerting moves and maneuvers, and a measure of calculated daring—but always, swift movement, for we cannot stand overlong and slug it out tube to tube from one direction.

Higher commanders can well consider that rapid and deceptive shifts of our armored elements in action will be the best way to project their destructive potential, insure it against atomic strikes and devour the effort and attention of Red forces. Our armor should rest the least and move the most.

**O**NE's crystal ball may be clouded or cracked, and the things-to-come department is an uncertain bureau at best. However, certain known facts about the past performance of Red armor suggest that we should watch for these weaknesses:

Lead tanks have a way of getting ahead of their infantry. This led the Germans to wait patiently while (limited) deep tank drives were made—and then mop up at night. The Reds finally caught on so they tank-mounted their infantry (a good target package for big guns). Today, the Red ratio of truck transport is still far behind ours. Infantry can be slow in coming.

Compared with our armored division, the ratio of infantry to tanks is very low in the Red tank division and only slightly higher in the mechanized division.

Communications-wise the Reds don't

yet measure up to us, except in telephones. This means their armor has a lower coordinated rate of shift than we have. Time can count, especially when we add the Malenkov factor of hesitation common to lower commanders who must query higher authority. One can gain tactical advantage here of 10 to 55 minutes! This is a big advantage, if exploited by rapid action.

Antiaircraft-wise Red armor is not the best protected even though Red tank generals are conscious of the need and seek more.

Make 'em maneuver, both to force fuel consumption of tanks and to get

broadside of Red armored formations. Red logistics, especially fuel resupply, are not as efficient and modern as ours.


As for rapid tank gunnery, Red tanks can be out-duelled on a mass basis, but a grave danger lies in the SUs behind the tanks.

In summary: Red armored blitz can be halted best by taking measure of their day's progress and then wading in deep to isolate their armor from logistical and infantry-artillery support for the next day. A multiple combination of measures must be employed in coordinated action. *Mobility*, over and above that of the Reds, can best insure success.



## Reflections on the PATROLS IN KOREA

**Lieutenant David Abshire**



**P**ATROLLING, always important in war, achieved unusual, and perhaps even unique, importance in the Korean war, especially in the static warfare of 1952-53. In those days patrols often were the main operational effort and patrol policies (and supervision) originated from division and corps.

In a more fluid war higher commanders and staffs would be unable to devote comparable time to such small operational efforts and so it cannot be said that such high-level attention to patrols will continue.

But patrols will still be important. There is always a great need for exact information about the enemy. And patrols, properly planned and conducted, are unsurpassed for this purpose.

It is important, therefore, to examine

the patrol actions of 1952-53 in Korea in light of some common sense principles, and see where, how, and why those principles were applied or violated. We will find, unfortunately, that they were violated more often than they were applied.

**Principle 1: Each patrol should be assigned a single mission, clearly stated.**

Too often this was forgotten, and the assignment came out something like this: "Recon the route for signs of enemy activity, screen suspected areas, and kill or capture any enemy sighted." The patrol leader is given no clear-cut guide to decision. Instead, he is given several missions and authorized to follow any one of several courses, with the result that the patrol will probably accomplish nothing unless the leader is a man of exceptional drive and intelligence.

Commanders who frequently complained of a lack of aggressiveness from patrol leaders might have found that ambiguous missions were a chief cause. Confusion is the rule in battle, and commanders and staff officers must not

compound it by failing to be explicit, certain, and simple.

As an example, suppose a regiment needs a prisoner. Then the patrol must be planned just for that purpose. The patrol leader is assigned the mission "to capture enemy personnel." Then, regardless of fire fights and casualties, of external pressure and confusion, the patrol leader knows his job and, knowing it, he will probably bring in a prisoner.

**Principle 2: Reconnaissance patrols must be small, mobile, and flexible.**

A friendly outpost had been overrun and counterattack plans were being made. The counterattacking company wanted to know: "In what strength does the enemy occupy those positions? What is he doing there?" But they never got the timely information they needed because patrols of ten, twelve, and fourteen men sent out to get it were easily detected and defeated by the enemy. Three men, using stealth, patience, deception, and cover of darkness, could have obtained that information. Yet three-men patrols were never dispatched because of policies

---

LIEUTENANT DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Infantry, is a 1951 graduate of the Military Academy. He saw service as a platoon leader, company commander, and division G2 operations officer in Korea. He is now aide to the Commanding General, Camp Gordon, Georgia.



that developed from the early days in Korea when the Communists ambushed large numbers of small UN patrols. These ambushes occurred when it was necessary to conserve our meager forces. Therefore, the practice was adopted of sending out much larger patrols. These stronger combat patrols could accomplish their mission of engaging the enemy but as *recon* patrols they were unsatisfactory. For a recon at night must use stealth to penetrate the enemy position, to see and hear without itself being seen or heard. Three men are quieter than a squad.

There are other disadvantages in using a combat patrol for reconnaissance. Men were taken from their positions on the MLR because only the rifle platoons had the manpower for such patrols. A large patrol created a larger target for mortar fire. Control was more difficult. Mobility and flexibility were reduced. The route of the cumbersome patrol was easily detected by small *enemy* recons of one, two, and three men.

It appears that in trying to minimize risks of ambush we incurred greater risks.

Obviously, increasing the size of a patrol is not the solution to dangers of ambush.

**Principle 3: To prevent itself from being ambushed, a recon patrol must rely on camouflage, stealth, supporting fires, suitable weather and darkness.**

This principle holds the key to safety from enemy ambush. Let's enlarge on it:

(1) Paradoxically, a small patrol often has considerable fire support—direct and indirect—from the MLR. This was especially the case in Korea in 1952 and 1953. Company OPs furnished a view of patrol routes. Company commanders had available not only battalion weapons, but also many sector weapons. Direct fire weapons for close support were especially important. Frequently five heavy machine guns, three caliber .50 machine guns, tanks, AA weapons, three 57mm rifles, and three 75mm rifles could be used.

(2) Smaller patrols would result in a smaller manpower drain, and the men in each company selected for patrols could receive special training.

(3) Night recons generally should leave friendly lines at dusk. The patrol can see the immediate surroundings where enemy might lurk, and still not be seen from the enemy MLR. At dusk, too, the enemy has not reached most of his ambush sites. Varying the times of departure from day to day looks well on the acetate at higher headquarters. But the risk of ambush is not reduced, for the enemy moves out early, and stays out until dawn.

(4) We know in advance many probable areas of enemy ambush, and sporadic harassing and interdiction fires should be placed on these areas to make them untenable to the enemy. Just before the patrol reaches these sites, MLR fire can hit the areas again.

(5) If a recon patrol is moving deep into enemy territory, or far from supporting units, then a patrol base should be established. This, of course, is a larger unit located on advantageous ground to furnish the same type of support the MLR fires furnish closer-in patrols. However, such a concept is entirely different from the "support group" which continually followed the recon element, and was widely used in Korea.

If these five factors had been applied to reduce ambush dangers, patrolling would have been more fruitful.

**Principle 4: Attempt to introduce surprise into every possible operation.**

Surprise begets confusion, and confusion does the worst damage to the

mind. But UN patrols too frequently neglected the element of surprise.

Suppose, for example, that a regiment had taken over a new sector. What pattern of patrolling was followed? Patrols initially were close in, then were gradually pushed out.

When these patrols first approached enemy outposts, they could find some of them napping. Then regiment would start planning a raid on the outpost. There would be more recons, each one finding the enemy increasingly alert. By the time the raid took place the enemy was ready for it.

Here is an illustration of proper use of surprise: It was a summer night on the eastern front and a friendly patrol was deep in Mungdun-ni Valley with enemy outposts on high ground and on both sides overlooking the valley. An enemy communications trench extended across the valley, and the friendly patrol was advancing eastward along it. Then contact was made, and a fire fight started by enemy approaching from the east.

At this, enemy on the high ground to the west immediately began descending the hill toward the rear of the friendly patrol. But a friendly machine gun team a hundred yards to the rear of the patrol set up to fire to the west cut loose. The enemy from the west were stunned and disorganized, not so much by the fire power of the machine gun as by its position and by the fact that they were not accustomed to UN patrols carrying that weapon in this particular sector.

Rifle grenades and rocket launchers can have the same or greater effect. Used at the right moment in a night fire fight, they introduce surprise and shock far out of proportion to their often inaccurate fire.

**Principle 5: Fire support is a matter of intricate coordination, cooperation, and foresight.**

Improper fire support coordination at the company level was a frequent event in Korea. For example, almost as a rule, the company commander had attached one or more sections of heavy machine guns and several 75mm recoilless rifles. Tanks were often under his operational control; quad .50s were available on continuous call. Including sector weapons, the company frequently had four or more additional caliber .50 machine guns. In a fluid situation, the company commander would not be responsible for so much fire coordination, but the fact remains that in Korea, he was responsible for it.

The following homemade list of fire support capabilities will give you an idea



of the complex fires that are often necessary to support a patrol:

(1) To soften an objective area by preparatory fires.

(2) To isolate by fire the ground around a patrol, and to neutralize vulnerable approaches to the patrol when it makes contact with the enemy.

(3) To furnish close continuous support to cover the advance of a raiding patrol.

(4) To cover the withdrawal of a patrol, and any evacuation necessary.

(5) To furnish counter battery and mortar suppression fires.

(6) To furnish harassing interdiction fires, diversionary fires, and to clear suspected ambush areas.

(7) To limit or neutralize enemy observation during daylight; to illuminate during the night.

It takes experience and a degree of imagination to apply these to the maximum. It also requires centralized direction. We talk about fire support coordination centers and coordinators at high levels. But we often forget that the same principle must be applied within the company. When a patrol makes enemy contact, one officer must coordinate all fires from the MLR. He must not himself adjust fire, or get involved in phone or radio transmissions. His sole duty is supervision.

**C**OMMUNICATIONS necessary to control the different weapons are equally important. Mortars and artillery present no problem; communications from OP to FDC are SOP. But this is not quite true of direct fire weapons. And perhaps that is why the great misfortune of the fire support in Korea was related to direct fire weapons.

With so many weapons under company control, the best solution was a direct fire direction wire and radio net, which included the 57 and 75 recoilless rifles, certain key caliber .50 machine guns, heavy caliber .30 machine guns, tanks, and quad .50s. With such a net all these weapons can be brought into use effectively and instantaneously. This net must be separate from the company administrative net.

Third, consider the fire-support plan. The success or failure of a patrol depends just as much on the supporting fires as on the actions of the patrol members. All fire-support crews should have a separate briefing in which the patrol plan, any preplanned sequence of fires, specific code designations for fires, designation of terrain features, definite targets, rates of fire, and missions for each weapon are discussed.

#### **Principle 6: Sustained, well-aimed fire counts—especially in rugged terrain.**

The time was shortly after daylight in eastern Korea. A combat patrol divided into two groups moved up the steep slopes approaching an enemy outpost. The close-in fire support to soften and neutralize the objective had not been effective. The alerted enemy started throwing grenades and satchel charges down on the patrol. The first group began to direct wild, uncontrolled fire toward the enemy trenches. It accomplished nothing. Two men in the second group started firing single, well-aimed shots from the top of the outpost trench line. This fire had an immediate effect on the enemy.

What about a night fire fight? Even then, sustained, well-aimed shots alone produce success. For it has not been an uncommon occurrence to have both enemy and UN troops fire over each other's heads at night. Automatic weapons climb when fired from the hip. And at night

the soldier cannot realize just how high he is firing. Likewise, how many of our men know, and are thankful for the high, erratic firing of the enemy burp gun? Once again sustained, accurate fire counts!

Suppose a night patrol is ambushed? The first five seconds usually determine the result. If the friendly forces fire wild and high they may spare a crouching, close-by opponent. Furthermore, the initial fire of the enemy is often to distract and mislead a patrol, so that it is exposed in another direction. The predesignated plan of returning fire in event of ambush must therefore encompass specific directions of fire assigned each patrol member. Patrol members will then be able to sweep the entire area, thus disorganizing all enemy elements lurking nearby. Wild, heavy fire alone will not be effective.

#### **Principle 7: Weather and terrain between the line of departure and the objective can make a patrol ineffective.**

A patrol moved out toward an enemy outpost on a snowy December night. The slopes were steep and icy; the route was long, rough, circuitous, selected so that the patrol could approach the outpost from an unsuspected direction. As the patrol slid and waded along, men slipped, fell, crouched—and cursed aloud. Ordinarily the patrol leader had a strong hold over his men, but not that night. Two hours later, as the patrol neared the objective, noise discipline was so poor that the patrol leader established a perimeter. Then he and the scout proceeded. He suddenly sighted two enemy, unaware of his presence. He raised his carbine to fire, and tried to press the trigger. His finger did not move. He removed his mitten and tried again. No result. The cold had taken its toll.

In spite of bad weather and rough routes, grease pencils will glide easily over ridges and draws on acetate maps. But staff planners must beware. The route would have been excellent in the summer. Not so in the winter. For patrols must reach their objective with the strength and energy to accomplish the missions.

\* \* \* \*

**O**BVIOUSLY these comments are far from conclusive. The backdrop is the Korean conflict in 1952 and 1953. Not a typical war, to be sure. But these principles are so basic that they will again be applicable, even though the scene, motives, and nature of a new war may be different.

#### **Corrections**

The staff hopes it isn't coming apart at the seams despite the horrible evidence in the form of editorial and typographical errors that we have committed in the past couple of months. We hereby rectify the worst of them as best we can and beg the indulgence of our readers.

In "Where Can We Get the Fighting Men?" by Major Irvin M. Kent, the first paragraph, second column, page 35, of the May issue should have read: "In times of war or general mobilization the probable increase in pension liability of the government because of the induction of what was hitherto considered substandard personnel is NOT a valid consideration when weighed against the necessity for combat replacements." We regret that the unintentional dropping of the negative completely altered Major Kent's position.

In the June issue we committed these crimes:

We used the word Coldstreams instead of Coldstream Guards at one place in Major Paget's article. We hasten to assure his Colonel that the mistake was ours and not Major Paget's! He also called us up short for calling the Guards' "scarlet tunics" blouses. Again we're sorry.

We unaccountably botched up the by-line of Lt. Col. John B. Gibbons, Jr. This is an unforgivable error and we shall carry the shame to our final resting place.



Life photos. Copyright Time, Inc.

The author (*left*) and Major General R. O. Barton on Normandy in 1944

# D PLUS TEN YEARS

A participant reflects on the great events of ten years ago when General Eisenhower carried out his orders to "enter the continent of Europe . . ."

**MAJOR GENERAL  
H. W. BLAKELEY**

**E**ARLY in the afternoon of 6 June 1944 in Normandy, three senior officers of the 4th Infantry Division—Maj. Gen. R. O. Barton and two brigadiers, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and I—caught up with the colonel of the regiment which had made the assault landing on Utah Beach. He was pushing his battalions forward, contact with the Germans was close, and the situation was far from clear. It is doubtful that he appreciated having three generals breathing down his neck for the next half hour. However, he survived it, and went

---

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, retired, was the Artillery Commander of the 4th Infantry Division at the time of the invasion. He later became commander of the Division and led it through the remainder of the campaigns in northern Europe. He lives in Washington and is a regular contributor to this and other magazines.

This view of one of the Allied beaches was made on 9 June—three days after the assault was launched



on to wear four stars and command the Eighth Army in Korea. His name was James A. Van Fleet.

Van Fleet was only one of the notable cast of characters for the D-day show. A young major general who had parachuted into Normandy in the dark of the previous night spent the day trying to collect his widely-scattered 101st Airborne Division. He was Maxwell Taylor who now commands the Eighth Army. His artillery commander, one Anthony C. McAuliffe, had also arrived by parachute. He now commands the Seventh Army, and sometimes regrets that he ever said "Nuts!" The commander of the other airborne division, the 82d, was Matthew Ridgway, now the Army's Chief of Staff. His assistant commander was James Gavin, now General Ridgway's G3. And about to come ashore was a corps commander whose future also included four stars and the title of Chief of Staff—J. Lawton Collins.

The complexity of the planning of the greatest amphibious operation in history was obscured at the time by the need of secrecy until the invasion was an accomplished fact and by the rapid flow of headline news afterward. Of the more than two million soldiers, sailors, and airmen eventually involved in the operation none was more entitled to ulcers than Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan of the British Army. From March 1943 until General Eisenhower arrived to take over as Supreme Commander in January of 1944, Morgan was COSSAC—Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Com-

mander (designate). His basic trouble was that there was no Supreme Allied Commander, either in fact or "designate." That meant not only that he had no commander to turn to for decisions on literally thousands of important matters, but that there was no one in a position to fight effectively for the additional troops, landing craft, airplanes, and munitions which he believed, correctly, were needed for a successful invasion.

With General Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander came a statement of his mission: "You will enter the continent of Europe and . . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." D-day was to be in May. With a commander at the helm, however, it became possible to urge successfully that the number of troops should be increased, the area of the attack widened. D-day was postponed to 5 June.

The final plan provided for assaults on five beaches—three British (Sword, Juno, and Gold) and two American (Omaha and Utah), plus three airborne division drops—one British behind Sword Beach, and two American behind Utah Beach.

**T**HE 4th Infantry Division was scheduled for Utah Beach, and we were soon busy with a series of landing exercises. In one, surprisingly, the Division suffered its first casualties, when German torpedo boats got through to our convoy and sank two ships. The Division also captured its first prisoner during this exercise when an enemy pilot para-

chuted down from his burning plane. Another exercise was named "Hound" and it was long remembered because of the bitter weather with high winds and driving sleet and snow. Later, in France, I happened to be reminiscing with a soldier about that particular exercise, and commented how unpleasant it had been. "Yes, sir," he agreed, "that Hound was a son of a bitch."


The handling of the contradictory requirements of secrecy and of giving all possible information to the troops was a vital factor in the ultimate success of the invasion. That there was no serious leak during all the months of preparation is something both astounding and ground for pride in the discipline of British and American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This is particularly true of the hundreds of enlisted men—typists and draftsmen, for example—who knew for a long period where the landings were to be made. They mingled freely with their comrades and civilian, but kept their mouths shut.

Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., joined the 4th Division during the planning phase. He had not only been Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Governor of Puerto Rico, and Governor General of the Philippines, but he had served with distinction in the 1st Division in both world wars. At fifty-seven, he could well have been sitting at home. Instead, he insisted, unsuccessfully at first, that he should land with the first assault wave. He finally wrote a note in long-hand which resulted in his wish being granted:

May 26th '44

To Major General R. O. Barton, C.G.  
4th Inf. Div.

1. Since your informal refusal of my request to go with the assault companies I have given much thought to the question and decided to request reconsideration because of the following facts.
2. The force & skill with which the first elements hit the beach & proceed may determine the ultimate success of the operation.
3. The rapid advance inland of the assault companies is vital to our effort as the removal of underwater obstacles cannot be accomplished unless the beach is free from small arms fire.
4. With troops engaged for the first time the behavior pattern of all is apt to be set by those first engaged.
5. Considered, accurate information of the existing situation should be available for each succeeding element as it lands.
6. You should have when you get to shore an overall picture in which you can place confidence.
7. I believe I can contribute materially on all of the above by going with the assault companies. Furthermore I know personally both officers and men of these







**BRADLEY**  
First Army

**GEROW**  
V Corps

**EISENHOWER**  
SHAEF

**COLLINS**  
VII Corps

Six weeks later four of the D-day commanders got together for a group photograph

advance units and believe that it will steady them to know I am with them.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT  
B.G. U.S.A.

I SAW much of General Roosevelt during the first weeks in Normandy. His jeep was named "Rough Rider" after his father's Spanish-American War regiment, but he took it to places which gave its name a more factual reason. I well remember stopping my jeep one day just short of a crossroads which was being heavily shelled. Suddenly out of the smoke and dust came the "Rough Rider," windshield smashed, Roosevelt driving. He pulled up alongside of me and asked, "Any news?" in the same tone he might have used when sitting down to mess in a training area.

During General Eisenhower's first visit to the 4th Division soon after our arrival in England, a new record was established for going up and down through channels. As commander of Division Artillery, I had strongly urged that our light artillery battalions be issued self-propelled guns, but we had not received a decision. My seat at luncheon was about halfway down the table, with General Barton opposite me. I leaned over and said, "How about getting a decision as to the self-propelled guns?" He passed the idea on in more detail to the corps commander. It went on up the table to General Omar Bradley, then commander of the First Army, got a quick examination by Eisenhower, and

in something like three minutes was back through channels to me with a firm decision: we would get our self-propelled guns.

The Allied side of the picture as D-day approached was generally good. The completeness of the planning and orders was well exemplified in J. Lawton Collins' VII Corps when a final meeting of senior commanders turned up almost no questions.

IF things were going well at the lower levels, there were soul-searing problems for General Eisenhower. On May 30, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, the Air Commander-in-Chief, renewed his protests against the dropping of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions as planned. He believed that the combination of unsuitable landing areas and expected strong resistance would result in "futile slaughter." On the other hand, Utah Beach had a large inundated area behind it, and there was serious doubt that the troops making the seaborne landing would be able to get inland unless airborne troops seized the exits from the causeways crossing the inundated area. Eisenhower decided that the attack would go as planned.

Then, on the night of 3-4 June, with many of the convoys already at sea, he weather experts changed their hitherto optimistic forecasts; the overcast would not permit visual air bombing in the early hours of 5 June, and sea conditions would make the use of landing craft

difficult. Eisenhower, at a 0430 hours meeting on 4 June, decided on a twenty-four-hour postponement — actually twenty-four hours and thirty minutes because of the tide difference.

My small headquarters group had sailed from Dartmouth during the evening of 3 June in a convoy of thirty-five landing craft, tank. A little after 0900 the next day, I went up on the bridge. Our LCT was the right rear vessel of a three-column formation. With the white-caps, and the strong wind whipping out the flag at the masthead of each craft the convoy made a striking picture in spite of the low overcast. Suddenly, the LCTs at the head of the three columns turned sharp left. Our crew was immediately on the alert because this might be evasive action from an enemy attack, but almost immediately, the columns turned left again and the whole formation following along in trace, was headed back over our route. It was evident that D-day had been postponed.

It was a letdown for everyone. A day's postponement meant the possibility of serious errors in getting thousands of vessels into formation and on schedule again, and only two days of postponement were possible because of tides. If we had to return thousands of men to England, all with considerable knowledge of the invasion plan, what chance of keeping that information secret?

I think we spent the night off Weymouth. It was a confused night of hails from strange craft and yelled warnings

about a mine field. When I went on deck the next morning we were on our way again. General Eisenhower had made the fateful decision during the night: D-day and H-hour were now, for Utah Beach, 6 June at 0630.

We spent the day plowing along the Channel. We had with us a British Royal Artillery major attached for liaison with the British warships supporting us. He was an old hand at assault landings. I remember talking to him that day about his combat experiences and asking him, "How many beaches will this make for you?" He answered quite seriously: "The seventh, sir, if you'll allow me to count Dunkirk."

**T**HE weather on the morning of the Day was not very encouraging. The sea was rough, the ceiling low, and visibility poor. As we passed through the transport assembly area, the small assault craft were gone from their decks. The ships of the gunfire support group were firing rapidly. Our LCT was a "free boat," but according to the plan, we were to follow the two leading infantry regiments and their attached artillery. I had no real function ashore until there was enough artillery there for my headquarters to take over the massing of fires. It was quickly evident that we could go in as planned, but neither the LCT's officers nor I could identify any landmarks. My aide, Lt. John B. Swanson, got out a strip elevation and a photograph. In spite of weeks of study for this moment, we could not make things fit. The skipper wanted to hunt for a guide ship which was supposed to be anchored off the beaches, but when he couldn't locate it (it had been sunk), I decided to go in anyway.

Some artillery shells were landing among the boats and vehicles near the water's edge. Mindful of obstacles and mines (we had already lost one battery of artillery, but I didn't know it), I told the skipper to put her in where another LCT was just backing off, went down the ladder to the main deck, and climbed over the vehicles to my command car. Then I discovered that my driver was too seasick to drive!

When we hit the beach, the ramp dropped, and my substitute driver didn't waste any time. We seemed to drop into a hole as we came off the ramp, but we made the beach without trouble. Just as we got through an opening in the sea wall, we caught it. The artillery concentration which came down on us was, I think, from only two batteries, but it was plenty, and we all did some notable burrowing into the sides of bomb

and shell craters in the vicinity.

We were lucky. One man was badly wounded, and my operations officer had a shell fragment in his lunch, but his lunch, fortunately, was still in his musette bag. After about four or five volleys the fire shifted from our immediate vicinity. Swanson moved over to me, spread out his map, and said, "We're here, sir." Swanson, whom I was to see killed within a month, rarely made mistakes, but my first reaction was doubt as to the accuracy of the location to which he was pointing. It was 2,000 yards to the left of where we were supposed to be, and in an area which had been



**BRIGADIER GENERAL  
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR.**

eliminated in the planning in the belief that the beach would be too muddy. A quick check proved that Swanson was right. Most of the carefully planned assembly areas were still in German hands, and the troops had a real chance to prove their resourcefulness and flexibility, with the situation complicated by the fact that they had to fight their way across about 1,000 yards of land, and then get across about a mile of German-made lake.

The six airborne regiments of the two airborne divisions had, as we were to learn later, made their drops approximately on schedule. They had been flown from England in transport planes which circled west of Cherbourg and came over the drop zones flying from west to east. The drops were widely scattered, but if this resulted in confusion for the paratroopers, it also confused the German commanders who had reports of airborne landings from practically all parts of the Cotentin peninsula. Two vital missions were accom-

plished, however. The 82d captured Ste.-Mère Eglise and the 101st secured the western ends of the causeways over the inundated area. Parachutes hanging from trees and crashed gliders decorated the landscape for days.

I sent liaison officers to establish contact with the two airborne artillery commanders—Tony McAuliffe and Andy March. They were hard to find, because they weren't where they were supposed to be, and, in fact, didn't themselves know for some time where they were. Both found my CP, separately, soon after daylight of D plus 1. Between them they only knew where three of their airborne howitzers were. My driver fixed them some hot coffee and powdered eggs. McAuliffe, nearly forty-six at the time, had parachuted in. March, who was forty-eight, weighed about two hundred pounds and was suffering from a bad knee, had come in by glider—which had crashed. Both, after two rugged nights with an equally rough day in between, were very much on the job, got the information they wanted about the situation, and shoved off at once to try to round up their commands.

The VII Corps part of the invasion plan was essentially to cut off the Cotentin peninsula, and then capture Cherbourg. The 90th, 9th and 79th Infantry Divisions, in that order, followed the 4th ashore. Under the decisive leadership of "Lightnin' Joe" Collins, the corps completed the first of its tasks on the night of 17-18 June when the 9th Division under Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy (also destined to be an army commander in later years) completed the crossing of the peninsula and cut the coastal road along its west side. The Corps then drove on to Cherbourg and captured it on 27 June.

The Utah Beach landing had been easier than expected, but the rest of the Cherbourg campaign was marked by some of the hardest fighting of the war. The 4th Infantry Division, for example, had nearly 5,500 battle casualties in its first three weeks ashore. (The 1st Marine Division had 2,736 battle casualties in four months of fighting on Guadalcanal.)

**T**HE British landings, in the meanwhile, had gone generally according to plan. Only on Omaha Beach, between the British zone and Utah Beach, was there near-disaster. Here Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow's V Corps ran into the bulk of an alert German infantry division instead of an overextended static regiment as had been expected. The assault landing was made by Maj. Gen.



The Normandy hedgerow country is pretty and peaceful here but in June and July of 1944 it was the setting for some of the dirtiest infantry combat of World War II

Clarence Huebner's experienced 1st Infantry Division, with a regimental combat team of the 29th Division and two Ranger battalions attached. The air bombardment had not been effective on the beach defenses, most of the "swimming" tanks had been sunk by the rough water or were not launched at all, and, more important perhaps, smoke and dust resulted in many of the small task forces not being landed accurately, with the result that they could not promptly perform their assigned missions. At the end of the day, the outcome was still in doubt, but the Corps fought its way out of its first precarious foothold and at the end of a week had a beachhead 15 to 20 miles deep. It then went on the defensive until the VII Corps should capture Cherbourg, be able to turn, and join in attacking out of the peninsula. The 29th Division had suffered most with more than 2,400 casualties.

**WHAT** of the German side? In western Europe, Field Marshal von Rundstedt was nominally commander-in-chief, but he did not have control over the air and naval units in the West, or, in fact, of some of the ground forces. He was handicapped, too, by Hitler's decree that any invasion must be dealt with in such a way that it should collapse "before, if possible, but at the latest upon the actual landing," and that "no headquarters and no unit may initiate retrograde movement . . ." Later, he for the first time emphasized the need of "first-rate, fully mobile reserves suitable for offensive operations."

With inadequate forces for either concept and without air forces capable of even a fifty-fifty chance of countering Allied air power, Rundstedt was forced into a fatal compromise. More than that, in one of the most peculiar developments

of the war, Field Marshal Rommel, who in the eyes of the world was the foremost advocate and practitioner of mobility in warfare, now, in his capacity as commander of the army group defending the Channel coast, put all his efforts into improving coast fortifications, minefields, and underwater obstacles with a resultant essentially static defense at the shore line. Whether or not he believed in this unorthodox method is controversial. It may well be that he was convinced after his North African experience that reserves could not be moved under the conditions of air superiority which the Allies could create. Furthermore, he had been unable to get adequate mobile reserves assigned to his command, and he well knew Hitler's psychopathic aversion to giving up ground.

When the invasion came, the German defense was marked by incomplete

beach defenses, no depth, inability to maneuver, lack of unity of command, inadequate reserves, and failure to commit what reserves they had promptly and accurately. Notable among the enemy's failure was his stubborn maintaining of the belief that our main attack would follow the Normandy landings and be in the Pas-de-Calais area. This belief was carefully nurtured by one of the most effective deception efforts in the history of warfare; a deception so successful that it was late July before any troops in the Pas-de-Calais area were moved toward Normandy.

On the Allied side, the mistakes were minor and the inadequacies of the preparations were mostly forced by time. For example, because of late arrival of landing craft very few Army units were ever "married up" with the vessels in which they made the assault landings. The dive bombing and strafing attacks of the Air Force were often inaccurate and were sometimes put down on our own troops. Lack of experience and of ground liaison parties accounted for most of these troubles.

A German division commander paid tribute to the spirit of the American troops in Normandy and to the completeness and efficiency of the organization behind them: "Each night we know we have cut them to pieces, inflicted heavy casualties, mowed down their transport . . . But—in the morning, we are suddenly faced with fresh battalions, with complete replacements of men, machines, food, tools, and weapons. This happens day after day."

And Von Rundstedt, after the fall of Cherbourg, gave the High Command some sound advice which cost him his job: "Make peace, you fools!"



GENERAL RIDGWAY (with grenades) AND GENERAL GAVIN  
Photographed in Belgium six months after the Normandy invasion



# The Month's Reading

## *The Military Press*

THE TIMES OF LONDON  
1 May 1954

... How, then, does [the British Army officer] learn what is going on outside his own parish and his own arm and army? If he were serving in the United States Army he would have easy access to a variety of well-produced, semi-official monthly journals such as *COMBAT FORCES* or *Armor* to give him facts, pictures, and opinions. In the better daily newspapers and magazines he would read long and expert articles. But the British officer is unhappily placed. His plight is not new, but a surfeit of military security and a shortage of newsprint have aggravated it. He takes what his general offers him.

\* \* \*

The Imperial Defence College, the Staff Colleges, and the higher specialist schools do much to teach officers to think of their profession as such. But if an officer does not begin his military thinking as a subaltern he will start too late; and it must be made somebody's business to provide him with solid and varied food for military thought, particularly now that so many young officers are married, and the mess is no longer a forum for late and leisurely debate. In some Commands officers are required to write essays; might they not be better occupied in reading, if they had the right material to read? In the next ten years the Army will have to fight hard for its new equipment and vehicles—for helicopters, for example, which are fast becoming as much a part of the United States Army as the jeep. Military conservatism and the Treasury will link hands, and it will need strong pressure from both inside and outside the Army to get the money. Ideas have wings, but they need fair winds. In building up since 1946 its large public relations branch the War Office has forgotten its duty to provide for its own officers. It is afraid of telling its secrets to the Russians, and the plain truth to serious students of military affairs. . . .

## *Zeal for the Air Force*

GILL ROBB WILSON  
*Air University Quarterly Review*  
Winter 1953-54

Beyond doubt the public is aware of air power. This awareness is the more acute because of the warheads of air power—the atomic and hydrogen bombs . . . of which air power is the chief carrier and against which air power is the chief defender. On the indubitable thesis that the public loves nothing more than its own neck, we may be sure of its interest in air power. But equally we may be sure the public could not care less who saves its neck. It is merely that air power is pertinent to existence. That is the sum and substance of that.

The Air Force could make no sadder mistake than to be-

lieve that public concern about air power is *ipso facto* zeal for the Department of the Air Force. The fact is that Army and Navy could quietly absorb every major role of the Air Force without enough public outcry to disturb a nursery.

## *Armies Win Cold Wars*

RAYMOND ARON  
*The Century of Total War*  
Doubleday & Company  
1954

The approach being taken by the United States in order to counter the new problems arising from Soviet production of atomic weapons and the existence of limited hot wars, seems to be as follows:

In the first place, the United States, which must now maintain not only the arsenal but the army of the coalition, must be secured against a sudden attack. If we assume that the Kremlin calculates rationally, one consideration should be decisive for it: the possibility or impossibility of paralyzing, or substantially weakening American power in a first attack. As long as the United States itself is invulnerable, the most spectacular initial successes would not guarantee ultimate victory. The organization of the Communist empire in the midst of war would meet with even greater difficulties than those encountered by Hitler's attempt at a European empire.

Next, in waging the cold war the West needs conventional armaments greatly superior to those it had in 1950. The reasons are obvious: The United States had not even the necessary resources for a local hot war like that of Korea. In the absence of rearmament, every Soviet aggression, direct or through a satellite, would drive them to a choice between capitulation (or retreat) and total war. The aim of the West is not to win a war, but to avoid it. Knowing this, Russia rightly expects the West to capitulate or retreat.

It may be urged that it is difficult to conceive the multiplication of local wars of the Korean type. In the Middle East, in Iran, the threatened countries do not possess the minimum of military forces without which resistance is out of the question. In Southeastern Asia civil wars are raging. Chinese intervention there would no longer mean local strife, but war against China herself.

Admitting that other local wars are improbable, the West is nevertheless obliged to make an effort at rearmament. The West did not succeed between 1943 and 1945 in using its actual superiority to influence negotiations with the U.S.S.R. But since 1950 the U.S.S.R. has used its superior armament to spread terror. The industrial potential of the United States remains a supreme argument which prevents irreparable initiatives, but it is not enough to reassure the populations doomed to occupation in the event of war, or perhaps to convince the Kremlin that its adversaries are determined to resist.

In other words, this simple proposition has finally been

accepted: Regular armies have no substitutes as an instrument of cold war. Whatever the technique of the next war, divisions, tanks, soldiers, are still regarded by the statesman and the man in the street as an essential element of power. To restore confidence in the masses of Europe, of the Middle East, and of Asia and to instill fear or respect in the masters of the Kremlin, atom bombs and production figures are not enough.

## The Virtue of Insanity

THE BOSTON HERALD  
7 May 1954

The author of this editorial is Don Murray, winner of the 1953 Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing.

What is it to a young man, bent over in the cutting straps of a parachute, dug at and poked by the uncomfortable shapes of battle equipment?

What does he think when the plane roars in maddening crescendos at the end of the runway, shaking and fluttering, asking to be allowed to fly; to speed to its target and home again: What does the boy think who is cargo; who won't make the flight home?

What does he think when he looks out the gaping hole where the door has been taken out of the old plane, to make it easier to jump? Listening to the uneven growl of the motors, looking at the ground, seeming to rise and fall, lurch along unevenly after the plane; what are his thoughts?

In this crew, who is the boy? Is he a Legionnaire who compares the green-brown of river land, the dark color of jungles, the angry back of mountains to the comfortable Rhine country?

Is he a Frenchman and, if so, what kind of patriotism does he feel, seeing this wild land instead of the manicured shapes of the cultivated farms of his own centuries-civilized land?

What do men think, flying into battle? They thrust aside the sick, warm fear; the fiendish shadow of death. Their mind plays with pictures from a past (building sand castles on a warm beach or picking up a laughing, squirming baby for a toss into the air). They see flashes from a future they want (where they are successful in a world after wars; well fed and well loved).

But as soldiers they turn from memories and dreams to the comforting details of preparedness. Check the straps and the equipment. Your weapon and is the ammunition handy? Chin strap. Stand up and hook up the parachute. Follow the routine of getting ready. Push aside the past, the future. Concentrate on straps and equipment and orders. Lumber to the door, anxious to get it over with, fight to get out, to spill down to the mud of Dien Bien Phu.

What does a young man think about swinging gracefully above a green world, letting the quiet close about him? What

does he feel when the quiet is cut and sliced and run red by the sounds of bullets?

Smashing to the ground; running from the shells to cover; getting ready to fight; is he so busy with the fight for survival that he has no time to think about the wild idiocy of being in the lonely garrison of Dien Bien Phu? Isolated from friends; from hope itself; does he wonder, as we do, where he got the courage; where he had the insane idea of going to defend Western Europe by way of a muddy hell hole in a ravaged jungle half way around the globe?

And yet his insanity, even if he loses, may by its very intensity keep the walls of the Free World strong. We, a comfortable half a world away, salute his glorious insanity.

## Research—More for Less

HON. DONALD A. QUARLES  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development  
Speech, Atlanta, Georgia  
13 May 1954

To ensure this technical leadership, we must have and must continue to have a sound military research and development program. This year, the Department of Defense is spending for research and development about 1.3 billion dollars, the highest level of such expenditure in our history. This is about two and one-half times the average research and development expenditure in the years immediately before Korea, when the level ranged around one-half billion dollars per year. Such fluctuations are unwise. We paid the heavy penalty in the rapid build-up both in the initial inefficiency of the research and development work, as such, and in the attempt to produce in large quantity matériel for Korea that had not been completely developed. The present program, however, taken together with the military-related programs of the Atomic Energy Commission, accounts for about one-half the total research and development under way in the United States. As important as this work is to the security of the country, I doubt that we could devote a very much higher fraction of our research and development effort to defense without damage to the essential civilian economy and the long-term welfare of the nation. In fact, the budget now under consideration by the Congress for the next fiscal year cuts back this level of expenditure by about 10 per cent. There is, of course, no prospect for the kind of peace that would justify letting down our guard, so the challenge is to get substantially full value from the moderately lower expenditure level. This situation in research and development is part of the preparation for the long pull. Realizing how quickly things will happen in the next major conflict, it is apparent that we must perfect the most modern and effective weapons now and have them ready in our arsenals and in the hands of our troops before war starts. We must realize that we will never again be allowed the time for orderly build-up from a peacetime to a war footing.



In Berlin the service family can never forget the close presence of the Communists, but it isn't a cloak-and-dagger existence

# BERLIN

*An Island in the Soviet Sea*

MAJOR MARCO POLO

**T**HE U.S. soldier stationed in Berlin is on an island, surrounded by the Soviet zone of Germany. The movies and some of the news stories that have come out of the city lend a cloak-and-dagger air to the assignment, but actually the tension isn't that high. Many men and their families who have served in Berlin would like to go back.

The zone of Berlin that is open to the Western allies (the United States, Great Britain and France) covers only 185

## AROUND THE BASES—6

square miles. But in that area living is good and comfortable and offers all of the conveniences of a large and cosmopolitan city anywhere.

You can expect to stay in Berlin three years, now the normal tour. Travel may be either by sea or by air, depending on what is available and how fast they want

you to get there. If you travel by sea the ocean trip will take about nine days, leaving from New York and landing at Bremerhaven, with the trip into Berlin by rail. If you fly, you will leave either from Washington National Airport or Westover Field, and land at Frankfurt-Main air field, to make the last leg of the trip sometimes by train, but normally on the daily courier plane.

At this writing concurrent travel is not authorized, and if you ask the trans-



portation people they will tell you it will take forty weeks for your family to join you in Berlin. However if current plans are carried through there will be concurrent travel by November; and in any event the delay between the time the sponsor gets there and his family joins him will not be nearly as long as it is now. Normal practice today is to assign only bachelors to Berlin with the exception of people in so-called "key" positions. Those family men assigned there can expect to have housing allotted them shortly after they sign in, and as soon as housing is promised families can move Berlin-ward.

**H**OUSING is good. In the past year and a half there have been several apartments built by the Army, and some day they will probably be entirely occupied by military families. But now they are used largely as bachelor quarters for senior noncoms and company-grade officers. Families are normally provided German roomy and comfortable houses. Each house has a good yard, and a part-time gardener-fireman goes with the quarters.

You need take no furniture with you. Everything you need will be provided. But there are some exceptions. Take your own beds, for example, if you like to sleep in deep comfort. Many wise Army travelers always carry their own beds, and this is a smart move if you are headed for Berlin (or anywhere in Germany) where the bedsteads are handsome, but the springs and mattresses are not exactly conducive to relaxed sleep.

You'll need your own linens and your own pots and pans. True, you can get handsome table linens in Germany and the other parts of Europe you will probably visit during your tour, but you'll want your own to carry you over. And while kitchen utensils can be obtained from the Quartermaster they won't be what you are used to.

You can buy good furniture at good prices in Germany (and also in France and Belgium) if you are willing both to shop and to wait while it is made for you. So unless you have occasional pieces that you simply can't live without, don't take your furniture. The same is true of pictures, about which I'll have more to say later.

Be careful about electrical appliances. The current in Berlin is 220 volt, 50 cycle, and your clocks, radios and record players will not work unless they have been converted. Conversion is a simple job that you can have done either in the States before you leave or in Berlin after

you get there. Most people recommend having it done before you leave, since the home-grown job seems to be more satisfactory.

You will have to have converters, too, for your other appliances. These transformers can be bought either here or in Germany; \$6.00 is a top price. Working through such a transformer you can run your toaster, waffle iron, vacuum cleaner, or what have you. However, if you don't want to bother you can get excellent electrical goods on the local market at good prices.

The outlets in Berlin, by the way, are different from the American style, so you will find you will have to change the plugs on all of the electrical equipment you take with you. This is a simple task.

You will probably find a television set just extra baggage. There is some German television, but the U.S. radio nets are not telecasting and there are no plans for American television in Berlin in the foreseeable future.

Washing machines are good to have, but not a necessity since you will probably have domestic help. If you do take a machine make it a non-automatic model, since the water pressure in Berlin is not designed for U.S. automatic washers.

**S**HOPPING facilities in Berlin are good. The commissaries are well stocked with the regular supplies of canned and packaged goods you will find in a United States commissary, green vegetables are plentiful both frozen and fresh from the European markets, and milk, butter and other dairy products are brought in from the Scandinavian countries. Meats are good and plentiful.

The Post Exchange (this is true throughout Europe) offers large varieties of things, but still leaves a good deal to be desired in the clothing department. Items of uniform can be easily obtained. So can standard items of sports clothes for men, men's shoes, and simple clothes for women. Sporting equipment, toilet articles, books and magazines can be bought at the PX, and you can even buy a car through the Exchange system.

You will need a pretty complete wardrobe for your Berlin tour. Social life is active, so you will need dinner clothes (summer and winter, although you can have them made there) as well as uniform. Winter uniform is prescribed for the entire year for duty, but there is a short period in the summer when tropicals are authorized for off-duty wear.

Civilian clothes are authorized, and you will want some. In choosing clothes for the family, remember that Berlin has a temperate climate, seldom drop-

ping to zero and seldom rising above 80.

The ladies should make arrangements with the personal shopper in their favorite department store before leaving the States. Also arrange for shoes and clothes for the kids. These things are hard to find both in the PX and on the German market. Women can, however, find some very pretty clothes in the Berlin specialty shops. Berlin has a tradition of good fashions (Germany's pre-war movie industry was centered in Berlin) and it has grown out of the rubble along with the rest of the city. The specialty shops have very few ready-made garments, but they have excellent fashions and materials which can be made for somewhat less than custom-made specialty shop items in the United States. You can dress in good fashions for between \$40 and \$100 a garment in Berlin. For sports clothes and less expensive ready-made dresses you had better use your Stateside department store.

**E**QUALLY as valuable as your personal shoppers are the mail order houses. The Post Exchanges in Berlin have mail order desks where catalogues from Sears, Montgomery Ward and the other large mail order houses are available, but it is easier if you have your own catalogue. You will find it useful for keeping your children in shoes, cold and wet weather gear, and special toys, and your family in other small but important odds and ends.

Men will find that while they can get uniform items and some standard sports clothes through the PX, they will want to import some clothing from the States and also find a good tailor in Berlin. Since Berlin is such an inclosed community the people who live there are thrown close together. Social life is more formal than elsewhere in Germany. Possibly one reason is that many of your friends will be British and French. At any rate you are in luck because German tailors are good and they now understand American tastes in the cut of clothes.

A good deal of your recreation will be social. Because travel is limited and there is no "country" you can reach easily from Berlin, the life is urban. And because the Russians have sealed off their sector of the city so completely they have thrown the British, French and Americans more closely together. There is a great deal of "international" social life between the members of the forces of the three Western powers, and you will find that you are eagerly welcomed at the French and British clubs. It is true that there is a closer bond between the Americans and British than between

Americans and French, but this is only because of the language problem, and if you speak French or are willing to try to learn you will have many chances to make good friends among your Gallic allies.

Aside from social life, Berlin offers great opportunity for recreation. For the athletically inclined there are golf (on an excellent course), tennis, riding, swimming, boating, and skating. The swimming is still confined to pools (of which there are several), since the U.S. medical authorities frown on the rivers and streams.

In addition to the outdoor sports there are the ubiquitous (on U.S. installations) movies, legitimate theater, opera, fine music and art.

**B**ERLIN has two opera companies and one light opera house. All three do a fine job. The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra plays frequent concerts, and there are several legitimate theaters. Unfortunately the museums and art galleries that were once world famous have not yet been rebuilt, but there are a number of new galleries which offer large showings of modern art. By careful selection and interesting shopping you may be able to pick up some paintings which will delight you for years to come.

All of this, of course, is confined to your 185-mile island. For hunting, fishing, skiing, or more ambitious shopping you must leave the city, and this a major undertaking. In Berlin you are 104 miles from the nearest "free" city.

Actually the trip is not too bad. If you want to get out of Berlin you must plan on three days at least.

You can get out of the city in one of three ways: fly, ride the train, or drive. There is a courier plane which leaves Berlin twice a day for Frankfurt and, with proper orders, you and your dependents can travel on it if space is available. The catch is, of course, that once you are in Frankfurt you are on foot.

Trains leave once a day, for Frankfurt and Bremerhaven. Here again the trip is easy but leaves you on foot.

Driving, you travel out the Autobahn, through the Soviet zone, and into West Germany. It is 104 miles to Helmstedt, the closest western city. If you are on a routine assignment in Berlin this is the best way to go, because once you are into West Germany you have your transportation with you. For people on so-called "sensitive" assignments, however, it is a little more difficult. They must make arrangements with the Provost Marshal to have an MP drive their car

to Helmstedt while they take the train. Once in Helmstedt they pick up their car and go their merry way. On the way back they drop the car in Helmstedt for an MP to return to Berlin, and again make the rest of the trip by train. This is a simple security measure, but does add to the cloak-and-dagger aspect of the trip. Once outside of Berlin and the Soviet zone, all of the recreational facilities of Germany and the rest of Europe are available to you.

**B**ERLIN is a good place for your children. Because it is a city and movement is somewhat restricted, the Special Services people have a large program of activities for young people. In addition, the schools are excellent. The Army operates schools from the first grade through high school, and many people consider these to be the best U.S. schools in Europe. For the nursery school set, many parents have felt it wise to send them to German schools. There are a number of good German pre-school age schools, and the American children seem both to enjoy them and to get a lot out of them. They learn more of the language, and normally get along very well with the German children.

All of the U.S. schools teach German as a normal part of the curriculum, starting with the first grade, and through Special Services your children can study music, musical instruments or art from good teachers.

Recreation-wise, all of the facilities that are open to adults are also open to children, and the British and French will take the kids in as graciously and eagerly as they will accept the parents.

Your children will get a good deal of marginal education from your servants, too. Servants in Berlin are good, and while they are not as cheap as in some other places in the world, they are inexpensive by American standards. Average wages are from \$20 to \$25 a month, the latter being for a housekeeper who will not only keep the house and cook but will do the shopping, often advantageously as far as your budget is concerned.

If the \$20 or so seems high, and if you and your family are willing to do more of the work around the house, you can frequently find a German college student who will do the heavy work, help in the kitchen and help serve for his room and board. Since German college hours are not the same as ours (most students are at school no more than half a day) this is frequently a satisfactory solution. The labor office of Army headquarters can give you assistance and up-

to-the-minute advice on the household help problem.

**T**HERE are certain things you will need to make your tour of Berlin more pleasant. One is an automobile. While it is true there is a limited area in which you can roam in Berlin, public transportation is slow, crowded and infrequent. Since you may find yourself living a considerable distance from the commissary, PX and your job, a car will be useful. Also, your social and recreational activities may be quite a distance from your house.

You can take a car with you. The government will ship one automobile to Europe for you on your travel orders. If you have a small car of a popular make, and it is in pretty good shape, it may be wise to take it. Otherwise you might find it more advantageous to buy one when you get there.

Service facilities through the PX are good in Berlin and the rest of Germany, but only for the popular brands. Parts for other makes are sometimes hard to find. Standard gear shifts are more easily repaired in European country garages than the automatic type, a fact worth keeping in mind. Also, European roads are narrow and rough (except for the Autobahn and a few other superhighways) and gasoline (other than at QM stations) costs from 60 to 75 cents a gallon.

You can buy U.S. cars in Germany, through the PX, for a good price, since you escape most taxes and if you do not take a car with you you get free cross-ocean transportation. Or you can buy European cars, which are smaller and harder-riding than American automobiles, but are easy to drive, easy on gas, and built for European driving. Here again you may be able to make a good deal since the seller can get dollar credits from you, a big item in the economy of Europe today.

**O**NE of the most interesting—and most trying—things about an assignment in Berlin is of course the international situation. It is hard for Americans to get used to living in a city where there are streets they must not cross, neighborhoods they must not visit. At first all soldiers and their dependents are worried about this, and it colors both their thoughts and their actions. But they soon find that Berlin is a vital and exciting city, and they get over their fears. They find that it is interesting to be on the front line of an ideological battle, where they can look across the street and see how the other side is doing.

# Lament for a Skulker

COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER



PRIVATE EDDIE D. SLOVIK

*I'll run away again if I have to go out there*

**D**URING the Second World War there were 318,274 deaths in the United States Army, of which 225,618 were battle deaths. Of the larger number, 142 were deaths by execution, all for murder, rape, and rape-murder except one. The one exception was Private Eddie D. Slovik, 36896415, who was "shot to death by musketry" on 31 January 1945 for the crime of desertion in the face of the enemy. He was the only American to be executed for a purely military offense since the end of the Civil War.

Slovik was not the sole American soldier in those eighty years to desert in the face of the enemy, nor was he the sole soldier to be tried and convicted for that offense. He was the only one to pay the extreme penalty provided by law. Many Americans have regretted that this "fine record" was broken.

But is this a "fine record" of which Americans could be proud? Is it not possible that it is instead a shameful record that reveals a national refusal to face hard facts, a squeamishness that could so weaken our moral



**COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, JAGC-USAR,** is an experienced lawyer, a soldier whose military knowledge goes far beyond that required of a JAG, a skilled raconteur, and the author of magazine articles and books on both legal and military subjects. In our opinion he is at his best when he combines these two fields to write on military law as in the instance of this article. Colonel Wiener has been a reserve officer for eighteen years and a contributor to this magazine and its predecessors for about the same period. During the Second World War he



served in Trinidad, on Guadalcanal, and with the Tenth Army on Okinawa. Now in the private practice of law in Washington, specializing in appellate cases, Colonel Wiener as a trial judge advocate has prosecuted military cases, and as a civilian attorney has defended military persons before boards of review and the Court of Military Appeals. In addition to serving the Association of the U. S. Army as its General Counsel, Colonel Wiener cheerfully lends his considerable talents to the staff of the Association and Journal whenever they are needed.

fibre as to make Americans unwilling to fight and if need be die in the defense of their country?

The answers to these questions can well be sought through an examination of the case history of Private Slovik. Slovik's story recently was told by William Bradford Huie in *The Execution of Private Slovik*, produced in both hard-cover and paper-cover editions, and condensed in *Look* magazine. Unfortunately, neither the book nor most of the reviews of it that have appeared in the literary magazines and metropolitan newspapers escaped the emotionalism the subject usually arouses in Americans. Consequently there has been an almost complete lack of objective appraisal of the real problems raised by the case of Private Slovik.

**SLOVIK** was born in Detroit, 18 February 1920, of Polish ancestry. His father, originally named Slowikowski and a native of Poland, was a punch-press operator in an automobile parts plant; employment in the twenties was intermittent; home conditions were poor; and Eddie grew up as a dead-end kid with a police record that began when he was twelve.

For five years there is a list of petty recurring offenses, and then late in 1937, just short of 18, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for embezzling \$59.60 over a six-month period. Released on parole in September 1938, he stayed at liberty four months, after which he drove off with someone else's car, and was once more sent to prison; he remained in confinement until released on parole a second time in April 1942. An ex-convict, he was automatically classified IV-F.

He found work, and met and in November 1942 married a girl five years older than himself, who, though crippled and subject to epileptic attacks, gave him the strength to go straight; significantly, he usually addressed her, in his voluminous letters, as "Mommy." They were happy together and prospered, moved into a larger apartment for which they bought new furniture, and also bought a second-hand Pontiac. Mr. Huie says, "They had their own private war plans: while the boom lasted they wanted to get as much as they could as fast as they could."

**GORDON HARRISON**  
The Saturday Review

Since the Army had drafted Slovik after first declaring him unfit material for a soldier, did the Army not undertake a special responsibility to make a soldier out of him? More than justice to one man was involved. If the Army by rejecting ex-convicts proclaims the need for a moral fiber in its fighting men, it has said in effect that the weak, the maladjusted, the anti-social, constitute an intolerable danger to the discipline of the organization. Yet Slovik was at last accepted as though he were just another recruit to be fitted into whatever table of organization had a vacancy. He was trained for the infantry. Apparently he was trained well. Mr. Huie, quoting from letters which Slovik wrote from boot camp, comments that the Army almost succeeded in making a soldier out of him. The near success, however, only underlines the final failure, for it is apparent that once Slovik was absorbed in the system, the system no longer remembered the special problem that he represented.

But the Army was beginning to scrape the bottom of its manpower barrel, and Slovik was reclassified I-A on his first wedding anniversary, reporting for duty in January 1944. He was sent to the Infantry RTC at Camp Wolters, Texas.

There followed a wave of letters home breathing self-pity—"I'm so lonesome"; "I can't understand why they did this to us"; "Why couldn't they leave us alone"; "Mommy why did they have to do this to us? We were headed for love and happiness. All we needed was a home and a new car." But in all of Slovik's letters home, which are quoted extensively, and which Mr. Huie says should be preserved in the Library of Congress as "required reading for any scholar who would understand the Second World War," there is not a trace of any suggestion that millions of other Americans, who likewise had been headed for love and happiness, were being similarly inconvenienced. Nor does Mr. Huie, who writes of Slovik that "more than anything on earth, including the United States, he loved his wife; that he loved their newly furnished apartment," ever seem to be aware that similar preferences were—well, hardly unusual—among others in the service.

Slovik wrote home from Wolters, "I am trying to act just as dumb as I can 'cause the smarter you are the faster you have to go overseas." "I am going on the rifle range Saturday and I am going to foul up. I'll try to have a poor score so they won't send me overseas." "I'm not trying to be a good soldier." "I'm sick and tired of shooting my rifle." "You know how much I hate to use a rifle." But then a change crept in. "I have that speed hike to make today. . . I'll try my best. So far I've been doing purty good

and I don't want to fail now." "Well darling I made that speed hike and I feel swell this morning." As Mr. Huie notes, the Army almost made a soldier of Slovik.

But, as his wife was not able to work because of ill-health and so could not maintain the cherished apartment, Slovik applied for a dependency discharge. The Red Cross's suggestion that Mrs. Slovik move to more modest quarters was not acceptable to the Sloviks, and the application for discharge was denied. But, apparently because of its pendency, Slovik was not shipped out with the buddies with whom he had trained, but stayed behind at Wolters. After a short furlough in July, he was sent overseas on 7 August with 7000 other infantry replacements, complete strangers. On the trip over, while cleaning his rifle, Slovik said to one Tankey, a new buddy, "I never intend to fire it."

**L**ANDED in England, Slovik received two days' instruction in hedgerow fighting, and was then shipped to Omaha Beach. On 25 August, after five days of processing at the 3d Replacement Depot, Slovik and eleven others, accompanied by an NCO, were issued ammunition, put into a truck, and told they were assigned to Company G, 109th Infantry, 28th Division. The truck set out for Elbeuf to join the unit, passing over the wreckage, destruction, and death that remained of what had been the Falaise pocket—hardly an auspicious introduction to the war. Arrived at Elbeuf, shelling began; the men dug themselves in on the NCO's order. There was an order to move out, and some of the replacements reached G Company; Slovik later wrote conflicting versions of his own conduct on that occasion.

At any rate, he and Tankey did not join Company G, but turned themselves in to a Canadian outfit, the 13th Provost Corps, with which they remained for about forty-five days. Slovik did odd jobs for the Canadians, principally cooking. On 7 October, he and Tankey finally reached the 109th's headquarters, and on the next day he reported to Company G.

He told the CO that he was "too scared, too nervous" to serve with a rifle company and that unless he could be kept in a rear area he would run away. The CO assigned Slovik to the 4th Platoon, turned him over to the platoon leader, and forbade him to leave the company area without permission. The platoon leader introduced Slovik to his squad leader. Later Slovik came to the

CO and inquired if he could be tried for AWOL; the CO said he would find out, and had him placed in arrest and returned to his platoon area. About an hour later, Slovik went back to the CO and asked, "If I leave now will it be desertion?" The CO said yes, and Slovik left, without his gun, walking fast.

At this point, the CO came out and said to Tankey, who was there, "Soldier, you better stop your buddy. He is getting himself into serious trouble." Tankey ran after Slovik, grabbed him by the

#### S. L. A. MARSHALL The New York Times

**I**N every war which I have attended for this country, I have seen men forced to do duty in the combat line who obviously had no emotional fitness for it. They were potential crackups who should have been detected at the induction center. In a noncombat service they could have been useful. But they were sent forward where they invariably became a load on their able comrades, a disgrace to their families and a drain upon the national substance. This was done in the name of "fair play." In the long run, it is as costly as is our other bad habit of siphoning culls into infantry service.

Conceivably, in this age of massive retaliation the infantry requirement is no longer the decisive consideration. But there is always a first line of some kind, and it is not a place for Eddie Sloviks.

Unless that is the point, Mr. Huie should have left the incident decently buried. And unless Mr. Huie's readers approach this book reflectively, dwelling less on its horror than upon its meaning, then it should never have been written.

shoulder, and stopped him. "Come on back, Eddie, you don't want to do this. . . ." Slovik said, "Johnny, I know what I'm doing." He jerked away from Tankey and kept going.

At about 0830 hours the next morning, Slovik turned himself in to the Military Government detachment, 112th Infantry, told the cook he had made a confession, and handed him a green slip containing the following:

I Pvt. Eddie D. Slovik #36896415 confess to the Desertion of the United States Army. At the time of my Desertion we were in Albuff in France. I

came to Albuff as a Replacement. They were shelling the town and we were told to dig in for the night. The following morning they were shelling us again. I was so scared nerves and trembling that at the time the other Replacements moved out I couldn't move. I stayed their in my foxhole till it was quite and I was able to move. I then walked in town. Not seeing any of our troops so I stayed over night at the French hospital. The next morning I turned myself over to the Canadian Provost Corp. After being with them six weeks I was turned over to American M.P. They turned me lose. I told my commanding officer my story. I said that if I had to go out their again I'd run away. He said their was nothing he could do for me so I ran away again AND I'LL RUN AWAY AGAIN IF I HAVE TO GO OUT THEIR."

This confession was turned over to a Lieutenant Colonel of the 109th Infantry, who warned Slovik that the written confession could be damaging to him, and suggested he take it back and destroy it. Slovik refused, and then signed the following on the reverse of the green slip.

I have been told that this statement can be held against me and that I made it of my own free will and that I do not have to make it.

After that, Slovik was confined in the division stockade—"just one of the kids bucking for a court-martial so he could stay out of the line," observed one of the sergeants. When some of the others came back from their trials saying they had received sentences of twenty years, Slovik rejoiced with them.

Since Slovik had never even tried soldiering in a rifle company, he was sent for by the Staff JA, who offered to suspend action on the court-martial if Slovik would go back. Slovik refused; "I'd be willing to take a job way back from the line with a quartermaster outfit or something like that, but if I can't get that, then give me my court-martial." The Staff JA warned of the consequences—desertion in time of war is a capital offense, "You might even get a death sentence." Slovik was adamant. "No, I've made up my mind. I'll take my court-martial."

**A**ND he did, on 11 November, before a nine-man general court-martial composed exclusively of staff officers. The combat people were otherwise engaged, for this was the period of the Hurtgen Forest, and, in particular, of the 28th Division's repulse at Schmidt, "one of the most costly division actions in the whole of World War II," according to the Army's official history. (The battle began on 2 November, most of it

was over by the 9th, and on 19 November the 28th Division was relieved by the 8th Division.)

The case against Slovik was open and shut and the trial lasted less than two hours. Actually, there was nothing to try, Slovik having fully admitted his guilt. After findings of guilty, the court took three ballots on the sentence. All were unanimous: death.

The record was then forwarded for review, at which time Slovik's civilian background became material. But whether Slovik's past influenced the convening authority, Maj. Gen. Norman D. Cota, CG, 28th Division, may well be doubted. General Cota's attitude was crystal clear:

Given the situation as I knew it in November, 1944, I thought it was my duty to this country to approve that sentence. If I hadn't approved it—if I had let Slovik accomplish his purpose—then I didn't know how I could have gone up to the line and looked a good soldier in the face.

And so, on 27 November, General Cota approved the sentence, after which the record was sent to the Theater Judge Advocate for further review. That officer had before him Slovik's plea to General Eisenhower for clemency, which, although saying, "I don't believe I ran away the first time as I stated in my first confession," and, "I'd like to continue to be a good soldier," was pointedly silent about offering to return to the infantry duty for which Slovik had been trained.

The Theater JA's review said in pertinent part,

These prior offenses are not of sufficient gravity to influence my recommendations in the instant case. However, they indicate a persistent refusal to conform to the rules of society in civilian life, an imperviousness to penal correction and a total lack of appreciation of clemency . . .

There can be no doubt that he deliberately sought the safety and comfort of the guardhouse. To him and to those soldiers who may follow his example, if he achieves his end, confinement is neither deterrent nor punishment. He has directly challenged the authority of the government, and future discipline depends upon a resolute reply to this challenge. If the death penalty is ever to be imposed for desertion it should be imposed in this case, not as a punitive measure nor as retribution, but to maintain that discipline upon which alone an army can succeed against the enemy.

And so General Eisenhower confirmed the sentence, on—23 December 1944. The Battle of the Bulge was raging, Bastogne was surrounded. Indeed, on the day before, 22 December, General

McAuliffe of the 101st Division had responded to the German demand for surrender with "Nuts!"—a monosyllable that has become part of our history.

General Eisenhower's action completed AW 48 confirmation; AW 50½ review was still to come. The record of trial was found legally sufficient by a board of review, and then by the Assistant Judge Advocate General for the ETO. The latter officer wrote:

This soldier has performed no front line duty. He did not intend to. He

**MAJ. GEN. JIM DAN HILL (NGUS)**  
in syndicated newspaper column

Slovik had every opportunity to be a man. He arrived in the bitter Hürtgen Forest fighting at a time when military courts were becoming a joke. Every dogface on the line knew the rear area, chair borne soldiers were commuting the long sentences of the front line courts to three months "in the interest of morale and the war effort." A death sentence often meant no more than a comfortable prison through the duration.

Private Slovik, far from being the maladjusted psychopath Mr. Huie would have you believe, traded on this trend at the wrong time and place. When every effort to get him to fight met with confessed cowardice and AWOL from assigned posts of duty, he faced a court; begged cowardice, received the death penalty.

It was properly reviewed by higher authority. He was publicly shot by a firing squad.

With him also died a fast burgeoning front line theory that assimilated psychopathic cowardice could pay dividends—not while brave men were dying for their fellow men in the bitter Battle of the Bulge.

deserted from his group of fifteen when about to join the infantry company to which he had been assigned. His subsequent conduct shows a deliberate plan to secure trial and incarceration in a safe place. The sentence adjudged was more severe than he had anticipated, but the imposition of a less severe sentence would only have accomplished the accused's purpose of securing his incarceration and consequent freedom from the dangers which so many of our armed forces are required to face daily. His unfavorable civilian record indicates that he is not a worthy subject of clemency.

Slovik was sent back to the 28th Division to be executed, somewhat to the surprise of General Cota, who, however, "conceded the logic in the theater commander's action: a deserter should be

shot by the outfit he deserts."

And he was, on 31 January 1945, the only execution for a purely military offense from the close of the Civil War until this day. He died far more bravely than he lived; as the attending chaplain later said, "Slovik was the bravest man in the garden that morning."

## II

**UNFORTUNATELY** Mr. Huie set out to write a macabre horror story and arranged his materials to that end. He starts the book with a trip to the cemetery plot where lie Slovik's unhonored remains, begins and ends most of his chapters with the actual execution, and then lingers in infinite detail over the mechanics of putting a human being to death in cold blood. There is good coverage in the sense that everyone connected with the case who is still living and could be found was interviewed at length, but the story is never told consecutively, and the author jumps back and forth past the act of execution, not to discuss basic central problems of military sanctions, but to pull out all the stops and start the tears flowing.

Not unnaturally, the book contains numerous errors and at least one seriously misleading suggestion, namely, that the Slovik case only came to light after the author struggled for seven years to get the file declassified.

Actually, Mr. Huie knew the essential details of Slovik's offense over most of that period. In the June 1948 issue of the now defunct magazine *Liberty*, Mr. Huie contributed an article on "Are Americans Afraid to Fight?", in which, at page 80, he told the essentials of Slovik's desertion, calling the man "Lewis Simpson." He was vague about the process of review, to the point of suggesting that General Ben Lear may have participated therein. A look at the law would have cleared up that point without declassification. But, with information from the record available to him, Mr. Huie had access to the names of the participants, whom he was then enabled to interview. It is a pity that the standards of his approach and presentation do not measure up to those of his thoroughness and industry.

For instance, he says that Slovik was executed "for the crime of *avoiding* a duty," to which is also given the verbal twist of "put to death for a crime of omission." The fact of course is that Slovik was shot for two acts of desertion—which are plainly acts of commission. The difference is perhaps of more significance emotionally than legally, but the



distortion is unhappily characteristic of the author's treatment.

Mr. Huie says, "The last American to assume final responsibility in such a case had been Abraham Lincoln; the last West Pointer, acting for the United States, had been General Winfield Scott." In fact, the last President who dealt with death sentences imposed on American soldiers for purely military offenses was Woodrow Wilson, in respect of four death cases from the 1st Division in the winter of 1917-1918. (The details are in Frederick Palmer's biography of Secretary Baker and in the 1919 hearings before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on the court-martial system during World War I.) Moreover, the last West Pointer who confirmed death sentences for military offenses in the Civil War was probably General Meade, who approved them for the Army of the Potomac right up to Appomattox; Winfield Scott was not a graduate of the Military Academy.

Mr. Huie says, "Throughout virtually all our national history the power of life-and-death over American soldiers has been exclusively the President's . . . But by the Act of 1920 (the 1920 Articles of War) confirming power was delegated to the theater commanders in certain death cases, one of which was desertion in time of war." The fact is otherwise. Except for the period 17 July 1862 to 3 March 1863, the President's approval was never requisite for such sentences in time of war. AW 65 of 1806; AW 105 of 1874; AW 48 of 1916 and 1920. Not until AW 48(a) of 1948 was the law changed to eliminate field confirmation in wartime death cases.

In one instance, Mr. Huie has undoubtedly learned something since 1948. Then he wrote (*Liberty*, June 1948), "The 28th Division was not one of our more distinguished divisions." Today he says, "No unit bearing arms for this community of free men is older or has a prouder heritage," and he calls it "a big, tough, hard-luck, meat-grinding outfit."

**B**UT whatever the author may thus have learned over the years, surely the most shameful aspect of this book is the false hope it attempts to raise in Slovik's widow for obtaining Slovik's insurance. That insurance went unpaid because Slovik died "under dishonorable circumstances," as indeed he had, and because the law specifically provides that "No insurance shall be payable for death inflicted as lawful punishment for crime . . ." Mr. Huie attempts to make a case out of the circumstances that General

Cota disapproved the portions of the sentence other than the shooting, and that the Theater Judge Advocate recommended confirmation of the sentence for disciplinary reasons. But the reason for the partial disapproval was that the sentence as adjudged did not comply with the form in the *Manual for Courts-Martial*, and of course desertion in time of war is a crime, one that routinely, regardless of sentence, entails a loss of citizenship unless the deserter is subsequently restored to duty. It was cruel to raise such hopes; but it was more than cruel, it was sordid exploitation to bring Mrs. Slovik to Washington, there to be

What went wrong?

Significantly enough, in all of Slovik's voluminous letters to his wife, there are only three references to patriotic emotion. Is that simply a reflection of the circumstances that, as a member of an underprivileged racial minority, Slovik may have had but scant attachment to the United States? That cannot be the whole story, because he was similarly devoid of attachment to the country of his father's birth; he had no urge to avenge the Nazis' brutal treatment of the Poles. Indeed, while with the Canadians, he treated a captured German pilot with obviously unnecessary kindness. "Eddie



The men who made the soldierly decisions: Generals Eisenhower and Cota photographed in Europe before the case of Private Slovik came to their official attention.

photographed clutching a copy of the book, to seek relief legislation. (Both Michigan Senators refused their aid.)

The most charitable appraisal of Mr. Huie's book is the suggestion that he is out of his depth and on unfamiliar ground. He wrote more convincingly when, in *The Revolt of Mamie Stover*, he chronicled the life and work of a Honolulu harlot.

### III

**B**UT the problems posed by the Slovik case are far more significant—and far more disturbing—than Mr. Huie's failures of commission and omission.

The first of these is: Are Americans afraid to fight? How can we indoctrinate our young men so that, when the next test comes, they will stand and not run away? The Army almost made a soldier of Slovik, and the chaplain helped him die far more of a man than he had lived. One of the men in the firing squad said, "I can't understand why a man who had the guts to face a firing squad like that wouldn't stay in the line with the rest of us."

just didn't hate anybody, not even the Germans." Perhaps patriotism and hatred of those who have wronged one's own blood are overrated as motivating factors.

S. L. A. Marshall thinks so; in his *Men Against Fire* he points out that the real attachment that a soldier has is not to his ideals, but to his buddy: "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade."

It was coincidence, unhappy coincidence, that Slovik's Camp Wolters friends went off while his application for discharge was being processed. But surely a more intelligent use of the admittedly faulty World War II replacement system could have avoided sending twelve green men in a truck across the carnage of the Falaise pocket. At the very minimum, they should have been sent, not to one company, but to Division HQ. If Slovik's story does nothing else, it underscores the wisdom of having a replacement company as an organic

unit in each division, and it likewise emphasizes the essential psychological soundness of the packet replacement system.

That is not to say that everyone can expect always to be surrounded by old buddies; on that basis we would be back to the Civil War fallacy of letting units be decimated and reinforcing the armies with new units. There must be individual replacements, and while the replacement will perhaps never be completely happy, his morale can be improved, and his military effectiveness increased, by giving him some feeling of cohesion with his new unit, by giving him what Slovik in all fairness never had.

Still—Slovik had a buddy. Tankey was his constant companion for two months, from Kilmer, on the trip overseas, in England, at Elbeuf, with the Canadians, and when the two rejoined the 28th Division. They had much in common: both were from Detroit, both had worked in auto plants, both were of Polish descent, both were happily married—and Tankey endeavored, without success, to dissuade Slovik from deserting in October. Lack of a buddy does not fully explain the Slovik case.

**O**f course not all men can be made into front-line doughboys. Some lack the physical stamina, some lack the necessary emotional fortitude, some have both but break down sooner than their fellows. Here again, Slovik does not fit into the usual categories.

First, there was never any question of Slovik's sanity or legal responsibility, and the facts simply do not raise the issue of general-versus-psychiatrist that Mr. Huie attempts to inject. Nor do General Cota's doubts as to the effectiveness of some of the military psychiatry practiced in his division have the slightest relevance in the present connection.

Next, there was no question here of combat fatigue, of a good soldier who had served under fire ultimately refusing to do more, or deliberately running away after having previously chalked up a good record. Slovik never gave the line a try. He was universally liked, he was a good buddy, "do anything in the world for you," "do anything I told him to"—anything, that is, except his assigned duty.

Finally, the recorded reluctance of Slovik ever to use his rifle—it is in his letters home, it was in his remarks to Tankey on the overseas journey—suggests inquiry into what S. L. A. Marshall reported on the findings of the psychiatrists in the ETO: "They found that fear

of killing, rather than fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure in the individual, and that fear of failure ran a strong second."

Well, fear of killing may have been part of Slovik's trouble, but assuredly he had but little fear of failure; and while his first glimpse of the war at Falaise and at Elbeuf made him understandably frightened, the real question is posed by the contrast between his panic when he took off in October and his fortitude on the morning of his death. And that question, in all fairness, remains unanswered.

A weaker man would have quailed

WALTER MILLIS  
The New York Herald Tribune

Was it justice? One cannot answer in the negative without a thought for all the others whom a modern nation drives to terror and death in war. Can one really distinguish with any precision between those whose personalities cannot stand the strain and those who can? Public sentiment and the new military code are so hostile to execution for cowardice that Mr. Huie believes the Slovik case will be the last of the kind so long as we retain our democratic form of government. But without a death penalty, can men be driven to battle in sufficient numbers? Mr. Huie does not attempt to answer these or the many similar questions which arise. He has recounted the tragedy, simply, movingly and illuminatingly, for what it was.

before the firing squad; the SOP for military executions provides for "a suitable braceboard and straps" if "collapse has taken place or is imminent." Slovik had no need of it, and one of the provost sergeants said, "I came nearer needing it than he did." Whence did Slovik draw his strength on that last day?

Said Father Cummings, the chaplain: "If you ask me where Eddie Slovik found his courage, I'll have to give you the 'commercial.' For two thousand years the Catholic Church has been supplying what Eddie Slovik needs on the day he meets his death. From where else can a little man find strength?"

The Communists indoctrinate their soldiers without resort to religion. Is there not some military specific, with or

without the aid of the chaplains, that will similarly inspire Americans? And if Father Cummings is right, why can not, why should not, his source of strength be applied to the Sloviks beforehand?

#### IV

**I**n *War As I Knew It*, written shortly before his accidental death, General Patton wrote:

One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. . . . I am convinced that, in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk in battle, should be executed; and that Army Commanders or Corps Commanders should have the authority to approve the death sentences. It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousands of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon.

That, unquestionably, is medicine too strong for the temper of our nation—and has been for some time. Even in the first World War, General Pershing's request for broader confirming powers over death sentences than those conferred by AW 48, in order to put him on a parity with the British and French commanders, was turned down by Secretary Baker and President Wilson. We have come a long way from the standards of colonial days, when Colonel George Washington in 1756 and 1757 hanged deserters from his Virginia Regiment in preference to shooting them, because he thought that hemp taught the lesson better than lead.

The decreasing number of civilian offenses for which death can now be inflicted as a punishment by the civil courts reflects a deep-seated national mood. "A man's life is at stake," has a powerful impact in daily affairs, not just in the movies, as witness what is now apparently a standard feature of every capital sentence: the tedious appellate process, the dramatized appeal for executive clemency, the last-minute resort to habeas corpus, and then an application for a stay of execution. The acrobatics in the Rosenberg case last summer come readily to mind.

**A**ND so it is perhaps not to be wondered at that the same currents of opinion have affected military law. Independent appellate review in the court-martial system, outside of the chain of command, got its start when, after the accused had been executed, the War Department first heard of the 24th Infantry death cases that arose out of the

# The Execution of a Civil War Deserter



Readers of *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* found the above drawings of the execution of a Civil War deserter spread across two pages of the issue of January 4, 1862.

The captions under the smaller drawings across the top read, from left to right:

"To the Execution"; "The deserter Johnson"; "Troops passing the body."

The legend across the bottom reads:

"Scenes attending the military execution near Washington of Private William H. Johnson, of the Lincoln Cavalry, on Friday afternoon, 13th December, in presence of Gen. Franklin's division, for desertion and intended communications with the enemy.—From sketches made on the spot by our Special Artist. See Page 102."

Houston riot in 1917. As it happened, the records were legally sufficient, but a holding of legal insufficiency would not have accomplished resurrection. So GO 169 of 1917 varied AW 48 of 1916 to provide that no death sentences could be executed until after review in the War Department. And the Texas mutiny cases invoked another reform, GO 7 of 1918, requiring similar review before a dishonorable discharge could be executed.

Those provisions were codified in AW 50½ of 1920; that is why Slovik's case was reviewed both by the Theater Judge

Advocate and by the Assistant Judge Advocate General. After World War II, all field confirmation in death cases was abolished by AW 48(a) of 1948, a circumstance barely noticed at the time, but which hardly amounted to an accolade of approval for the several theater commanders' stewardship of death cases in the struggle with the Axis. Now, under Articles 67(b)(1) and 71(a) of the Uniform Code, all death cases require mandatory review by the Court of Military Appeals and confirmation by the President, with the result that, in the usual murder case carrying a death sen-

tence, several years elapse between crime and punishment. (In the Guam rape-murder incident, tried under the 1948 Articles of War, where the accused resorted to habeas corpus and reached the Supreme Court, the offense was committed on 11 November 1948 and the accused were not hanged until 28 January 1954.) Thus, as sought to be applied to purely military offenses, capital punishment has become an empty threat: the war would be over long before any such sentence could be executed. In those circumstances punishment has lost its deterrent effect—which in mili-



tary life is its principal justification.

**E**VERY year, nearly 40,000 Americans are killed in automobile accidents, and the number is increasing. The great majority of citizens approve the stern decision that killed almost 200,000 human beings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And yet when it comes to a single killing by musketry as punishment, General Cota himself, whose personal courage is attested by a DSC, said of the Slovik execution which he deemed it his duty to witness, "That was the roughest fifteen minutes of my life."

Is that a reflection of national feeling? Or is it simply squeamishness? At any rate, the same sentiment finds its way into routine military administration. Between the World Wars, an American officer was hanged in the Philippines for murdering his fiancée. But he is listed among the "casualties" in the following year's *Army Register* simply as "Died." Huie writes that the only notification Mrs. Slovik received was that her husband had "died in the ETO." This is not quite correct. The Army knows that the Chaplain who last attended Private Slovik wrote in full to Mrs. Slovik shortly after the execution took place.

The Army's refusal for many years to let the Slovik record be seen rests however on a different basis. The policy, the tradition, always was, court-martial records are privileged, regardless of the type of offense. Whether AWOL, drunk and disorderly, larceny, rape, or what-not, no one except the accused and his family or counsel could have access to a record of trial. Whether, as an original proposition, this was a sound policy, may well be a matter admitting of doubt; after all, the verbatim record of every criminal trial in a civilian court is available to anyone who will visit the courthouse. Somewhat more difficult to explain is why the Army's policy should have been varied for this particular case, why information from the Slovik file was suddenly made available to one who from past published performances was something less than a disinterested scholar.

**T**HERE are references in the book, there has been much talk over the years by JAG officers, about the "fine record" of no death sentences for military offenses in the AEF; and some have deplored the Slovik case for that reason. Well, General Pershing did recommend execution of the four 1st Division death sentences, for sleeping on post and willful disobedience, sentences that President Wilson, on Secretary Baker's rec-

ommendation, later commuted. But was it a "fine record," and does such an approach by judge advocates serve the best interests of the service?

Not all of the 225,618 individuals who were battle deaths in the World War II Army died bravely, but surely the great majority of them did. Why then, is it a "fine record" to condemn the brave to a high risk of death, and then to make certain that those, like Slovik, who deliberately refused duty, should be spared and later released, to be thereafter free to attend to their own pursuits? What is the sense of all the panoply of trial procedure, and all the careful reviewing, if the sentence that has been prescribed and adjudged is simply to be commuted? Is not the prevailing attitude, whatever may be its emotional origin, mightily unfair to every mother's son who, when ordered forward to probable death, goes willingly without flinching?

The president of the court-martial that sentenced Slovik remarked, "There was his confession: he had run away from his duties as a rifleman and he would run away again. Given the circumstances of a division locked in bloody battle and taking heavy casualties, I didn't think I had a right to let him get away with it." How can anyone quarrel with that conclusion? Mr. Huie hints that the sentence might have been different if the court has been composed, not of staff officers, but of combat officers, but this is highly improbable. Combat veterans are understandably more severe with respect to combat offenses, as unit commanders are always more severe as to disciplinary offenses, besides which, the 28th Division had just suffered, at Schmidt, what the *Three Battles* study describes as "a major repulse to American arms." A court composed of combat officers would not have taken three ballots; one would have sufficed, and it would probably not have required much preliminary discussion.

**I**T is similarly difficult to disagree with the views of one of the firing squad, a fine combat soldier: "We decided he had it coming to him. He had deserted us when he was needed most, and his leaving could have caused a whole company of good men to have been slaughtered by Jerry patrols, of which there was plenty running around loose."

Yes, Slovik had it coming to him, but why was he the only one? That is Mr. Huie's repeated question—and one to which the answer is less clear.

When Slovik was being tied to the

execution post, he said to the provost sergeant, "They're not shooting me for deserting the United States Army. Thousands of guys have done that. They just need to make an example out of somebody and I'm it because I'm an ex-con. I used to steal things when I was a kid, and that's what they are shooting me for. They're shooting me for bread and chewing gum I stole when I was twelve years old."

As the legal reviews previously quoted have shown, Slovik's civilian record was a factor in his being denied clemency, though probably not the determinative one, for assuredly his civilian offenses paled by comparison with the enormity—and the brazen effrontery—of his military offenses. Would he have been shot if he had never tangled with the police as a boy, if as a youth he had never seen the inside of a prison or a reformatory? The answer there must be a qualified one: Yes, given the other factors. Slovik was sentenced while his unit was taking a pasting in the Hurtgen Forest, his sentence was approved towards the close of a month that cost the 28th Division almost 5700 casualties, and his sentence was confirmed just when the 101st Airborne was besieged in Bastogne, while the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge hung in the balance. Given the aggravated circumstances of his case, given the timing of reviewing and confirming action in relation to the war situation, Slovik would undoubtedly have been shot regardless of his civilian background. The only thing that could possibly have saved him would have been what he specifically refrained from putting into his clemency appeal—an offer to go into the line and so do his duty.

**S**TILL—why was Slovik the only one executed by his own people? There remains an irreducible residuum of troubling doubt, not as to Slovik—he had his full measure of justice—but as to the others. Were there not many others equally guilty who deserved the same fate? Was the final result of only one execution for desertion in all of World War II fair to the 225,618 battle deaths of that conflict? If without qualms we conscript men and force them to fight and invoke the full sanctions of national power to lead them to death in line of duty, must we not, in fairness to such men, deal with similar lack of qualms with the few who deliberately and calculatingly shirk their duty?

And if we do not, how can we, in General Cota's words, ever again look any decent fellow-citizen in the face?

# The cold objective look

Instead of committing ourselves to either limited or total war, we should be prepared to exert whatever force is needed to preserve our security

## COLONEL SHILLELAGH

**M**ANY years ago one of my very wise teachers said: "Other Americans may cultivate illusions and prejudices about war, but we soldiers cannot afford to do so. We have to fight it, and we must look on it with cold objectivity." That is the look we need today when it is fashionable to take "new looks" at our military establishment.

The enemy of objectivity is hope. Through the ages, men have tried hard to believe what they wanted to believe about preserving peace, and in doing so they became weak, invited aggression and conquest. Hope must be flanked by prudence if it is to lead men to peace.

The pressures of hope in the world today are obvious to all. They have not only complicated the problems of alliance but also have inspired the "new" theories of war. The argument of intolerable destruction is old, but strengthened by the birth of atomic warfare. The objective is limited war. The philosophy is found in four principal theses which are:

- Force is total.
- The professional military man thinks in terms of total victory and total destruction.

---

COLONEL SHILLELAGH is a combat-arms officer who contributes to this magazine from time to time.

- The civilian policy maker must limit the destruction of war to preserve civilization.
- Wars can be limited by forbearance.

**T**HE concept that force is total implies that it is uncontrollable and inevitable. Once man becomes embroiled in the use of this total power, the only end is obliteration for one or both parties to the struggle.

Is this concept valid? We know that atomic warfare has vastly increased the power of weapons and that the offensive air weapons have a high capability of penetrating enemy defenses. Yet we also know that offensive and defensive capabilities are subject to continuing adjustment with the development of new weapons; so that this balance represents a present and temporary condition which is subject to change. The apparent present trend is to increase the offensive advantage.

If force is total, what is the impact of this consideration on war? How do we prevent the application of this total force? Our defense planning has given one answer in the creation of a deterrent capability which would answer aggression with swift and devastating retaliation. Are there other practical and less expensive courses open to us?

Slavery is a possible alternative. It seems to be the logical end of all the intermediate positions. Certainly total

force is limited only by the objectives of the one who holds it. If you grant the advantage to an enemy who wields total power, you hold no escape from his will but death.

There is nothing new, however, in the subjection of the weak to the powerful. It is the implication that power can and will be used to destroy civilization that is behind "force is total."

**T**HE thesis that professional soldiers think in terms of total power and total destruction implies that their judgment cannot be trusted if civilization is to be preserved. This position prepares for the argument that new answers are required and that the new theorists have them.

There is something to this. Some military men and some civilians are so dazzled by power in its various forms that they see nothing else. Such thinking, however, is not in the best military tradition. Hitler was dazzled by power, but the German General Staff was not.

The American soldier has traditionally been conservative in the use of power. His point of view has been to appraise power realistically but always as the servant of the national interest.

There is no unanimity about this appraisal today. Each new weapon brings a new chorus of claims that it has revolutionized warfare, that old forms are obsolete. This was claimed for the

airplane after World War I, for the atomic weapon after World War II. In changing the dimensions of power, the atomic claim to revolution is more impressive than others have been. It has tended to upset the tradition of objective appraisal as military men adjust to this new scale of power. Some are afraid to use it; others regard it as the arbiter of all power conflicts of the future.

As the atomic arsenal grows, there will be tremendous pressure to use it. We must maintain our atomic armament as the essential element of our deterrent power. Must we carry also the burden of conventional armament?

The arithmetic of atomic power is simple. The art of using it in war is far more complex. It is new. The implications of using the atom are uncertain and the consequences of misjudgment are appalling. These factors are apparent in the first eight years of the atomic era. There is serious doubt that atomic weapons can or should replace conventional weapons at this stage of history.

**N**O one can quarrel with the thesis that the civilian policy maker must limit the destruction of war to preserve civilization. In the first place, it is clearly his responsibility, in our country at least, to make the vital policy decisions. The Second World War destroyed enough of our civilization to indicate what would happen in unrestrained atomic warfare.

The danger of the thesis is in the implication that limitation of destruction can be achieved by some agreement of civilian policy makers or by restraining the military leadership. It suggests that there is an alternative to the carefully planned preparedness which has been our shield in the past. Would there were. If there is a cheaper way than our present course to guard the independence and security of the United States, we should be following it. For the objective of military preparedness must be not alone to guard our security, but to do the job as cheaply as possible. If the statesman can reduce the real threat, the soldier can reduce his defenses correspondingly.

Restraint of the military leadership can, however, lead to some very gross mistakes of policy. Policy is properly a framework within which military affairs must be conducted, and it is made by the political leadership of the country. When, however, the restraint spells out details of military action, we can develop a political interference in mili-

tary action which will insure the failure of military operations. It is therefore the implication that civilians should move into the proper domain of military leadership which holds potential danger.

**T**HE thesis that war can be limited by forbearance is popular today, especially among the smaller border nations which fear that they may be engulfed in an atomic struggle. This position has been stated by the Secretary General for the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, in these words: "... As you know, the United Nations, in full harmony with what we believe should be the standards of the future, is an organization dedicated to the principle that military force should not be used save in self-defense and to repel aggression ..."

This position appeals to all who hope for peace based on reason. Can we accept it? Does it stand the scrutiny of cold objectivity? What does it really mean in terms of practical politics and real security?

This "standard of the future" does not conform to historic American concepts of the use of force. In World War II, President Roosevelt did not stop with the recapture of the Philippines but went on to Okinawa and planned for the invasion of Japan. Our armies in Europe did not stop at the borders of Germany but fought on to an unquestioned victory. World War I, the Spanish-American War, the Civil War—all our wars before Korea—followed this same pattern. We then accepted that the issues for which we fought could be resolved only by victory. Victory required acceptance by the enemy of our terms of settlement or the destruction of his military forces or both.

If this United Nations position were accepted by the aggressor-minded nations, a truly great achievement would be realized. It is not. This has been the tragedy of pacifism through history: it is accepted by the peace-loving people to the detriment of their own security and rejected by the war-making people through whom alone it might benefit mankind.

In practice, the suggestion is that the peace-loving nations forbear. They always have, in so far as initiating war is concerned. But the suggestion today is that they forbear after an aggressor has initiated war. Does forbearance at such a time truly promote peace? Or does it promote war?

If the punishment for burglary were mere ejection from the premises, with no arrest or trial or imprisonment, it

seems highly probable that burglary would increase. Under these circumstances, if the burglar succeeded in getting away with the loot, he would achieve his aim; if he failed, he might get hit by a shot, but he would be free to try again at his leisure.

The force for order which police exercise in a community of people can be exercised among nations only by the victors. The United Nations position would persuade peace-loving nations to withhold such force when they have the capability of punishing aggressors. Thus the world would be like a community that does not punish its burglars. The proposal does not seem to define a position that will promote peace.

Moreover, forbearance can be practiced by the peace-loving nations when they hold overwhelming power; but in a closely fought struggle, it could be suicidal. In such a struggle, victory is not something which you can take or leave. The opportunity may come to you today and only today. If you do not seize it, the enemy may win victory and your destruction tomorrow. The United Nations position seems to be a form of pacifism which only the strong can enjoy.

**T**HE terms of public discussion do not suggest that we have evaluated Korea. This tragic struggle has in fact been our first test of war in the atomic age and in the United Nations period. It does not provide answers to all the questions which face us, but it does shed significant light on prevalent theories of limited war. In particular, it bears on total power and forbearance.

It was public knowledge before Korea that U.S. strategy was based upon the retaliatory capability of strategic air forces and atomic bombs. It was clear that our strategic concept was defined only for war with the Soviet Union and that our use of atomic weapons in smaller wars was unplanned. It seems doubtful that the possibility of such small war was seriously considered. This was to be the age of total power and total destruction.

There was a good prospect that the prompt threat of using atomic bombs against the North Koreans in June of 1950 would have stopped that aggression immediately. We may attribute our indecision to the lack of a plan. We presumably had a plan for war with the Soviet Union, but this did not fit the case. Using the bomb against a small aggressor must have raised a whole host of new questions of psychology and poli-



tics and practical application of the bomb which could not be resolved when action was required. Our failure to announce immediately our intention to use the bomb set a strong precedent against the use of atomic weapons in small-scale war. We never reversed this position in Korea.

Thus we have inherited from Korea a strong taboo against the use of atomic weapons. But times have changed. Whereas in 1950 we were practically the sole possessor of atomic weapons, we must assume that the Soviet Union now has them in quantity to support large-scale warfare. The risk of starting unlimited atomic warfare was negligible then, but is real and substantial now. Who first uses atomic weapons today must anticipate the prospect of atomic reprisal.

**T**HE crucial problem in the waging of atomic war lies with the President, who must initiate it. The use of atomic weapons in retaliation involves no new major problems for military men.

Most discussions of total power disregard the very important fact that you cannot control the ground from the air. The air avenue affords great flexibility in applying atomic destruction, but it does not give control of the ground. Perhaps the threat of destruction will cause the enemy to surrender and submit to your orders; but this is likely only if you have overwhelming power and he has no capability of retaliation.

If we had intervened in Korea only with atomic weapons and without ground forces, the Soviet advisor to the North Koreans might have chosen to evacuate Pyongyang and continue his campaign to conquer the peninsula. He might have reasoned that he could establish his headquarters in Seoul, which we would not attack, and accept the destruction of Pyongyang as a cost of victory. Our atomic power could have stopped the North Korean Army if we had enough ground strength to force the North Koreans to concentrate. But we could not have stopped the North Korean Army with air power and atomic weapons alone.

Apply this theory elsewhere. Assume that we are prepared to apply our atomic power ruthlessly against an aggressor until he cries "Uncle." What does this involve for us? Shall we find ourselves inflicting widespread and indiscriminate damage to property and civilians in order to accomplish a mission which could have been accomplished with better effect and with far less cost

### Design Contest Ends 30 September

The announcement of a \$100 prize contest for the design of a seal for the Association of the United States Army has brought in a few entries and we expect many more. We hope those interested will remember that there is no limit on the number of submissions any one person may send in. Get your entry in soon; if you have a better idea later send that one in also. Final entries must arrive at the Association offices no later than 30 September, 1954.

For those who missed the May issue, or who have discarded their copies, a postal card to the Secretary will get you a set of rules.

One hint to contestants—the accepted design will be the basis for ROTC medals, and possibly lapel pins, so there is a limit on the amount of detail the design can carry. In other words: keep it simple.

by ground forces? Would the American people permit it? Shouldn't the prime lesson of Korea be final destruction of the myth that you can control the ground from the air?

General Van Fleet has stated flatly that he could have destroyed the Communist armies in Korea if he had not been restrained by higher authority in the summer of 1951. When the Communist armies had the capability, they had not failed to make a second invasion of South Korea; but the U. N. Command was restrained on the threshold of victory. This was a laboratory sample of substituting forbearance for victory.

One consequence was two more years of war, with higher casualties on both sides than would have been incurred in decisive combat in 1951. We left the initiative to the enemy, surrendered our advantages of superior armament, and fought on his terms.

It may be argued that stopping at the 38th parallel avoided World War III. It seems a thin thesis, plausible in a period of panic but difficult to believe in cool appraisal. We then had an advantage in power which we shall never again possess. It seems more likely that we could have destroyed the Communist field armies, obtained wholesale surrenders, caused a collapse of the regime in China. What are the rewards of victory?

**T**HE implied merit of the policy of forbearance is that you curtail the losses

and suffering of war. There is much historical evidence on this issue, for these ideas are not new. Generally, a short war is cheaper in all costs, a prolonged war costlier. The Thirty Years War exhausted Europe with indecisive struggle; in contrast, Napoleon's quick victories involved comparatively smaller losses and damage. If the policy does shorten the period of warfare, it should reduce the losses of that particular contest, whatever its other effects may be. The test, however, is actual accomplishment. There is evidence that the policy of forbearance will prolong the struggle and increase losses and may lead to defeat.

If the policy of forbearance has merit, there must be some controls in application which will insure that it is effective and not a boomerang. For instance, if we had said in 1951 that we would grant an armistice (and we were winning then) if the Communists ceased fighting and disengaged promptly, we would have stopped hostilities or determined the enemy's lack of interest in an armistice. If the enemy preferred to continue fighting, we would then have had to make that alternative less attractive to him.

**L**IMITED war and total war are dummies. These arbitrary concepts rarely fit into the practical choices which confront a nation.

If we were bent on conquest, we might indeed face a choice of alternatives between the full application of our power and the partial progressive employment of it. The Soviet Union faces such choices today.

As a peace-loving nation, we are interested only in the minimum power required to preserve our security. When that security is threatened, we must take necessary action to preserve it. Whether this action involves us in limited or total war will depend on the occasion and circumstance which lead to the use of force.

It is not wise to approach the event with preconceived notions either for limited war or for total war. The enemy will have something to say about the kind of war which is fought.

If the issue can be resolved with a small use of force, we should use no more. Certainly we do not want a narrow conception of total war to warp our judgment of the event. On the other hand, if the enemy is bent on waging total war, I hope we shall not be prepared—mentally or spiritually or physically—only for limited war.

# A Line Officer Looks At Ordnance

COLONEL S. LEGREE

**A**FTER twenty-four years of Reserve commissioned service in artillery, I have finally had a chance to change my mind about Ordnance Corps and its people. To me, Ordnance was always some vague collection of people whose main function was to say "No." Individual Ordnance officers were usually fine, likeable men, but as an organization, Ordnance offered us high-silhouette tanks when our enemies had low-silhouette jobs, antitank guns that were too low-powered for the job, and AAA matériel that appeared too complicated for its effect.

Much this same attitude, of course, applied to my ideas about the other technical branches. I was told, but didn't deeply believe that the services were on the same team, and tried hard to help the line.

A 15-day tour of active duty at Frankford Arsenal has changed a lot of my ideas. I now work on the assumption that the services are composed of people with the same (or better) intelligence, patriotism, selflessness and diligence as those of the line.

For eighty working hours I toured the laboratories, the shops, the offices and the production lines at Frankford. I talked to youngsters who signed official papers as "John Doe, Pfc., Ph.D.," Second Johns who were as sharp as any I have met in the line, Light Colonels and Majors who were turning down better-paying jobs in industry because they believed in what they were doing, and civilians who had assignments that ranged from research scientist through electronics engineer, chemist, machinist, inspector, and floor-sweeper. All seemed happy at the opportunity to explain to a line officer what they were doing.

Frankford Arsenal performs many functions in a varied field. It is responsible for research and development on projectiles and cartridge cases, artillery mechanical time fuzes, ammunition up to and including 30mm, aircraft person-

nel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes, recoilless rifles, and fire-control instruments. It does process and production engineering for the same list of commodities, less recoilless rifles. It prepares, stocks and issues drawings and specifications for the same list, again, except recoilless rifles. It procures artillery mechanical time fuzes, aircraft personnel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes, and fire-control instruments. It manufactures and/or assembles projectiles, cartridge cases, artillery mechanical time fuzes, ammunition up to and including 30mm, aircraft personnel catapults and canopy removers, VT fuzes for non-rotated munitions, and fire-control instruments.

In addition, the Arsenal is responsible for maintaining and operating the Ordnance facility for the manufacture and assembly of metal cartridge cases and projectiles, and for R&D, process and production engineering, and the preparation of drawings and specifications for selected cartridge cases, projectiles, and recoilless rifle ammunition rounds.

There are other departments that do important work of a similar nature. I can't possibly mention all of them.

**T**HE commanding officer, whom I knew twenty years ago as a tough, capable and efficient captain of Field Artillery, was proud of his arsenal and the Ordnance Corps, but far from satisfied that the ultimate in perfection had been reached. His instructions to me included a request that I keep my eyes open as I toured the arsenal so that I could offer him suggestions for improvement in any department. This is the place to confess that I wasn't of much help to him.

As I went through each department, I approached the tour with the attitude that: "The operations here are designed to help the line. Can I find here any attitudes, procedures or ideas that indicate their eyes are not on the ball?" The answer to the question was, "No, I couldn't." The worst I could find was that some of the people, especially in research, were more interested in the scientific aspects of their work than they were in the application of it—but I'd be

the first to argue with anyone who believes that attitude, in moderation, is wrong.

As a line officer who has suffered through my share of unfilled requisitions, I welcomed the opportunity to examine the stock-control setup for Fire Control Instruments. Think of the pressures on this fairly small group. It handles thousands of line items, through many depots. You want the range-finder for your tank; you're not interested in excuses.

But did you know, for instance, that the taxpayer is telling Ordnance, "Don't buy or build any more of these expensive instruments than you need"? The manufacturer says, "It still takes nine months to make a baby and it still takes X days to make a range-finder." Congress says, "Follow this complicated procedure in making your contracts; we're sorry it's going to slow procurement, but you must protect the government against incompetent contractors, take the lowest bid, help distressed labor areas, buy American, and don't over-obligate your funds. . . ." The Civil Service Commission insists that the procurement and stock-control people are graded too high—"If these experienced people won't take a lesser grade find ones who will."

So the item you want isn't in the nearest depot, the one that the book says services your particular location, and it takes time to locate a depot that has it, and it takes more time to process the paperwork. You're sore, and Ordnance is so tied up in its own red tape that it forgets its job is one of service to the troops. Don't believe it. Ordnance knows what the job is, and tries to do it to the best of its ability—and it has plenty of ability. The trouble is that Ordnance has problems, too. Maybe you could do better. I couldn't. And they asked me for suggestions; they'd ask you, too. They're never satisfied.

**A**NOTHER question that interested me personally was why the long, long procession of different models of practically everything. About the time the using service learns how to maintain and operate an item, along comes an

---

COLONEL S. LEGREE, the pseudonym of a reserve colonel of artillery, has been an occasional contributor to this magazine for many years.

"improved" model and we start training all over again.

This situation obtains because the Ordnance research people, and their development people, and their industrial engineering people, are always looking for ways to get more metal on the target, and to save the taxpayer a buck. And it goes deeper than saving that dollar; the dollar is just a measure of man-hours, materials, and machine-tool use—and these are scarce commodities in time of war. If Ordnance can redesign an item so it costs \$4 instead of \$5, that's a twenty per cent saving in money, but it may insure supply in time of war by the use of more abundant materials, labor of lower skills, and simpler machinery. And if adding Widget Z adds to the probability of hitting the target, you do want Widget Z, don't you?

Each time I saw a new piece of equipment, on the drawing board or at some other stage of development, I asked: "Why so complicated? Don't you people realize we have to train people to operate this stuff and maintain it and repair it—and training time will be scarce in the next war?"

Each time the answer was the same. "In most cases, Army Field Forces gives us the requirements. If they want a rock to throw, of a certain weight, it won't be very complicated. But when they tell us they want to penetrate a certain weight of armor at X yards, and they want to do it with the first round,

at certain relative speeds, with a weapon that weighs no more than Y pounds, and with a round of ammunition that has certain specified qualities—the item gets complicated. We aren't happy about it, either, but if there is a requirement we fill it, and with as much simplicity as we're smart enough to come up with. Even after the item is standardized, if we can simplify it we do so. Remember, we deal with industry every day and we know their limitations also."

They are very convincing but I still think some of the stuff is over-engineered and over-elaborate.

Casually the engineers drop into their conversation: "When I was at Knox [or Bragg, or Benning, or Sill] last week a unit commander came up with an idea we're working on. Those boys use the stuff, and their experience is worth more than all our theory."

**N**O, the Ordnance people don't think we are knuckleheads, even if we don't know which end of the slide-rule bites and which end kicks. They're trying to give us what we want, and they understand the difference between theory and practice. If occasionally they take an impatient attitude toward us and our ideas—they are human and have the same failings we do. They're the experts. Do we give much weight to the recommendations of the armchair strategists and the enlisted veterans?

I didn't have to bring up the old topic

about operating and maintenance manuals, or even spare-parts allowances. The Ordnance people weren't on the defensive on these points; they merely wanted me to understand that when lead-time is cut sixty per cent or more, logical steps often must be omitted. You just can't write a manual from a drawing board. You must know what the item will do, what its weaknesses are, how it should be maintained—all the things that come from experience are lacking because there hasn't been any experience. Logical guesses are not really a substitute for experience factors.

The subject of inspections and quality control is one that Ordnance takes very seriously. Sure we get a defective round every so often; usually when it's most embarrassing. Once in a while something turns up unserviceable in the original package. We have all had those experiences, and they rankle. But, as the hen said to the cook, could you lay a better egg? There is inspection at every step of every process, and the equipment Ordnance designs for inspection is weird and wonderful. Mechanics, electronics and the old reliable human eye examine everything many times. There are gauges that look like the control panel for KDKA, and other testing gadgets that, if I may lift a phrase from many training-aid stories in the *JOURNAL*, "are made from salvaged materials at no cost to the Government." Some of the destructive testing, designed to learn just how much punishment an item can take, simulates battle and climatic conditions to a faithful degree.

**A**LL this may sound rather lyrical. It isn't meant to. It is just that I, a Reserve line officer, had an opportunity to see the other side of a fuzzy picture, and what I saw was good. Suppose we all go on the assumption that Ordnance (and we could probably assume it for Chemical, Signal, Quartermaster, Transportation, Engineers, and the others) is composed of a group of men which contains the same proportion of geniuses, 8-balls and run-of-the-mill Joes as Infantry, Artillery or Armor. We can assume they are trying their best, even as you and I, to perform their stated duties in the most efficient manner possible. The men at the top reached there through the same processes of seniority and selection. They wear the same "U.S." on their collars.

They have problems we don't know about; they know much more about ours than we do about theirs. If we know them better, we can work better with them. They're on the team.

Deft craftsmen with many years of experience turn out models of intricate fire-control instruments in this Frankford Arsenal machine shop





# The Word from the Schools

## THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

### New Commander

Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, former Infantry Center deputy Chief of Staff, is the new Commanding General of The Infantry Center, succeeding Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., who now commands the 1st Infantry Division in Europe.

Brig. Gen. A. S. Newman, Deputy Commanding General of The Infantry Center, has also left Fort Benning for assignment in Europe. Brigadier General Ernest A. Barlow has replaced General Newman as Deputy Commanding General.

### Operations "Trainfire" & "Hi-Lo"

Two major research projects are now in progress at The Infantry Center to improve the individual effectiveness of the combat soldier through training. The projects have been named "Trainfire" and "Hi-Lo."

"Trainfire" has been designed to improve the individual accuracy of the rifleman in combat. Plans call for the building of record courses to study the accuracy of riflemen and the use of certain weapons on different targets.

"Hi-Lo" is a study of failure due to fear. The Research Unit is attempting to determine such things as why a paratrooper fails to jump after he has completed his rigorous training. The Unit will also study the ability of individuals to condition themselves to height. To accomplish this, a mock tower with different jump levels will be employed.

### Reservists Summer Training

More than 3,000 Reservists from the Third Army area will receive active duty training this summer at Fort Benning. The 15-day training periods for the Reservists are scheduled from July 18 to August 30.

Reserve chaplains, Engineers, medics, Infantrymen and members of the Judge Advocate General and Quartermaster Corps will participate in the training.

### Rifle and Pistol Matches

Fort Benning has been selected as the site of the Third Army and All-Army Rifle and Pistol Matches during June and July.

Lt. Colonel Richard H. Smoot of Honolulu, Hawaii, executive officer of the matches, said that personnel competing for berths on the U.S. Army Rifle and Pistol Teams must qualify at Fort Benning to be eligible to participate in the National Trophy Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, August 7-September 16. The same teams will participate in the Southeastern Regional Pistol Matches at Jacksonville, Florida, July 29-August 1, and the Southeastern Regional

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

### ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

*That guns will never be deserted simply because danger threatens is a point of honor around which the artillery has largely built the solid discipline of its corps.*

S. L. A. MARSHALL  
May 1953

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Rifle matches at Fort Benning, August 5-8, before departing for Camp Perry.

## THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

### Electronic Warfare

To acquaint students with electronic warfare (i.e., jamming) and the means of combating it, TAS is now introducing jamming into certain periods of instruction in the field.

Jamming operations are conducted by the Department of Communications monitor station but could be accomplished from any vehicle in the field. The actual jamming is done either by use of jammer devices—specially issued to the Department of Communications—or through use of the 3-position, dial light switch in the "ring" position on any RT-66, -67, or -68. Such use of the switch is probably the most effective means of jamming and may be employed by troops in the field; it is especially effective if, simultaneously, the frequency band is rotated back and forth through the frequency being used. In instructional periods, care must be exercised to insure transmission is restricted to authorized frequencies only.

Gunnery service practices are presently the media for this instruction. Jamming is timed to be coincident with a gunnery problem being fired by radio. Normally starting in the middle of a transmission from the FO to the FDC, the interference is continued for a period not in excess of 4 minutes. During that period, the FO radio operator attempts to operate through the jamming. If operation is impossible, he tunes his set slightly to either side of the frequency being used or turns to the monitor station's frequency to request an alternate frequency. The operator is instructed to wire only as a last resort.

To insure the highest standards for this instruction, the communications instructor for each period notes: (1) the adequacy of briefing given students, (2) action by student operators during the jamming, (3) the amount of disruption suffered by the class, and (4) if the jamming is of instructional benefit to the class.

## Commo Doctrine on OPs

Current communications instruction for battalion OPs requires the installation of both wire and radio communications. This principle is applicable to all howitzer and gun battalions, not to 105 direct-support units only.

Wire must be laid in, in addition to radio communication. (Normally, the battalion Commo directs the nearest howitzer battery to install a wire circuit from its switchboard to a phone at the battalion OP; this line, as time permits, may be extended to the battalion switchboard by battalion wire crews. On the other hand, an additional circuit can be installed from the battalion switchboard to the battalion OP; this solution provides "back-up" communication should the initial line fail.)

OP radio communication is normally established on the battalion command channel, K, for control and coordination of fires with the battalion S3. (This communication may be established by the S2 if the battalion reconnaissance and survey officer is occupied by duties elsewhere at the time; he usually is. Both the S2 and the RO use an AN/PRC-9. If the OP is manned by firing battery personnel, they will switch to the battalion K channel. However, the unit SOP may state that if fire missions are to be conducted from the OP, its radio will operate on the normal fire direction frequency or, when applicable, on the frequency of the forward observers with the reserve infantry battalion.)

### Unit Histories

The preparation and publication of Artillery unit histories—where such histories are presently nonexistent or technically and academically inadequate—has been initiated as a continuing project at TAS. The mission has been assigned to the Department of Publications and Nonresident Training under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commandant.

The project is presently scheduled for implementation in eight phases, seven of which are writing phases. The final phase, the nonwriting phase currently under way, is devoted to detailed and intricate planning and other preparatory activity required for such a vast writing program and is expected to continue for the next eight months. Commencing upon the conclusion of Phase I, the second phase is devoted to the preparation and publication of narrative histories for all field artillery and divisional antiaircraft battalions now in the active Federal service.

The project is based on two concepts: First, unit histories—so neglected in the past—will promote appreciation and pride in troops for the traditions and achievements of their own units. The traditions

of the past will then work for today's commanders and will contribute immeasurably to that essential, *esprit de corps*; and military history for instructional purposes must be grounded in the battery and battalion, where the results of decisions and actions are most immediate.

Recommendations or suggestions are requested and should be forwarded directly to: Chief, Department of P&NRT, TAS, Fort Sill, Okla.

### Variations in Metro Effects

In order to make a limited demonstration of variations in metro effects of successive messages four hours apart, the Department of Observation computed the metro effects during four consecutive days, for the 155mm howitzer, 155mm gun, and 8-inch howitzer. During the period, there were no abnormal weather conditions.

The assumed direction of fire for each weapon was 4800 mils. The assumed range to the target was 13,000 yards for the 155mm howitzer, 23,000 yards for the 155mm gun, and 16,000 yards for the 8-inch howitzer.

Messages were taken on a 4-hour schedule from 0700 to 1900. The effects for the 155mm howitzer and 155mm gun are charted at the right.

Examination of the charts indicates that:

(1) If the metro change is a straight-line function, rounds fired with the 155mm howitzer three hours after one of the metro messages was taken would have missed the target by as much as 140 yards in range. Rounds fired three hours after other messages would have missed the target by as much as 75 yards in deflection.


(2) Changes in metro effects do not follow an established pattern; consequently, it is not possible to estimate on any one day the changes in weather effects which will take place after a 4-hour metro message is taken.

In fact, though charted as straight-line functions, it is considered certain that changes in metro effects do not follow a straight line. It is even possible that the change in metro effects three hours after a particular message is taken will be greater than the change four hours later.


Results of this test confirm those of some 10 or 12, 3-day tests conducted by a division's artillery in Korea between June and December 1952. The tests in Korea were run through the entire 24 hours of the day. It was determined by the division artillery staff that metro changes during the hours of darkness were so slight that metro messages every four hours during darkness were sufficient. However, the division artillery SOP was revised to require metro messages every two hours during daylight.

Incident to verification of the change in metro effects over 4-hour periods, it was again confirmed that metro changes dictate that registrations be conducted during the flight of the metro balloon, if the registration corrections are to be valid.

### EFFECTS FOR 155 HOWITZER



### EFFECTS FOR 155 GUN



# CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

## No. 11 | *Military Missions and MAAG*

**A**N assignment with one of the many United States Military Missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) scattered throughout the world is a satisfying and challenging duty. Countless opportunities to demonstrate Americanism first hand by example and teaching and making more friends for the United States come to officers on such assignments. These officers are in almost daily contact with the leaders of the government, diplomatic corps, and armed forces at the highest level. Understandably officers selected for such assignment (and their families as well) must meet the most exacting and highest standards of professional attainments and social acceptance. In return for hard work and in some cases personal inconvenience there are many personal advantages in such assignments.

United States Army personnel serve with Military Missions and/or MAAGs located in the following countries:

Belgium	Iran
Brazil	Italy
Bolivia	Liberia
Chile	Netherlands
Colombia	Nicaragua
Costa Rica	Norway
Cuba	Panama
Denmark	Paraguay
Ecuador	Peru
El Salvador	Philippines
England	Portugal
Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia
Formosa	Spain
France	Thailand
Greece	Turkey
Guatemala	Venezuela
Honduras	Yugoslavia
Indo-China	

**T**HE purpose of a Military Mission is to aid in the training of the armed forces of the host government. The purpose of the MAAG on the other hand is to administer the military assistance to the host country under the Mutual Security Program. This military assistance is in the form of military equipment, materials and services, including technical and training assistance.

Each of the Missions and MAAGs is a team and positions are established which will best provide the desired as-

sistance for the host government. Many of the teams are composed of men from all branches of the service.

**I**N meeting the officer personnel requirements of the Missions and MAAGs, the Career Management Division must assign qualified officers who are available for an overseas assignment and whose careers have progressed so as to make such an assignment appropriate. Selected officers must be professionally qualified and possess qualities of personality, tact and judgment that will reflect credit on the Army and the United States. In most cases the Career Branch makes the final selection of an officer, but in some instances they must be further nominated to the Mission or MAAG or presented to the host government for acceptance. Normally requirements are received and selections made from three to five months in advance of the reporting date. In those cases where the replacement officer must be presented to and accepted by the host government or must be able to speak the language of the host country, requirements are received eleven months in advance to provide sufficient time for nomination and training of the officer selected.

**M**ANY officers would like to know how they can get an assignment to one of the Military Missions or MAAGs. Special Regulation 600-175-5, dated 12 February 1951, outlines the basic qualifications required for selection. Qualified officers interested in assignment should indicate their desires on the Officer's Preference Card so that consideration can be given to their assignment at the time they become eligible for an overseas assignment. Also, those officers desiring one of these assignments may volunteer for such foreign service at any time prior to receipt of overseas orders by making application under the provisions of AR 600-175. Upon being placed on the volunteer list, consideration will be given to their assignment according to stated preferences, although when they become eligible for foreign service in their normal turn, they automatically lose their volunteer status and are placed on the regular roster for an overseas assignment. This does not auto-

matically bar further consideration for such assignments, however.

Only officers selected for assignment to a Mission or MAAG in Central or South America must be able to handle the language of the host country. Those selected who are not language qualified are sent to the Army Language School for a twenty-three weeks' course in Spanish or Portuguese before assignment. In some cases officers receive this training at commercial language schools. Only in a very few instances is language proficiency required for assignment to other Missions and MAAGs; however, it is always desirable and whenever possible officers with demonstrated linguistic ability are assigned provided they are otherwise qualified.

**A**UTHORITY for travel of dependents varies with local conditions in the host countries. At the present time families may accompany officers assigned to Missions or MAAGs located in: Turkey, Greece, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Ethiopia, Italy, France, Denmark, England, Belgium, Liberia, and all countries of Central and South America. Travel of dependents to other countries is possible only with the specific approval of the Chiefs of the agencies. The tours vary from one to three years, based primarily on the local conditions (specific lengths of tours may be found in AR 600-175).

To aid in preparing for one of these assignments, each officer selected receives a brochure written by the members of the Mission or MAAG from their actual experience. These brochures include information covering all manner of things from how and what to pack to the price of corn flakes on the local market.

From a career standpoint, assignment to a Military Mission or MAAG may well be advantageous. All positions require ingenuity and ability. Some are for instructors and as such are similar to assignments on the staff and faculty of a service school. Other positions such as advisors to commanders and staff officers of units ranging from battalion to army size broaden one's vision and capacity. The opportunities are great for the individual officer and present a unique opportunity to be of service to the Army and the United States.





MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN

## Great Soldier

### GENERAL DEAN'S STORY

As told to William L. Worden by Maj. Gen. William F. Dean  
The Viking Press, Inc., 1954  
296 Pages; Photographs; Maps; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. PAUL D. ADAMS

*General Dean's Story* is a story of brilliant leadership and outstanding heroism on the field of battle, combined with unflinching and enduring courage and fortitude during his three years of captivity under the harshest conditions of deprivation and inhuman treatment.

The story is a character study of a man who had served his country well in peace and war for twenty-seven years, with courage, wisdom, compassion, resourcefulness, and honor.

General Dean's story passes swiftly over his youth and young manhood, describes modestly his earlier but outstanding military career culminating in the World War II command of the 44th Infantry Division, and leads the reader rapidly to the dramatic events of June 30, 1950, when President Truman ordered United States Army forces to Korea to repel Communist aggression. The world did not know much about General Dean at that time, but those in the military services who did know him felt sure that General MacArthur selected the 24th Division for the initial deployment because of its stouthearted commander.

The war in Korea for General Dean was brief and frustrating because he and his gallant band of soldiers had so much to do and so little with which to do it. The best that could be done was to conduct a delaying action to cover the concentration of the Eighth United States Army on the Naktong Perimeter. The 24th Division met the overwhelming hordes with determination and succeeded in its mission at the expense of heavy casualties. One of the missing on July 21, 1950 was the intrepid commander who was last heard of as per-

# The Month's Books

A word about our reviewers this month. Gen. Adams, now Deputy G3, commanded the 24th Division in 1952, and is an old friend of Gen. Dean's. Col. Dupuy, well known to JOURNAL readers, was in the SHAEF public information setup in World War II. Col. McCarthy was a member of the U.N. truce team in Korea and observed many of the events about which Mr. Poats writes. Col. Thomson is an authority on totalitarian regimes, an economist, and a student of international relations. Gen. Blakeley commanded the 4th Division in World War II and is well launched on a second career as a military writer. N. J. Anthony, assistant to a long succession of JOURNAL editors, is no mean military antiquarian himself. Stefan Possony is the author of several books on air power and international relations.

sonally leading a small group of men armed with bazookas in an effort to kill enemy tanks then overrunning the town of Taejon, Korea. Silence fell over General Dean and only now is his complete story available, although parts of it have been told in the press and on other occasions since his return on September 4, 1953, after three years of captivity.

General Dean's own account is as absorbing as any story that could be devised by an imaginative writer. He describes his belated efforts to escape from Taejon; the mustering of the small party at the roadblock and his accidental separation from the party, to wander for thirty-five days in the Korean hills in an effort to avoid capture, only to be finally physically overpowered, captured and held in inhuman bondage for three years. His ability to speak objectively and as honestly as it is possible for a human being to speak of painful personal experiences, makes this book an important study of the Communists which should be read by both military and civilian students.

A most important characteristic of the Communists, as observed by General Dean, was their persistent effort throughout his captivity to obtain from him some form of approval or rationalization for their own

lawlessness and aggression. Their persistence causes the reader to wonder whether the Communists, in spite of their bold front, are not filled with doubts and misgivings about themselves and their ways.

While appreciating his own limitations in evaluating the overall results of military operations, General Dean throws considerable light on the measures taken by the Communists to counter aerial bombardment. In speaking only of that which he saw, he observed that the Communists organized the whole population to prepare shelters, repair roads and railroads, and move large quantities of supplies at nighttime by using rigid traffic control and management. The methods used by the Communists explain to a great measure their success in supplying their armies in spite of the intense air efforts to strangle these activities.

Perhaps the most informative part of the story is the description of the Communist propaganda campaign charging the United Nations Command with employing biological warfare. The account of how the Communists propagandized their own people first, inoculated the entire population and required wide-scale counter measures such as catching flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin, followed by the publicized charges, shows the extremes the Communists will go to in lying to their own people as well as the entire world if it suits their own ends. The brutality shown their own people to convince them of a lie and their total disregard for the truth in trying to blame the historical diseases of the Orient on the UN Command illustrate clearly the techniques and moralities involved in the big-lie technique, which is now a common tool of their propaganda.

The stupid inhumanity of the Communists as described by General Dean is totally outside of the provisions of the Geneva Convention. For example, he was held in such close confinement that he was not permitted to stand up except for the most necessary purposes; when he was sleepless at night he was not permitted to lie down during the daytime; when his physical con-

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

### LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

The Russian officers were usually brave men who were little concerned about casualties, but in the higher ranks there were signs of a kind of inertia. This displayed itself in the formalism and simplicity of the operative plan, which excluded manoeuvring and was obstinately pursued to victory or defeat. The Russians based their art of war on weight of material, and were clumsy, ruthless, and extravagant.

MARSHAL MANNERHEIM

*Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim*

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

dition cried out for fresh air and sunshine, he was hardly permitted to see the light of day; and never did he have minimum food requirements.

One very puzzling aspect of the cruel treatment received by General Dean was the stringent measures taken by his North Korean captors to prevent anyone outside of his immediate circle of guards from seeing him, except for Burchett and Winnington, the Communist reporters.

While General Dean feels that he must have had it better than other prisoners of war, one can doubt that this is so in view of his long periods of illness, solitude, inactivity, lack of fresh air and sunshine, and little better than starvation rations. Good soldier that he is, he worried about his men, as much as a prisoner of war could, and wanted to be with them to help them if that were possible. Even this was denied him.

To be captured, although physically overpowered, was a bitter blow to Bill Dean and throughout his captivity he was troubled by the thought that he had somehow failed in his duty. Nothing could be farther from the truth, for throughout his combat and his captivity he lived up unflinchingly to the highest calls of duty, personal conduct, and traditions of the United States Army as expressed in the words Duty—Honor—Country, revealing himself to be truly a great man and a great soldier.

## The Biggest Story

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:  
THE SUPREME COMMAND  
By Forrest C. Pogue, Ph.D.  
Department of the Army, 1954  
607 Pages; Illustrated; Maps;  
Charts; Index; \$6.50

Reviewed by

COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

The Allied Expeditionary Force in 1944-1945 successfully assaulted Hitler's *Festung Europa*. It was an operation in which the armed forces of the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, and other free nations joined in complete integration for the first time in history under a single high command. Next to the Creation it was, as one newspaperman aptly put it at the time, "the biggest story in the world." Three-dimensional—air, ground and sea—and mounted with infinite care and after long preparation, its scope was enormous, the difficulties legion, and the stakes world freedom. It was opposed by a tenacious, cunning enemy of proved military ability.

This AEF was directed by a Supreme Commander whose task was further complicated by the very instantaneousness of modern communications. Our President, our Chief of Staff, and Britain's aggressive Prime Minister were thus enabled to join with the U.S. Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to breathe hotly down General Eisenhower's neck while France's erratic, intransigent de Gaulle confused the issue to the best of his ability.

Dr. Pogue here relates the story of the

AEF command direction. A spate of personal memories, histories and official reports has issued since the last shot was fired; but up to this time no objective analytical account of the actual operations of SHAEF—Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force—has been published.

The *Supreme Command* fills this vacuum. More than that, from the viewpoint of this reviewer, who by the fortunes of war took an humble part in SHAEF operations from a position enabling him to observe in one fashion or another all the events detailed herein, Dr. Pogue must be congratulated not only for his ability as a historian but also for his impartial objectivity. These congratulations extend also to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, since official histories always go to bat with one strike against them: the suspicion that official prejudices and national policies will combine to exercise censorship, gloss mistakes and overemphasize favorable situations.

The author portrays Eisenhower's problems and his solutions. He has also caught the influence of the even-tempered, pipe-smoking Tedder, balance-wheel of this intricate machine; and of the terrible-tempered "Beetle" Smith, whom Dr. Pogue well characterizes as Ike's "hatchet-man." He has, perhaps, missed the calming influence of Britain's quizzical "Freddie" Morgan who, after laying the foundation of Operation OVERLORD as COSSAC—Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander—cheerfully stepped down in good soldierly fashion when General Eisenhower selected Smith as his Chief of Staff, to the position of deputy. General Morgan's part in allaying the bad effects of what he himself characterized as "this Monty business"—the heated and long-lasting discussions of the Montgomery-Bradley command status—must not be minimized.

No war had ever been covered by the press in such voluminous fashion as was the campaign in Western Europe. Yet, due not only to the exigencies of security but also, on several occasions, to the stupid "heads-in-sand" policy to which all military commands, it seems, are dedicated, the world public never caught the complete picture. What was happening, it seemed, was that seven armies—four U.S., and one each British, Canadian and French—were dashing haphazardly over France and Germany like so many jealous knights errant.

So far as the public was concerned, that nebulous organization, SHAEF, far from exercising real command, was merely a whipping boy for the alternate lashings of Fleet Street and the BBC, and of our own press and radio, when chauvinism overflowed. Dr. Pogue shows the real facts in this matter.

"An alliance is based on an agreement by two or more powers that they will oppose their combined forces and resources to a common enemy. They do not agree thereby to have an absolute community of interest. The success of such an alliance is to be judged, therefore, not by the amount

of heat which may be engendered between the powers in their attempts to find a course of action which will most nearly preserve their individual aims while gaining a common goal, but rather by the degree to which the powers, while frankly working on a basis of self-interest, manage to achieve the one aim for which their forces were brought together. On that basis the Western Powers forged a unity seldom, if ever, achieved in the history of grand alliances."

That, it seems, covers the whole picture.

The author discusses, with complete documentation, the vexing problems that arose before, during and after the campaign—problems which soldiers and civilians have argued hotly ever since the war ended. Principal among them, of course, are the status and actions of Field Marshal Montgomery, commanding 21 Army Group, from the initial action before Caen down through the Bulge and his later insistence on making the main effort by a spearhead thrust into Germany.

"It is difficult," writes the author—and this reviewer agrees—"to sustain the charge that Montgomery wilfully disobeyed orders. It is plausible to say that he felt he was representing firmly the best interests of his country and attempting to set forth what he and his superiors in the United Kingdom considered to be the best strategy for the Allies to pursue in Europe. When his statements on these matters were accompanied by what appeared to be a touch of patronage or cocky self-assurance, some members of the SHAEF staff viewed them as approaching insubordination. There is no evidence that General Eisenhower shared these views."

But the illuminating point raised by Dr. Pogue—and this gives an insight into the reactions and thought-processes of the great soldier who is now our President—is contained in this remark:

"In both the U. S. and British armies it was understood that proposed plans might be debated and various views developed. General Eisenhower encouraged this type of discussion and often invited criticism of his plans. It is possible, however, that he added to his own command problems by failing to make clear to Field Marshal Montgomery when the 'discussion' stage had ended and the 'execution' stage had begun."

When Monty did receive a final directive he gave forthright and loyal assurance that "you will hear no more on the subject of command from me . . . I have given you my views and you have given your answer. I and all of us will weigh in one hundred per cent to do what you want and we will pull it through without a doubt."

The moot questions of Ardennes intelligence before the Hitler counter-offensive, and the later decision to turn from Berlin are both discussed copiously. It is doubtful if the emotionally-minded will be convinced, but the facts are laid bare. The command decision in the first case took account of a calculated risk; in the second

case it followed the military principle of the objective—elimination of the enemy's armed force.

One thing Dr. Pogue brings out with reference to the Ardennes: the vicious crystal-gazing tendency to neglect "enemy capabilities" by an overemphasis of "enemy's probable intentions."

*The Supreme Command* belongs in the library not only of every soldier and every civilian interested in military history, but also of every student of current international events. It is all the more important because it gives us an index to the pitfalls and problems confronting the SHAPE of today and tomorrow.

## Hot History

### DECISION IN KOREA

By Rutherford M. Poats  
The McBride Co., 1954  
340 Pages; Index; \$4.75


Reviewed by

COL. C. W. MCCARTHY

Hot history is hard to handle but Mr. Poats, in his reportorial style, has done an excellent job. One must note, however, that in his hard-pressed effort to make a deadline, he has in some instances failed to do a thorough job of research on his background material.

However this does not detract from the feeling of history related by one who saw it made. This is especially true of his accounts of the give and take military action that moved up and down the wasteland called Korea for nearly two years. Those who are looking for an account of the fighting will enjoy his military style of reporting. They will appreciate particularly the care with which he has given credit and placed blame by carefully stating unit designation in each case. This touch also adds to the feeling of authenticity which his accounts of the action convey. But the "Decision" which Mr. Poats writes about encompasses much more than the military decision or, as some might say, the lack of one in Korea.

By placing together the many decisions, military and political, international and national, which had to be made during the course of the Korean action, Mr. Poats gives a clear picture of what in his opinion was the great decision—one that reached far beyond Korea. In his words, "We had shown that we meant it when we said we sought peace and opposed the use of war to settle international disputes." We would fight when we had to as evidenced by our aid to the Republic of Korea in June of 1950, but after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of billions of dollars, we had the courage to stop when our military strength was at its peak and try to work out a settlement through the medium of a political conference. It was hard to hold this ideal high and rally around it the support needed to keep it before the eyes of the world. It is not quite clear to whom Mr. Poats would give the major credit for formulating and adhering to this decision.



# STRATEGY FOR THE WEST

MARSHAL OF THE R.A.F.

**SIR JOHN SLESSOR**

G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

Bold, dynamic, controversial—this book is as important for our era as the ideas of General Billy Mitchell were in the twenties and those of Major Alexander P. de Seversky in the past decade. . . . Slessor believes that another world war not only *must* but *can* be prevented. The Great Deterrent to Communism, he says, is modern air power armed with atomic weapons, and he gives chapter and verse to disprove the theory that an armament race causes war. In detail he examines such subjects as Russia's fears of our atomic power . . . the inevitability, for the time being, of localized conflict . . . and the fabulous new weapons of 1954 and after. \$3.00

# KESSELRING

A SOLDIER'S RECORD

**ALBERT KESSELRING**

A behind-the-scenes, first-hand account by a great German Field Marshal. Telling the story as he sees it, in plain words, without shading, without apology, his excellent account of the war on all fronts is also a fascinating picture of the professional German soldier's mind. "There is much in this record of general interest to both the military student and the layman. Kesselring's comments on personalities, strategy and methods of exercising high command make excellent reading. A valuable contribution to the history of World War II."—L. K. Truscott, Jr., N.Y. Times. 18 photographs. 7 maps. \$5.00



UNITED STATES ARMY

**COMBAT FORCES**  
*Book Service*





## Pass In Review

**One of the new books** sure to be talked about is Jonathan Daniels' *The End of Innocence* (\$5.00). This is chiefly an account of the Wilson administration (1913-1921) when Daniels' father, Josephus, was Secretary of the Navy, and young Franklin D. Roosevelt was an assistant. Daniels draws heavily on his father's unpublished diaries to give an entertaining, backstage account of those hectic years. This is one of those cases where you get some excellent historical material with a nice sugar-coating of unessential but entertaining trivia.

**Harcourt-Brace has passed along** some gladsome tidings. This fall will see the publication of Carl Sandburg's famous *Abraham Lincoln* (\$7.50) in a one-volume edition. This 800-page book will be a distillation of his monumental six-volume work which is considered by most as the top Lincoln biography.

**Many Army wives** would undoubtedly enjoy the new biography of the President's wife, *Mamie Doud Eisenhower* (\$3.75). This portrait of the First Lady takes up in great detail her treks from one Army post to another and provides an excellent opportunity to compare notes and share reminiscences.

**For some years now** we've been doing business with Bill Corrigan, Doubleday's irrepressible agent in this area. Bill rarely misses an opportunity to plug for one of their books, which led him to give me a call last week and remind me that after the editors of this magazine had selected Bruce Catton's *A Stillness at Appomattox* (\$5.00) as one of the twelve best military books of 1953, it went on to win the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize. Since our readers have expressed approval of the book anyhow, I don't mind falling for his subtle effort.

**Speaking of selections** of winners, I would like to nominate one for the best title of the year. There's a new book coming out written by an ex-alcoholic, describing his jousts with John Barleycorn, entitled *Comin' Through the Rye*. If the book is half as good as that title, I wouldn't miss it for the world.

**All great minds** certainly don't run in the same channel around here. Several of the staff as well as some of our more eminent reviewers have been conducting a two-month discussion on the merit of giving space to a full-length review of Cecil Woodham-Smith's *The Reason Why* (\$4.00). This is a fine and exciting book to read, but the "nays" won out primarily because it is not basically a military book, although one of the final chapters is devoted to the "brave six hundred" who galloped into the jaws of death at Balaklava. The book has lots to recommend it for pleasurable reading. It draws fine portraits of the Earl of Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan who, though brothers-in-law, were bitter enemies. Few books have caught as well the flavor of arrogant British aristocracy of the period, and the manner in which they bought their commissions and promotions. And, finally, it covers in rich detail the high degree of military ineptitude and heroism that resulted in the famous "Charge of the Light Brigade." See why it was so hard to make up our minds?

**Professor Richard W. Leopold** of Northwestern has recently made a worthwhile historical contribution with the publication of *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (\$3.00). Root is best remembered by the Army for his splendid work as Secretary of War in creating the American army's General Staff. He resigned that job in 1904 but Teddy Roosevelt soon had him back in harness as Secretary of State. Root had a relatively unhappy life as an ultra-conservative in a progressive era but nonetheless he made substantial contributions to the country and this study brings him into better focus.

**Last month, I forgot** to mention an intriguing new book called *Confederate Agent* (\$5.00). This tells the story of Tom Hines, agent extraordinary, who led a conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. Government for the Confederacy during the Civil War. There seems to be lots of new material in this hair-raising account of some of the most daring adventures of the Civil War.—R.F.C.

He leaves no question as to where in his opinion the credit should go for the ultimate military success enjoyed. For an old "MacArthur man" it must have been extremely difficult to admit that "young" Ridgway had all the qualities of the old master, including "eloquence" and a greater capacity for military leadership. The book contains a brief sketch fitted into the narrative of each of the military leaders. In no case has the author been unduly harsh or extravagantly praiseful, but by good reporting he clearly indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals, which opinion has, in many cases, been substantiated by more recent events.

Possibly Poats' greatest contribution to current history is the complete account of the imbroglio between President Truman and General MacArthur. Here we have factual recording without a pronouncement by the author on the wisdom of the action taken. All of the documents relating to the case as well as the full account of the Wake Island Conference and the MacArthur utterances which forced the President's stand are included.

Mr. Poats includes a complete coverage of the armistice negotiations without filling the pages with extraneous detail which might detract from the real accomplishments of the negotiators. The limitation imposed by trying to include within the covers of a book the entire story of Korea has forced him to pass rather hurriedly through many of the more interesting episodes involved in the prisoner-of-war exchange and the establishment of the Neutral Nations Advisory Commission. An appendix which includes the armistice agreement will not only enable the reader better to appreciate the problem of the negotiators but will be useful as a reference.

He has probably given too much attention to the Schwable case at the expense of a more definitive account of the problems which faced the Indian Security Forces responsible for maintaining order among the prisoners of war in the neutral zone.

There is some question as to the validity of the blurb used on the cover: "The First Definitive History of the Korean War." History written before the smoke of battle has settled must necessarily be confined somewhat by the inability of one man to cover the entire action. We must accept that until after-action reports have been written and digested and the secret files of departments and individuals have been opened to researchers, a definitive history cannot be written.

Extravagant claims are not necessary. The author and the publisher should be proud of the fact that they have been able to put into the hands of the American public shortly after the end of the conflict a history which will not only prove useful to researchers and students but has a great value in providing the families of the hundreds of thousands of Americans a picture of what their menfolk who fought in Korea did before these same men had outgrown

the uniforms they wore.

It might be well to point out for the record that the 38th Parallel was not selected as the dividing line between U.S. and Russian forces by the Chiefs of State at Potsdam as stated by the author, but was an expedient arrived at at the time that the Japanese surrender documents were being formulated in mid-August of 1945 in order to provide a line of demarcation between U.S. and Russian forces for the surrender of the Japanese Armies. It is not fair to accuse our military and political officers of being so unrealistic as to select a parallel instead of some easily defined geographic boundary for a political division. There are other slight errors in the book regarding assignments of senior officers, but research cannot be perfect when speed is essential.

It is the sincere hope of this reviewer that Mr. Poats' book will serve to fix in the minds of all readers why we went to war in Korea and how we gained as a result.

### Complexity Compounded

#### THE STRUGGLE FOR INDOCHINA

By Ellen J. Hammer, with a preface by Rupert Emerson  
Stanford University Press, 1954  
332 Pages; \$5.00

Reviewed by

COL. C. A. H. THOMSON

Humbly, Dr. Hammer has made "a study of a valiant people and of the tragic situation in which they find themselves . . . (in an effort) to understand a little of the world, in Asia and in Europe, which we have only learned to know at all in recent years and still need to understand so much better." The reasons for our need are apparent to the reader of every day's newspaper; here in Indochina the forces of Communism, nationalism, and colonialism cross in such manner that the free world and the Communist world cannot ignore the outcome. Yet the struggle is being waged not only here; the forces involved respond to world conditions of politics, economics, diplomacy, and fighting. Hence the probability of any particular move in Indochina cannot be inferred simply from a plausible or from a comparable estimate of the interests of the free world. Dr. Hammer has done us the service of detailing, without highlighting, many occasions on which Communists in Indochina have failed to get support either from Moscow or Peking, or from the French Communist Party. Thus, in 1946, French Communists blandly sacrificed the interests of their party comrades in Indochina to the hope of seizing power in France itself.

Complexity is the keynote of the local situation, complexity further complicated by the tangled web of world politics. This irreducible complexity is further compounded by Dr. Hammer's non-chronological approach to her subject. She first sketches the world problem; takes up the situation at the end of the Japanese occupation; then traces Franco-Japanese rela-

### Pride of the Airborne

PARATROOPER. By Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley and Lt. Col. H. Glen Wood. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 96 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50.

Colonels Bradley and Wood have come through with a life-like picture-and-text combination that brings out the pride in accomplishment of the paratrooper by revealing the rugged details of airborne and ground combat training. Although designed primarily as a keepsake for those who have just won their jump wings, this book explains just why the man who drops from airplanes is a little different from most other men.



tions from early in the war through to the end. She then leaps back to the pre-French position, estimating the impact of the French onset and years of pre-World War II French rule. With a look at the thousand years of struggle against Chinese invaders, she details the beginning of the Communist movement and the emergence of Ho Chi-minh. Her story then goes through the war years, dealing with the Chinese occupation, the return of the French with British support, the subsequent negotiations with the French, the demands for independence, and the outbreak of the war on December 19, 1946. The story of Bao Dai and his relations with Ho, the Japanese, and the French is followed by the failure of the attempt of Bao Dai and Ho to find a common basis, and the emergence of Bao Dai, with French support, as leader of Viet Nam. Then come the emergence of Viet Minh into the Communist camp, the intensification of fighting, and the repercussions on French policy and action. A final chapter entitled "Perfecting Independence" brings the story down to early 1954, and concludes with a brief estimate of the meaning of Indochina for American policy and interests.

Several conclusions seem to emerge, although Dr. Hammer herself is cautious about drawing many sweeping ones. The one point which seems to unite Vietnamese is the desire for independence; much of Ho's strength comes from his position as leader of a nationalist movement. The other main pillar of Ho's power is terror. The people of the country are caught between two terrors—Ho's and the French. Whatever else has happened to Indochina, there has been an enormous amount of human suffering there—and not only during the past seven years. Attempts to repel the Chinese invader are centuries old. It does appear, however, that terror alone is not enough. Going beyond Lyautey's maxim that one should show power in order not to have to use it, the French for many years have used terror here. Thus the Vietnamese peasant must reckon with a good chance of brutality from either side.

Could the French really carry out the Pignon policy of setting native against native, so as to perpetuate French rule? The answer seems to have turned on the French reluctance to give Bao Dai—or any of the various possible sources of a national movement opposed to Viet Minh—the reality of power. Dr. Hammer shows in detail the French unwillingness to bring into reality by acts, the promises of independence emerging from the course of several postwar agreements with Vietnamese representatives. Without the French, Bao Dai would last but a moment. But he cannot consolidate and spread his power unless the French give him real freedom.

In concluding, Dr. Hammer reports the fear by many Vietnamese and Frenchmen that the solution to the struggle may be subordinated to the solution of more general and perhaps even insoluble problems of Far Eastern and international policy.

The general import of her book makes dim indeed the prospect that the solution could possibly be made without reference to the broader context. She expresses the hope that Vietnam may become not a Chinese satellite nor a proving ground for new forms of Western colonialism, but a fully independent nation endowed with democratic institutions. The reality of world politics seems to render such an outcome remote indeed.

In many respects this is a disappointing book. It could hardly have been more timely, but it is far from a clear and comprehensive overview of the subject.

Rupert Emerson has contributed a preface which further illuminates the complexities of the choices facing American policy, in a situation where anti-Colonialism and anti-Communism clash, and the balance of effort in Europe and Asia must be drawn. There surely is no simple way forward.

### Armored History

**IMPACT: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division**

By Lester M. Nichols  
Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill Co., 1954  
350 Pages; Maps; Charts; Illustrated; \$7.50

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Veterans of the 10th Armored Division should like this book. It has good maps, excellent pictures, and the text sticks to the subject. The 10th, trained for two years by the late Maj. Gen. Paul Newgarden who was killed in an airplane accident, and commanded throughout its combat service in Europe by Maj. Gen. (now Lt. Gen.) William H. H. Morris, was the first Third Army division to join the First Army in what became the Battle of the Bulge. On the basis of the Division's part in that engagement and the subsequent advance to the Rhine, General Bradley sent a message to the Division congratulating it on its "magnificent accomplishments."

The author, who served in all ranks from private to major, has done an excellent job of lightening his story with personal incidents, and he never forgets that the best tank or self-propelled gun in the world is useless without trained, dependable men to make it function. The 10th, he thinks, had real *esprit de corps* which "stemmed from pride in oneself and pride in belonging to a crack outfit."

### Let It Rest

**THE AMERICAN SWORD 1775-1945**

By Harold L. Peterson  
Ray Riling, Bookseller  
275 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$10.00

Reviewed by

N. J. ANTHONY

Some years ago when the Army saber was consigned to the boneyard, a mighty heave of relief was given out by all and sundry who had been tripped or near-tripped by their own pig-stickers. Now that the sword has been resurrected by the

Navy and Coast Guard, all hands fervently pray that the Army can find no reason for disturbing its rest—not even for ceremonial use. Except on the persons of horse cavalymen, the saber in modern times seemed as outlandish as boots and spurs on a Coast Artillery or Air Corps officer.

Mr. Peterson has placed all American makes of swords, sabers, cutlasses and their relatives where they belong—into a collector's item. He does a thorough job on 186 items in this latest addition to Ray Riling's series for military collectors. His text was reviewed by and has the blessing of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians. Mr. Peterson begins with terminology. (Bless us, he turns up no less than 12 points of nomenclature on the hilt, 7 on the blade, 6 on the scabbard!) Detailed histories and place of deposit accompany pictures of each model of enlisted men's, officers', cadets', diplomatic, presentation and silver-hilted swords, as well as scabbards and attachments. This bookshelf museum ends with a directory of American makers, a list of comparative values, and an essay on sources. Any professional library will be enriched by acquiring this contribution to military Americana. An arms collector's library is deficient without it.

### Malthus Reexamined

**THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE, An Inquiry Concerning the Condition of Man During the Years that Lie Ahead**

By Harrison Brown  
Viking Press, 1954  
297 Pages; Charts; Index; \$3.75

Reviewed by

STEFAN T. POSSONY

Up to now the Malthusian theory has proved to be as fallacious as the cerebrations in physics which assumed the existence of phlogiston and ether. Its fundamental fallacy consists in the oversight that man is not only a consumer but also a producer. Therefore, the increase of population is tantamount to an increase of significant resources. The second fallacy of Malthusianism has been the assumption that population growth would go on forever and probably in accelerated fashion while, in fact, growth rates tend to decline as wealth, industrialization and education become more widespread. True, Malthusianism is based on one correct fact: mineral and vegetal resources are limited.

Harrison Brown, a first-rate geochemist, has produced a very interesting book. He must have begun writing it when he was still very much impressed by Malthusian thought. But by the time we are at page 220, we find that "given adequate supplies of energy, man can, in principle, extract everything that he needs for his existence at a high standard of living from substances which exist abundantly on the earth surface—air, seawater and ordinary rock . . . The resources available to man permit him, in principle, to provide adequately for a very large population for a very long period of time." More specifically, it turns



out that despite minor difficulties and perhaps some space restrictions, a population of 50 billion and even more, could be sustained indefinitely. This being the situation, I may be forgiven for thinking that mankind has more urgent problems to worry about than the apocalyptic visions of economic doom sketched by Malthus and filled in by a legion of imitators.

In spite of the invalidity of Dr. Brown's

basic point, his book is a useful source of valuable information. He has pulled together pertinent statistics on resources and while sometimes his figures may be questionable and hypothetical, he has done an outstanding job of reporting. His chapters on food, energy and raw materials are highly informative and may serve as a handy reference on these problems seen in the full range of their global and time

dimensions. The demographic chapter is more open to criticism and in general his economic and historical analyses are, if I may be pardoned for saying so, what could be expected from a natural scientist.

Insofar as the military reader is concerned, the author has failed to analyze the very serious problems which arise for the industrialized countries of Western civilization, including the United States.

## A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

*This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.*

**AERODYNAMICS:** Selected Topics in the Light of Their Historical Development. By Theodore von Karman. Cornell University Press, 1954. 203 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.75.

**ANIMALS, MEN, AND MYTHS.** By Richard Lewinsohn. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 422 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. The second book in the series which started with *Gods, Graves and Scholars*. A "social history of the animal kingdom."

**APPLIED ATOMIC ENERGY.** By K. Fernside, E. W. Jones and E. N. Shaw. Philosophical Library, 1954. 156 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.75. Of British origin, this book offers a quick background in nuclear physics and discusses peace-time applications of atomic energy.

**BEST SPORTS STORIES 1954.** Edited by Irving T. Marsh and Edward Ehre. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 328 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50. The tenth annual edition, for those who want to re-read great sports moments of the year.

**CAVALRY OF THE SKY.** By Lynn Montross. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 270 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.00. The Marines' part in development of helicopter transport.

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:** An Annotated Bibliography, 1940-1952. Prepared under the direction of the Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research Council. Columbia University Press, 1954. 140 Pages; Index; \$2.00.

**MAMIE DOUD EISENHOWER:** A Portrait of a First Lady. By Dorothy Brandon. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. 307 Pages; \$3.75. An informal and casual biography.

**ENGINEERS OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945, Vol. II, Organizations, Troops and Training.** By the Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific, 1954. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00.

**HOW TO BUY A USED CAR.** By Alexander Walordy. Hanover House, 1954. 93 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.00. Pictures and text; covers both the mechanical and the financial sides of the deal.

**FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF.** By Clarence K. Streit. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 316 Pages; Index; \$3.75. The controversial author of *Union Now* approaches the question from a new angle; primarily an appeal for closer union of the free nations.

**FINGERPRINTS:** Fifty Years of Scientific Crime Detection. By Douglas G. Browne and Alan Brock. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 260 Pages; Index; \$3.50.

**HISTORY OF THE 111th FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, 1917-1919**  
**HISTORY OF THE 116th U.S. INFANTRY REGIMENT 1917-1919**  
Compiled and revised by Henry F. Seal, Jr., The Adjutant General's Office, Virginia National Guard, 1954. Short histories, photographically reproduced, of Virginia units famous in World War I.

**EPICS OF SALVAGE.** By David Masters. Little, Brown & Company, 1954. 234 Pages; \$3.50. Dramatic accounts of sea salvage in World War II.

**HOW TO CHOOSE THAT CAREER, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY.** By S. Norman Feingold. Bellman Publishing Company, 1954. 52 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.00.

**HOW TO HELP OLDER PEOPLE: A Guide for You and Your Family.** By Julietta K. Arthur. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. 500 Pages; Index; \$4.95.

**IMPACT:** The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division. By Lester M. Nichols. Bradbury, Sayles, O'Neill Company, Inc. 344 Pages; Illustrated; \$7.50. A well-illustrated history of a unit that served in four armies and seven corps.

**JUNGLE GREEN.** By Arthur Campbell. Little, Brown & Company, 1954. 298 Pages; \$4.00. Personal glimpses of the war in Malaya by a British Army major.

**THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL MAN-NERHEIM.** Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 540 Pages; Maps; Index; \$6.75. The life story of the strong man of Finland. A great patriot recounts his achievements and explains his motives which had their effect on the present situation in Europe.

**MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES.** By John Alan Appleman. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954. 421 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$8.00. A study of the procedure followed, and the substantive law applied, in war crimes trials at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and elsewhere.

**MY DIARY NORTH AND SOUTH.** By William Howard Russell, edited and introduced by Fletcher Pratt. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 268 Pages; \$4.00. A re-issue of the diaries of "Bull Run" Russell. The book was originally published in 1863. Russell was a correspondent of the *Times* of London

and covered both sides of the War Between the States.

**N.A.T.O. AND ITS PROSPECTS.** By Wing-Commander J. D. Warner, R.A.F. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1954. 110 Pages; \$3.00.

**THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS OF FLIGHT.** As visualized by Bernt Balchen and told to Erik Bergaust. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 214 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.00.

**PARATROOPER.** By Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley and Lt. Col. H. Glen Wood. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. 96 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50. A picture book with explanatory text to make the paratrooper proud and the walking soldier envious.

**REACH FOR THE SKY.** By Paul Brickhill. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1954. 312 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75. A biography of Douglas Bader, the British ace.

**SPIN-FISHING.** By Hal Sharp. Sterling Publishing Co., 1954. 128 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$1.50. A pocket-size illustrated handbook for those to whom spinning is something new. Very little on salt-water fishing.

**STRATEGY FOR THE WEST.** By Sir John Slessor. William Morrow and Company, 1954. 180 Pages; \$3.00. The famous Royal Air Force officer speaks of nuclear weapons and their effect on our strategy both in the Cold War and what may follow.

**TIME COUNTS:** The Story of the Calendar. By Harold Watkins. Philosophical Library. 274 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.75. The history of the calendar and the many attempts at calendar reform.

**U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:** The Supreme Command. By Forrest C. Pogue. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. 607 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.50. The workings of SHAEF from the selection of the Supreme Commander to the closing out of the headquarters. Another in the series of complete and authoritative histories issued by the Office of Military History. A text for future practitioners of coalition warfare.

**V-2.** By Walter Dornberger. The Viking Press, Inc., 1954. 281 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00. The story of one of Hitler's secret weapons by the man who directed Peenemunde, the German experimental rocket station. Its principal value lies in the fact that it offers an account of the frustrations of a scientific organization attempting to function under a totalitarian system.

# Selected Books For Military Readers

ALL TITLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

## World War II

Admiralties (Historical Division) . . . . .	.50
Army Air Force in World War II (Craven & Cate)	
Vol. I Plans and Early Operations . . . . .	8.50
Vol. II Europe: Torch to Point Blank . . . . .	8.50
Vol. III Europe: Argument to VE Day . . . . .	8.50
Vol. IV Guadalcanal to Saipan . . . . .	8.50
Vol. V Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki . . . . .	8.50
Bastogne (Marshall) (cloth) . . . . .	3.00
Calculated Risk (Clark) (paper) . . . . .	.25
Bradley: A Soldier's Story (Bradley) . . . . .	5.00
Churchill's Memoirs (Churchill)	
Vol. I The Gathering Storm . . . . .	6.00
Vol. II Their Finest Hour . . . . .	6.00
Vol. III The Grand Alliance . . . . .	6.00
Vol. IV The Hinge of Fate . . . . .	6.00
Vol. V Closing the Ring . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VI Triumph and Tragedy . . . . .	6.00
Command Missions (Truscott) . . . . .	7.50
Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower) . . . . .	2.98
Fleet Admiral King (King) . . . . .	7.50
Forrestal Diaries (Millis) . . . . .	5.00
Four Stars of Hell (Crittchell) . . . . .	3.75
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger)	6.50
History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Sherrod) . . . . .	6.50
History of U. S. Marines in World War II (Historical Division)	
Battle for Tarawa . . . . .	1.75
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons . . . . .	2.00
The Guadalcanal Campaign . . . . .	4.25
Saipan: The Beginning of the End . . . . .	3.75
The Defense of Wake . . . . .	1.50
Assault on Peleliu . . . . .	2.50
Seizure of Tinian . . . . .	2.50
Marine Aviation in the Philippines . . . . .	2.50
Marines in the Central Solomons . . . . .	2.75
Campaign in New Britain . . . . .	3.75
Recapture of Guam . . . . .	4.25

Payment must accompany your order including a 25¢ handling charge for each order.

We send you bonus coupons worth 15% of your order.

History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (Morison)	
Vol. I Battle for the Atlantic . . . . .	6.00
Vol. II Operations in North African Waters . . . . .	6.00
Vol. III Rising Sun in the Pacific . . . . .	6.00
Vol. IV Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions . . . . .	6.00
Vol. V Struggle for Guadalcanal . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VI Breaking the Bismarck Barrier . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VII Aleutians, Gilberts & Marshall . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VIII New Guinea & the Marianas . . . . .	6.00
Island Victory (Marshall) (cloth) . . . . .	2.00
(paper) . . . . .	.25
Two Jima (paper) . . . . .	.25
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (Kesselring) . . . . .	5.00
Life's Picture History of World War II . . . . .	10.00
Makin (Historical Division) . . . . .	.35
Omaha Beachhead (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.75
Patton and His Third Army (Wallace) . . . . .	3.50
Small Unit Actions (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.25
St. Lo (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.25
Strange Alliance, The (Deane) . . . . .	4.50
Struggle for Europe (Wilmot) . . . . .	5.00
To Bizerte (Historical Division) . . . . .	.50
U. S. Army in World War II (OCMH)	
Approach to the Philippines (Smith) . . . . .	5.50
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations (Watson) . . . . .	3.75

Cross-Channel Attack (Harrison) . . . . .	6.75
Fall of the Philippines (Morton) . . . . .	5.25
Lorraine Campaign (Cole) . . . . .	11.00
Okinawa: The Last Battle (Appelman) . . . . .	8.50
Persian Corridor & Aid to Russia (Mottet) . . . . .	3.50
Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops (Palmer) . . . . .	4.50
QM Corps—Vol. I. Organization, Supplies, Service (Risch) . . . . .	3.25
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare—'41, '42 (Matloff) . . . . .	3.25
Stilwell's Mission to China (Romanus) . . . . .	5.00
The Supreme Command (Pogue) . . . . .	6.50
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo & Schmidt (MacDonald) . . . . .	4.50
Transportation Corps—Vol. I (Wardlow) . . . . .	3.25
War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial) . . . . .	3.25
War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial) . . . . .	3.50
War Against Japan (Pictorial) . . . . .	3.50
Washington Command Post (Cline) . . . . .	3.25
Logistical Support of the Armies May '41 to Sept. '44 ETO (Ruppenthal)	4.50
U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (Isley) . . . . .	7.50
Uncommon Valor . . . . .	3.00
Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Historical Division) . . . . .	2.00
Volturno (Historical Division) . . . . .	.40
War As I Knew It (Patton) . . . . .	4.50
War Reports (Marshall, Arnold, King) . . . . .	7.50
Winter Line, The (Historical Division)	.35

## Civil War

A Stillness at Appomattox (Catton) . . . . .	5.00
Glory Road (Catton) . . . . .	4.50
Lee's Lieutenants (Freeman)	
(3 Vols. Boxed) . . . . .	22.50
Vol. I . . . . .	7.50
Vol. II . . . . .	7.50
Vol. III . . . . .	7.50
Lincoln Finds A General (Williams)	
Vols. I & II—Set . . . . .	15.00
Vol. III . . . . .	7.50
Mr. Lincoln's Army (Catton) . . . . .	4.00
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant . . . . .	6.00
Sheridan (O'Connor) . . . . .	4.50
Stanton (Pratt) . . . . .	5.95

## Other U.S. Wars

Combat Actions in Korea (Gugeler) . . . . .	5.00
Decisive Battles of the U.S.A. (Fuller) . . . . .	6.50
From the Danube to the Yalu (Clark) . . . . .	5.00
General Dean's Story (Dean) . . . . .	5.00
Korea: 1950 (Department of the Army)	1.25
Short History of World War I (Edmonds) . . . . .	7.00
The River and the Gauntlet (Korea) (Marshall) . . . . .	5.00
War of 1812 (Adams) . . . . .	3.00
War of the Revolution (Ward) Vols. I & II—Set . . . . .	15.00

## Handbooks and Guides

Army Officer's Guide (Harkins) . . . . .	4.75
Army Wife, The (Shea) (New ed.) . . . . .	3.50
Art of Clear Thinking, The (Flesch) . . . . .	2.75
Art of Readable Writing, The (Flesch) . . . . .	3.00

## ORDER FORM

### COMBAT FORCES BOOK SERVICE

1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Street Address \_\_\_\_\_

Town or APO \_\_\_\_\_ Zone \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_

☐ I ENCLOSE \$ \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE ADD 25 CENTS TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF YOUR ORDER TO COVER HANDLING AND SHIPPING CHARGES

Please send the following books.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

YOU SAVE 15%. Upon receipt of your remittance with your book order, we will send you Book Dividend Coupons worth 15% of the amount remitted, which can be used for purchasing additional books within the time limit stamped on the coupons. (Coupons cannot be issued with organization orders.) (OF-754)

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Art of Plain Talk, The (Flesch) .....	2.50
Battery Duties (Cocklin) (paper) .....	1.50
Company Administration & Personnel Section (Virtue) .....	3.75
Company Duties (Boatner) (cloth) .....	2.50
(paper) .....	1.25
Food Service for the Army & Air Force (Symons) .....	3.50
Frontline Intelligence (Robb & Chandler) .....	2.50
Guerrilla Warfare (Levy) .....	.25
Handbook and Manual for the Non- commissioned Officer (cloth) .....	3.50
(paper) .....	2.50
How to Survive an Atomic Bomb (Gerstell) .....	1.95
How to Make Sense (Flesch) .....	2.75
Intelligence Is for Commanders (Glass)	3.85
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951 .....	3.25
1953 MCM Supplement .....	.55
Map and Aerial Photograph Reading ..	2.75
Map Reading for the Soldier .....	1.00
Mathematics for the Millions (Hogben)	5.95
Military Management for National Defense (Beishline) .....	6.00
Notes For Troop Instructors:	
Automatic Pistol—Caliber .45 .....	1.00
Interior Guard .....	1.50
Military Courtesy and Discipline .....	1.00
Officer's Guide (MSP) .....	4.00
Orders and Directives (Chester) .....	3.00
Platoon Record Book .....	.50
Preventive Maintenance Manual .....	1.00
Squad Record Book .....	.25
Survival (Infantry Journal) (cloth) .....	1.50
(paper) .....	.25

## Biography

Abraham Lincoln (Thomas) .....	5.75
Genghis Khan (Lamb) .....	3.50
George Washington (Freeman)	
Vols. I & II—Set .....	15.00
Vols. III & IV—Set .....	15.00
Vol. V .....	7.50
Robert E. Lee (Freeman)	
(Boxed set, 4 Vols.) .....	25.00
Napoleon (Ludwig) .....	1.45
Napoleon's Memoirs (DeChair) .....	7.50
On Active Service in Peace and War (Stimson & Bundy) .....	5.00
Panzer Leader (Guderian) .....	7.50
Rommel: Desert Fox (Young) .....	3.50
Rommel Papers (Hart) .....	6.00
Stonewall Jackson (Henderson) .....	6.00
The Head and Heart of Thomas Jefferson (Dos Passos) .....	5.00

## Strategy and Principles of War

Airborne Warfare (Gavin) .....	3.00
Art of War (Sun Tzu) .....	2.00
Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Reinhardt & Kintner) .....	3.95
Battle Studies (DuPicq) .....	2.75
Caesar's War Commentaries (Warrington) .....	1.65
Defense of the West (Hart) .....	4.00
Effects of Atomic Weapons (Herschfelder) .....	3.00
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (Creasy) .....	1.65
Infantry In Battle .....	3.00
Mahan on Sea Power ((Livezey) .....	3.50
National Security and the General Staff (Nelson) .....	5.00
On War (Clausewitz) .....	5.00
Reveries On the Art of War (DeSaxe) ..	2.00

Soldier's Load and Mobility of a Nation (Marshall) .....	1.00
Strategic Air Power (Possony) .....	5.00

## General and Military History

American Campaigns (Steele) Vol. I ...	6.00
Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783-1812 (Jacobs) .....	6.00
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon) Vol. I .....	2.45
Vol. II .....	2.45
Vol. III .....	2.45
History of the German General Staff (Goerlitz) .....	7.50
Makers of Modern Strategy (Earle) ...	7.50
Men of West Point (Dupuy) .....	5.00
Military Staff: Its History & Development (Hittle) .....	3.75
War and Civilization (Toynbee) .....	2.50
War and Peace (Tolstoy) .....	2.45
Warfare (Spaulding) .....	5.00
War Through the Ages (Montross) .....	8.50

## Weapons

Book of The Garand (Hatcher) .....	6.00
Centerfire:	
Vol. I Metric Pistol and Revolver Cartridges .....	7.50
Vol. II American & British Pistol & Revolver Cartridges .....	7.50
2-Vol. Set .....	14.00
Guided Missiles (paper) .....	1.00
Gunsmithing Simplified (MacFarland) ..	6.95
How to Select and Use Your Big Game Rifle (Stebbins) .....	5.00

## Leadership and Psychology

Managing Men (Kraines) .....	2.00
Men Against Fire (Marshall) .....	2.75
Psychology for the Fighting Man (cloth) ..	1.50
(paper) .....	.25

## Dictionaries, Atlases

American College Dictionary (Regular) ..	5.00
American Oxford Atlas (Campbell-Lewis)	10.00
Thesaurus of Words & Phrases (Roget)	1.95
Thorndike Barnhart High School Dictionary .....	5.50
Thorndike Barnhart Dictionary (Thumb Indexed) Special .....	2.25

## Communism

Capital (Marx) .....	2.45
Red China's Fighting Hordes (Riggs) ..	4.00
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (Guillaume) .....	3.50
Soviet Military Doctrine (Garthoff) .....	7.50

## Unit Histories

Under the Southern Cross (Americal Division) (Crown) .....	6.00
Battle History of the 1st Armored Div. (Howe) .....	6.50
Old Breed (History of the First Marine Division) .....	6.50

First Cavalry Division in World War II (Wright) .....	3.00
First Special Service Force (Burhans) ..	5.00
Follow Me (Second Marine Division) (Johnson) .....	6.00
History of the Second Engineer Special Brigade .....	6.00
Third Infantry Division History (Taggart) .....	6.00
Third Marine Division .....	5.00
Fourth Marine Division in World War II (Proehl) .....	5.00
From Salerno to the Alps (Fifth Army) ..	6.00
Down Ramp (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th & 6th Eng. Special Brig.) .....	5.00
Spearhead (Fifth Marine Division) .....	6.50
History of the Sixth Marine Division (Cass) .....	5.00
6th Infantry Division in WW II .....	5.00
Ninth Marines 1942-1945 (Burrus) .....	5.00
Conquer (Story of the 9th Army) .....	4.50
Eight Stars to Victory (9th Division) ..	6.00
Night Climb (10th Mtn Div) (Harper) ..	2.50
The Angels (History of the 11th Air- borne Division) .....	6.00
History of XVI Corps .....	5.00
Saga of the XX Ghost Corps .....	7.50
Children of Yesterday (24th Infantry Division) (Valtin) .....	3.00
24th Forward (Korea) .....	7.50
27th Infantry Division in World War II (Love) .....	10.00
History of the 28th Infantry Regiment ..	2.50
Let's Go (29th) (Ewing) .....	5.00
Work Horse of the Western Front (30th Division) (Hewitt) .....	4.00
37th Infantry Division in World War II (Frankel) .....	7.50
40th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Jungleers (History of the 41st Infantry) (McCartney) .....	10.00
56th Fighter Group in World War II ..	10.00
71st Infantry Division History .....	1.50
76th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Ours to Hold It High (77th Infantry Division) .....	6.00
Thunderbolt Across Europe (83rd Division) .....	3.50
Battle of Germany (84th Infantry Division) (Draper) .....	5.00
85th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Blue Devils in Italy (88th Division History) (Delancy) .....	5.00
89th Infantry Division .....	5.00
91st Infantry Division in World War II (Robbins) .....	5.00
History of the 94th Infantry Division (Byrnes) .....	5.00
Battle Babies (99th Division) (Lauer) ..	6.00
Rendezvous with Destiny (101st Air- borne Division) (Rapport) .....	7.50
Epic of the 101st Airborne (Grout) .....	2.50
Timberwolf Tracks (104th Infantry) (Hoegh) .....	4.00
St. Vith (106th Division) (Dupuy) .....	5.00
Operation Sandstone (White) .....	3.50
History of the 120th Infantry Regiment ..	6.50
Second to None (Story of the 305th Infantry) .....	5.00
History of the 313th Infantry in World War II (Wood) .....	5.00
History of the 363d Infantry Regiment ..	5.00
History of the 376th Infantry Regiment 1921-1945 .....	3.50
390th Bombardment Group .....	14.00
History of the 398th Infantry Regiment ..	5.00
409th Infantry in World War II (East) ..	5.00
Americans (Story of the 442d Combat Team) .....	5.00
501st Par. Regt. (4 Stars of Hell) .....	3.75
The 727th Ry Operating Bn in World War II .....	5.00



**Ready Now!**



POSTMASTER: If this magazine is addressed to a member of the United States Military or Naval Service, whose address has been changed by official orders, it may be forwarded without additional postage. See Par. 16, Sec. 769, P. L. & R. Entered as second class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional Entry at Richmond, Va.

RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED BY THE  
COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL  
1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

## **The Battle History of the 1st ARMORED DIVISION**

**By George F. Howe**

Today's war—and tomorrow's—has been influenced by the successes and the failures of the 1st Armored Division in World War II. The 1st, the pioneer armored division of the United States Army, was our guinea-pig armored formation. Here, at last, is the story of how Old Ironsides fought for more days than any other American armored division, and left a record that is second to none.

**ALGERIA-FRENCH MOROCCO**

**TUNISIA**

**NAPLES-FOGGIA**

**ANZIO**

**ROME-ARNO**

**NORTH APENNINES**

**PO VALLEY**

What really happened at Kasserine? Why was the 1st Armored's T/O different from that of any other armored division? Did Old Ironsides influence the battle at Anzio? Can tanks fight in mountains? You'll find the answers to these questions and many others in this stirring account of leadership, audacity and efficiency. It's the true story of what happened; not how historians wish it had happened. Order your copy now.

**\$6.50**

**Published by**

**COMBAT FORCES PRESS**

**1529 18th St., N.W.**

**Washington 6, D. C.**